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Abstract 
 
This study examines the poverty of the ethnic minorities in the poorest areas in Vietnam. 
We find that the ethnic minority now constitute more than a half of the poor population, 
though they account for around 14.5 percent of the population,. The share of the poor 
ethnic minorities in the total poor has steadily increased from 18 percent in the early 1990s 
up to 56 percent recently. Our decomposition analysis shows that differences in 
characteristics could explain as much as one third of the income gap between the majority 
and all other ethnic minorities groups. Importantly, it implies that poverty of the ethnic 
minorities cannot be solved simply by investment in infrastructures and public services. 
This suggests an awaking alarm for the focus on provision of basic infrastructure and 
public services emphasized in most of the current policies and programmes for ethnic 
minorities.  
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Introduction 
 
The rapid economic growth experienced in Vietnam during the 1990s and early 2000s 
resulted in unprecedented reductions in poverty. The 54 officially recognized ethnic groups 
within Vietnam’s diverse society have not, however, shared equally from the benefits of 
this growth.  Poverty, life expectancy, nutritional status, and other living standard measures 
remain persistently low among Vietnam’s ethnic minorities. Despite comprising just over 
one seventh of the national population, the minorities accounted for about 56 percent of the 
poor in 2008.  Some government agencies forecast that by 2010, the ethnic minorities will 
constitute more a half of Vietnam’s poor population. Widespread poverty and some other 
aspects of economic well-being amongst ethnic minorities in Vietnam has been informed 
in, inter alia, the World Bank’s Vietnam Country Social Analysis on Ethnicity and 
Development (2009), World Bank (2008), and a number of studies as reviewed in Baulch 
et al. (2008), Pham and Reilly (2009), VASS (2007), Van de Walle and Gunewardena 
(2001). 
Vietnam has a large number of policies and programs specifically designed to assist ethnic 
minority development.  These programs and policies have paid attention to a wide range of 
socio-economic issues related to ethnic minority development and are targeted in different 
ways. With continuous supports, living standards of the ethnic minority has been 
significantly improved over the past decade. Income growth was observed with 
improvements in access to education, healthcare services, and basic infrastructures. 
However, what is most striking in the poverty reduction path of Vietnam is that the ethnic 
minority experienced welfare improvements at a slower pace compared to that of the 
majority (i.e. the Kinh ethnic group). As a consequence, the gap between the majority and 
ethnic minority tends to widen over time. 
In this context, understanding on the persistence of the poverty amongst ethnic minorities 
is essential for more effective support to socio-economic development of the ethnic 
minority. There has been a growing literature on poverty of the ethnic minority in Vietnam 
and most of this literature is based on the data available from the series of the VLSSs in the 
1990s and/or more recent VHLSSs. These high quality and nationally representative 
surveys have provided a good background for the analysis of poverty and shed valuable 
insights on aspects of the living standards of the ethnic minority. However, this is 
potentially subject to two important pitfalls. First, the V(H)LSSs are not designed to be 
representative for the ethnic minority, and consequently ethnic minority-headed 
households are often under-sampled. Second, the V(H)LSSs provide relatively small 
sample sizes on the ethnic minorities, making it not sensible to offer disaggregate analysis 
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for individual ethnic groups. Inheriting these two problems, interpretation of data available 
from these surveys and policy implications from the resultant findings should be taken 
with caution. 
In this context, this study is proposed to examine the poverty of ethnic minorities in 
Vietnam from a different perspective. Instead of using VLSSs and VHLSSs as in previous 
studies, we will explore the baseline survey (BLS) of the Programme 135 Second Stage 
(P135-II) as the major source of primary data. The BLS was implemented by the General 
Statistical Office (GSO) in 2007, under the authority of the Committee for Ethnic Minority 
Affairs (CEMA) and with technical assistance from UNDP on the communes that were 
targeted on the largest support programme for ethnic development – the Program 135.1 The 
survey consists of a sample of 6,000 households in the extremely difficult communes of 
Vietnam. The survey mirrors the Vietnam household living standards surveys and is 
considered to be of high quality.2 Since the BLS was completed, the dataset has bene used 
intensively in provide mid-term review assessment of the P135-II as reflected in Pham et 
al. (2009a) or UNDP-CEMA (2009). According to their throughout analysis, this baseline 
is arguably the most comprehensive survey on ethnic minorities available to date (see 
Annex 1 for details on the BLS).3 
Given this perspective, this report is proposed for answering the following main research 
questions:4 
(i) Question 1: What are the main characteristics, both income and non-income, of the 
poor ethnic minorities?  
(ii) Question 2: What are the disadvantages of the poor ethnic minoroties in accessing 
to public services and basic infrastructures?  
(iii) Question 3: How the poor ethnic minorities earn their income? What are the 
determinants of income gaps across different ethnic groups? 
                                                 
1
 As the survey was undertaken one and a half year after the start of the P135-II, it is not strictly a ‘baseline’. 
The survey provides a rich pool of information on the P135-II targeted communes in the early stages of 
implementation. This could be explored to develop a benchmark for evaluating the impacts of the Program. 
2
 The rounds of the Vietnam’s VLSSs and VHLSS over the past two decades are based on the general 
methodology of the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS). This LSMS has been 
implemented in most of developing countries in order to provide high-quality data on household living 
standards (see www.worldbank.org/lsms for more details). 
3
 The terms of reference for this study also stated that the data available from the Citizen Report Cards survey 
for the MTR of the P135-II and the NTP-PR should be used. However, as this survey mainly focused on the 
satisfaction of the beneficiaries on the support received from the P135-II, this data source is not really 
relevant for the purposes of this study. Instead, the BLS will be used as the main dataset. When appropriate, 
data from the V(H)LSSs will also be used to draw comparisons. 
4
 These research questions are proposed on the basic of the requirements set in the original TOR for this 
research. It should be noted that there are a number of requirements as stated in the TOR and this six research 
questions are proposed to capture these requirements. 
6 
 
(iv) Question 4: How the current policies and programmes have supported the poor 
ethnic minorities in improving their living standards? 
(v) Question 5: What suggestions could be drawn for future policies and programmes 
to support poverty reduction for the ethnic minorities? 
Given these objectives, this report aims at three important aspects on the living standards 
of the ethnic minorities. Firstly, the report will depict a comprehensive  poverty situation 
and economic well-being of ethnic groups in the extremely difficult communes. The focus 
will be placed on both income poverty and other non-monetary aspects of economic well-
being (e.g. access to education, healthcare services, support initiatives etc.). Secondly, the 
report will examine the determinants of the income gap between the majority and different 
ethnic minority groups. This will contribute to the growing literature on the ethnic welfare 
gap in Vietnam by decomposing the income gap into two components, one is attributed to 
the differences in ‘characteristics’ across the ethnic groups; the other is attributed to 
differences to ‘returns’ to these characteristics. The third important aspect is to investigate 
how the poor ethnic minorities have been supported by the current policies and 
programmes. And importantly, as a result of the analysis of this report, this will also cover 
the set of recommendations for future policies and programmes to support improvements 
in living standards for the ethnic minorities. 
This study employs a variety of methodologies.5 For the first two questions, descriptive 
analysis using statistical references will be used to inform both at average and a number of 
disaggregate dimensions. At the average, the analysis will provide a narrative of the 
characteristics of the poor ethnic minorities as a broad ethnic minority group in comparison 
with the majority group.6 In addition to this majority-minority dimension, the current 
report adopts other five dimensions for the analysis. Given the high concentration of the 
ethnic minority in this area, we aim at providing the analysis at the most disaggregate level 
of ethnicity possible (in addition to the conventional ‘majority-minority’ classification), 
taking into account the size of the sub-samples for individual ethnic groups. In order to 
make statistically meaningful references, any individual ethnic groups having more than 
100 observations in the sample of the BLS are treated as a separate ethnic group. 
Therefore, the report adopts a classification of 14 ethnic groups, including the Kinh (or the 
                                                 
5
 To keep the focus of this study as a policy-oriented research, we are not going to provide a detailed 
description of methodologies or data sources adopted in a separate chapter as observed in other typical 
research papers on poverty in Vietnam. Instead, the essentials of the approaches used are summarized in this 
Introduction section; the other details are provided in the annexes for the reader with technical backgrounds. 
6
 It is noted that the term ‘minority’ is used in this analysis to facilitate comparison with the economic 
literature on Vietnam, that is commonly used the term ‘minority’ to refer to the different ethnic minorities 
groups. However, the sample of observations covered in the BLS consist of 22 percent of the Kinh 
households and the remaining are ethnic minority-headed households. Therefore, the ethnic minority in our 
dataset is actually the ‘majority’ in the poorest communes. 
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majority),7 Tay, Thai, Muong, Nung, Dao, Mong, ‘others in the Northern Uplands’, Bana, 
H’re, Co Tu, ‘others in the Central Highlands’, Khmer, and finally other ethnic groups (i.e. 
the other groups that not reside in the Northern Uplands or Central Highlands).8 It is 
desirable to provide analysis on further disaggregate ethnic classification. However, this is 
constrained by data availability (see Annex 2 for further details). 
In addition to the ethnicity dimension, Vietnamese language ability is selected as the 
another dimension for the analysis in this study. It is generally recognized that Vietnamese 
language ability of the ethnic minorities is a potentially important factor for their 
integration in the society and thus living conditions. We will thus adopt the three levels of 
Vietnamese language proficiency. Moreover, gender of household heads could be an 
important driver of decision making processes within households, and thus we will also 
consider this as an important dimension of the analysis. We take into account spatial 
differences in living conditions by providing detailed indicators according to regions and 
by  geographical characteristics (i.e. whether communes are coastal and delta or other 
types, which include midland or mountainous communes). This study will distinguish 
between the poor and the non-poor when embarking the analysis in all the chapters. 
Further details on these dimensions of analysis are given in Annex 2.  
For the third research question, the report will adopt the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition 
approach as commonly used in the previous studies on the welfare gaps across ethnic 
groups in Vietnam (see for instance Baulch et al. 2008; Pham et al. 2009b for a review of 
the studies using this approach). Accordingly, the overall average differential in income 
per capita  between the ethnic groups will be decomposed into a part attributable to 
differences in characteristics between the ethnic groups (known as the ‘explained’ or 
‘endowment’ component) and a part attributable to differences in the estimated returns to 
characteristics between these groups (known as the ‘treatment’ or ‘unexplained’ 
component). The ‘characteristics’ in the former consists of household features (e.g. 
household demographic characteristics, human capital, household assets such as 
landholding, household access to infrastructures). Returns to these characteristics in the 
latter refers to the benefits that household have received from the above characteristics (see 
Annex 3 for the details of this approach). 
                                                 
7
 The Hoa households account for very small size in the sample (i.e. there were 42 Hoa households surveyed 
in the BLS), separating Hoa as an individual group is thus not statistically sensible. We’ve tried to separate 
the Hoa from the Kinh-Hoa to check if this would introduce any significant differences from the figures 
reported in this study but this is not the case. Therefore, we consider Hoa in the Majority group to facilitate 
comparison with the previous studies. 
8
 It is important to note that this classification is simply based on technically statistically reasons rather than 
any ethological background. 
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For the fourth research question, a desk study approach is employed to review the existing 
plethora of policies and programmes to support poverty reduction for the poor ethnic 
minorities. This should be noted that this report is not proposed to provide a 
comprehensive review of the policies and programmes that aim at improving living 
standards for the ethnic minorities. Instead, the report will highlight the ‘gap’ or the 
‘mismatch’ between the current policies and programmes and the characteristics of the 
poor ethnic minorities. The focus will be placed on what areas of interventions that have 
not been effectively covered by the current plethora of policies and programmes to support 
improvements in the living standards of the poor ethnic minorities.  
For the fifth research question, answering the above four research questions will provide 
the background to draw suggestions for future policies and programmes to support poverty 
reduction for the poor ethnic minorities. In this regard, this report is expected to provide 
input for the policy dialogue among different stakeholders for supporting poverty reduction 
for the poor ethnic minorities in the coming years, especially for the next stage of the P135 
and poverty reduction framework for the period 2011-2020. 
The structure of the current report can be now outlined. Chapter 1 will depict a 
comprehensive  poverty situation and economic well-being of the ethnic minorities in the 
extremely difficult communes under the coverage of the P135, with as much 
disaggregating for different ethnic minority groups as possible. The focus will be placed on 
both income poverty and other non-monetary aspects of economic well-being. The 
subsequent chapters will cover most important aspects of living standards of household 
residing in the extremely difficult communes of the country. In particular, Chapter 2 will 
focus on access to public services with a focus on access to public services, with a focus on 
education, healthcare, and other basic infrastructures. Chapter 3 will investigate major 
livelihoods activities pursued by the households in this area to earn their living. Chapter 4 
provides in-depth insights on the income gap between different ethnic groups. This chapter 
will re-examine the welfare gap amongst ethnic groups, which has been the subject of a 
number of previous studies using the V(H)LSSs. A review of and suggestions for policies 
and programmes to support poverty reduction of the ethnic minorities will be provided in 
the final chapter of the report. 
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Chapter 1. Poverty Profile of the Poor Ethnic Minorities 
 
This chapter reports poverty profile of the households residing in the communes under the 
coverage of the P135-II – this is to answer the first research question. Conventionally, 
there are two approaches to measuring poverty commonly used in Vietnam. One advocated 
by the World Bank is based on expenditure welfare measure; the other is income-based 
measure which is currently used by MOLISA and other authorities in Vietnam. As the BLS 
does not collect expenditure data, this study will thus rely on income as the welfare 
measure for its analysis. The next section will contextualize by providing an overview of 
poverty of the ethnic minorities in the country as a whole before moving the focus to the 
poor ethnic minorities in the P135-II communes. The second section will concentrate on 
inequality indicators to describe the inequality situation in the extremely difficult 
communes. To supplement for the analysis of monetary aspects of poverty in the first two 
sections, the final section will focus on some non-income aspects of living standards of the 
poor ethnic minorities. 
1.1 Poverty in Vietnam as an ethnic phenomenon 
To contextualize the poverty profile of the ethnic minority in the extremely difficult 
communes, it is useful to start with an overview of poverty of the ethnic minority in the 
country as a whole. Vietnam has made great strides in reducing the poverty rate, from 
nearly 58 percent of the population in 1993 to less than 16 percent in 2006. Figure 1.1 
shows that the ethnic minority has however experienced lower rates of poverty reduction 
than the general population. In 2006, 52 percent of ethnic minorities lived under poverty 
line; while the corresponding figure for the majority is 10 percent.9 What is most worrying 
is that the share of the ethnic minority in the poor population has monotonically increased 
over time. As shown by the round dots in Figure 1.1, only 18 percent of the poor was 
ethnic minority-headed households in the early 1990s, the corresponding figure for 1998 
was 29 percent, for 2004 was 39 percent, and most recently 47% in 2006 (using data from 
the V(H)LSSs). Accounting for around 14.5 percent of the population, the ethnic minority 
now constitute more than a half of the poor population. Given this, poverty will be a 
particularly a phenomenon of ethnic minorities in the future.  
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 In this part of the analysis, the WB-GSO poverty lines which mirror international standards. The general 
poverty line is based upon the food poverty line but allows for minimum non-food expenditure. The food 
poverty line is calculated as the expenditure required, given Vietnamese food consumption patterns, to 
deliver 2100 calories per person per day. These measures are absolute poverty lines and are constant in real 
terms over time. The basket of goods used to calculate the poverty lines is the same from year to year with 
adjustments only made to the prices used to estimate the expenditure required to purchase that basket. 
 Figure 1.1 Poverty evolution in Vietnam
Source: authors’ calculations based on the V(H)LSSs and the BLS
Poverty headcounts of the households in the 
reported in Figure 1.1 (on the second vertical axis), through poverty figures are not 
compatible as the national average were based on expenditure data as the welfare measure 
available from the V(H)LSS while those of t
poverty measure.10 It is noted that there is a big gap in pover
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gap is not as large as observed for the
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while the national average gap was 42 percentage points in 2006. This suggests that 
through Vietnam has achieved g
persistent for the ethnic minority and there is a danger that poverty could be an ethnic 
minority phenomenon in the future.
Given this overall picture, Table
extremely difficult communes
we calculated the head count index, poverty gap and poverty severity for the official 
poverty line. On average, 
living in poverty in 2007. This is considerably higher than the national average poverty 
rate using the same poverty line. It is noted that p
ethnic minorities rather than with 
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Figure 1.2 Poverty is severe for some ethnic groups
Source: drawn from the data calculated from the BLS
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proposed recently by MOLISA (i.e. VND 300,000/per person/per month),11 all the 
headcount indices will be higher by an order of more than 20 percentage points. In 
particular, it will translate to a poverty rate of 63 percent in the extremely difficult 
communes, and a poverty index of 70 percent for the ethnic minority in this area. Most 
importantly, poverty rates in most of the ethnic groups in the Northern Uplands and 
Central Highlands will be between 70 to 90 percent. 
Table 1.1: Poverty in the extremely difficult communes (% and decimal) 
    2005 poverty line 2007 CPI-
adjusted 
Headcount 
index  
Headcount 
index based 
on drafted 
poverty line 
  
Headcount 
index 
Poverty 
gap 
Poverty 
severity 
Average 42.7 0.2 0.9 53.1 63.1 
Ethnic groups 
  
Majority 27.1 0.2 2.5 37.1 47.6 
Other ethnicities 50.3 0.2 0.1 60.9 70.7 
    
Tay 45.7 0.2 0.1 59.6 68.3 
    
Thai 49.1 0.2 0.1 57.5 70.6 
    
Muong 44.0 0.1 0.1 54.4 63.9 
    
Nung 51.3 0.2 0.1 59.8 71.9 
    
Mong 73.8 0.3 0.2 82.6 89.1 
    
Dao 49.4 0.2 0.1 66.2 76.6 
    
Others in Northern Uplands 51.2 0.2 0.1 62.1 72.8 
    
Bana 57.7 0.2 0.1 71.9 80.7 
    
H're 60.8 0.2 0.1 73.6 81.0 
    
Co Tu 49.8 0.2 0.1 63.8 71.0 
    
Others in Central Highlands 61.6 0.3 0.2 71.5 81.4 
    
Khmer 28.4 0.1 0.2 34.7 44.9 
    
Others 57.1 0.2 0.1 68.9 80.4 
Regions 
  
Red River Delta 37.5 0.1 0.1 49.6 61.9 
  
North East 51.2 0.2 1.6 63.0 72.3 
  
North West 48.8 0.2 0.2 58.3 68.6 
  
North Central Coast 47.8 0.2 0.1 57.6 68.4 
  
South Central Coast 47.3 0.2 0.1 60.7 67.9 
  
Central Highlands 41.8 0.2 0.1 52.8 62.3 
  
South East 26.0 0.3 1.6 37.8 49.6 
  
Mekong River Delta 26.3 0.2 1.2 33.9 44.7 
Gender of household heads 
  
Male 44.3 0.2 1.0 54.8 65.2 
  
Female 33.1 0.2 0.1 42.9 50.9 
Daily language           
  
No or little Viet 53.8 0.2 0.1 64.2 73.5 
  
Both Viet and ethnic 44.0 0.2 0.1 54.9 65.7 
  
No or little ethnic 28.7 0.2 2.2 38.9 49.3 
                                                 
11
 Currently, the MOLISA is proposing a new poverty line for the period 2011-2015. The new poverty line is 
proposed to be 350,000 dong/person/month for rural households and 450,000 dong/person/month for urban 
households. 
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Poor vs. non-poor 
  
Poor 62.6 0.3 0.2 73.1 81.3 
  
Non-poor 28.6 0.2 1.4 38.9 50.2 
Source: authors’ calculation from the BLS 
In addition to the headcount index, which shows the percentage of the population having 
their income lower than the poverty line, used in the above analysis, the poverty gap index 
provide an indication on the cost of eliminating poverty. The Mong group not only 
comprises of the most poor households but also is the one with the highest ‘cost’ of 
eliminating poverty. On average, it costs 29 percent of the poverty line per person to pull a 
Mong household out of poverty. In addition, the most poverty-reduction costly groups 
include the other groups in the Central Highlands (27 percent), and the other minorities (24 
percent). Despite having the lowest poverty rate, the cost of eliminating poverty for the 
poor Majority is as high as that of the H’re, who ranked at the bottom two as the poorest 
ethnic groups. The households with the lowest cost of fighting against poverty consist of 
the Tay, Muong, Nung, Dao, and Khmer. 
There is a spatial pattern in poverty across the country. The Northern Uplands remain the 
poorest areas, ranked before the Central Coast and Central Highlands. Poverty also varied 
with levels of Vietnamese language proficiency. Those who had no or limited Vietnamese 
language ability were found amongst the poorest (i.e. 54 percent of them living under the 
poverty line). Those who spoke both Vietnamese and ethnic languages were found as poor 
as the average household in the poorest commune. And the those who spoke only 
Vietnamese and/or very little ethnic languages are the most better-off (the poverty rate of 
this group is almost identical to the Majority). In addition, there is also a considerable 
difference in the incidence of poverty across the two gender groups of household heads. As 
shown in Table 1.1, nearly 44 percent of the male-headed households were poor while the 
poverty rate of the female-headed was only 33 percent.  
The final rows of Table 1.1 suggest important policy implications. In these two final rows, 
we calculated poverty rate using the income data collected from households for one group 
who was classified as ‘poor’ and the other classified as ‘non-poor’. What matters is that the 
‘poor’ group are eligible for support from poverty reduction policies and programmes 
while the non-poor are not. Whether a household is classified as ‘poor’ or ‘non-poor’ in 
this case is approved by the authorities. We found that only 62 percent of the ‘poor’ group 
was actually poor. It implies a leakage rate of 38 percent, suggesting that 38 percent of the 
poor who have received support from poverty reduction programmes were actually not 
eligible for having those support. In addition, we reported 28 percent of the non-poor was 
actually poor, but were excluded from the supports that they should have received. This 
high leakage rate raises a serious question on the targeting efficacy of the current poverty 
14 
 
reduction policies and programmes in the extremely difficult communes of the country. 
This study is not the first to raise this question. Similar concerns were suggested in 
MOLISA-CEMA-UNDP (2009) when assessing the Programme 135-II and the National 
Targeted Program for Poverty Reduction (NTP-PR). 
1.2 Inequality: the ethnic minorities lagging behind  
Along with the poverty level which shows the percentage of the population living under a 
certain level of income, how income is distributed is also interesting to investigate. The 
central question is whether income has been equally distributed among the population. 
This is referred to as the analysis of inequality. Together with poverty reduction, inequality 
has been receiving growing attention in Vietnam as increase in economic growth is likely 
to result in disproportionate changes in living standard of different groups, suggesting an 
increasing inequality. The most widely used measure of inequality is the Gini coefficient 
which ranges between zero and one. The closer to zero, the more equally income is 
distributed; and the closer to 1one the less equally income is distributed. In addition to the 
Gini coefficient which is considered as a relative measure of income inequality, we also 
analyze the distribution of income in the extremely difficult communes using absolute 
measures of inequality such as percentile dispersion ratios. Using the Gini index, one of the 
most common measures of relative inequality, World Bank (2007) using expenditure per 
capita reported that the Gini rose from 0.34 in 1993 to 0.35 in 1998 and 0.37 in 2006, 
showing a modest increase over this period. 
One of the most commonly mentioned aspects of this growing inequality is the ethnicity 
inequality. Between 1993 and 2006, Vietnam’s national poverty headcount fell from 58.1 
to 16 percent, while educational enrolments, life expectancy and other measures of human 
development increased dramatically.  In the same period, the poverty headcount rate 
among Vietnam’s broadly defined ethnic minorities fell from 86.4 to 52 percent between 
1993 and 2006. School enrolments, nutritional indicators and life expectancy also remain 
low among the minorities (VASS, 2007; World Bank 2007). According to Baulch et al. 
(2008b), the gap in per capita expenditure between the Majority and minority has widened 
by nearly 15 percentage points between 1993 and 2004. The previous research on 
inequality in Vietnam has however been based on expenditure. Using income data 
calculated from the BLS, this section provides another picture of inequality in the P135-II 
communes. 
In Table 1.2 we report the estimates of the inequality measures for the whole sample of the 
extremely difficult communes, as well as for sub-groups identified by ethnicities, regions, 
gender of the household head, languages used in the daily life and self-declared poverty 
status. The average GINI coefficient based on the baseline survey data is 0.52, suggesting 
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that the relative inequality of income distribution is fairly high in the extremely difficult 
communes of the country. For comparison, we estimated the income-base inequality 
measures using the rural sample of the VHLSS 2006. For the rural areas, we found the Gini 
of 0.40, which is significantly lower than the Gini coefficient in the extremely difficult 
communes. This difference could be taken to suggest an important policy implication. 
Using the BLS on the extremely difficult communes, one of the prior assumption is that 
inequality in this poorest areas should be lower than the national average. However, what 
reported in this study suggests the opposite. Using the income data, the level of inequality 
in the extremely difficult communes is surprisingly higher than that of the rural average. 
This suggests a difficult task for the Government and donors. Further efforts are clearly 
needed to reduce the widespread poverty in these extremely difficult communes. But high 
inequality certainly warrants attention to deal with unequal income distribution in this 
areas. 
Table 1.2 Income distribution in the extremely difficult communes 
  Gini p90/p10 p75/p25 GE(0) 
Average 0.5 7.8 2.8 0.5 
Ethnic groups 
Majority 0.6 9.2 3.0 0.7 
Ethnic minority 0.4 6.0 2.6 0.3 
  
Tay 0.4 6.1 2.6 0.3 
  
Thai 0.4 6.9 2.7 0.3 
  
Muong 0.4 6.0 2.7 0.3 
  
Nung 0.4 4.8 2.1 0.2 
  
Mong 0.3 4.0 2.0 0.1 
  
Dao 0.3 5.0 2.1 0.2 
  
Others in Northern Uplands 0.4 6.4 2.7 0.2 
  
Bana 0.3 5.7 2.6 0.2 
  
H're 0.3 4.4 1.9 0.2 
  
Co Tu 0.3 3.9 2.7 0.2 
  
Others in Central Highlands 0.4 6.9 2.6 0.3 
  
Khmer 0.4 8.3 2.4 0.3 
  
Others 0.4 6.8 2.7 0.3 
Regions 
  
Red River Delta 0.4 6.4 2.7 0.2 
  
North East 0.3 5.7 2.6 0.2 
  
North West 0.3 4.4 1.9 0.2 
  
North Central Coast 0.3 3.9 2.7 0.2 
  
South Central Coast 0.4 6.9 2.6 0.3 
  
Central Highlands 0.4 8.3 2.4 0.3 
  
South East 0.4 6.8 2.7 0.3 
  
Mekong River Delta 0.5 7.5 2.8 0.5 
 Gender of household heads 
  
Male 
  
Female 
Daily language 
  
No or little Viet 
  
Both Viet and ethnic 
  
No or little ethnic 
Poor vs. non-poor 
  
Poor 
  
Non-poor 
Source: authors’ calculation from the BLS
Figure 1.3 below shows the estimates of the Theil’s L index (the Generalized Entropy with 
the weighting parameter equal to zero) of the whole sample in the 
communes and the sub-samples for the 
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scores. Since the majority account for nearly 90 percent of the population, the dominance 
of the majority is, however, not surprising. 
Across the spatial regions, the Gini coefficient in the Mekong River Delta is 0.63, standing 
at the top. In contrast, with the lowest Gini of 0.37 the relative income distribution in the 
South Central Coast regions is the most equal. Central Highlands region ranks the second 
most relatively unequal, just behind the Mekong River Delta. However, an absolute 
inequality measure which is the ratio of income level at the 95th percentile over the income 
level at the 10th percentile reveals that the dispersion of income between the top “rich” and 
the “poorest” is the highest in the Central Highlands. The dispersion ratio is 12.60 in the 
Central Highlands. The Mekong River Delta stands at the second top with the dispersion 
ratio of 10.09. The 75th/25th dispersion ratio which captures the information about 
incomes towards the middle of the income distribution also suggests the similar situation. 
The Central Highlands and Mekong River Delta rank at the top and second in terms of 
income inequality. The South Central Coast has the lowest score of the inequality 
measures. 
1.3 Other aspects of poverty in the extremely difficult communes 
The above analysis of poverty and inequality is based on income as a welfare measure. In 
this section, we examine other non-income aspects of poverty such as household 
landholding, valuable assets, access to essential public goods and services such as clean 
water and electricity.12  
It is arguable that land could be the most important physical asset of rural households, 
especially for those residing in the extremely difficult communes where livelihoods are 
mainly in agriculture. Table 1.3 summarizes the levels of annual cropland, perennial land 
and forestry with disaggregation by the ethnic groups, spatial regions, gender of household 
heads, daily language and poverty status. Possession of annual cropland across the majority 
and the ethnic minority is not considerably different. An average household in the 
extremely difficult communes had 1413 m2 of annual cropland. The majority household 
holds on average 1353 m2 of cropland, while the ethnic minority household has slightly 
less of 1442 m2. Comparing between different ethnic groups, it is found that the Tay, 
Muong, and Nung possess lower annual cropland while the Mong, Bana, and other ethnic 
groups in the Northern Uplands are best endowed. These figures do not however reveal 
any information on land quality. The current regulations classify annual cropland into six 
groups and perennial land into give categories. The ascending ranking of classification is 
                                                 
12
 This analysis of access to basic public goods and services will be implemented at the household level. In 
chapter 2 of this study, further detailed analysis on commune-level access to these goods and services will be 
provided. 
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associated with the lower quality of land. These categories are used for the authorities to 
tax on the land uses of households. In this report, we define annual cropland and perennial 
land as ‘good land’ if they belong to the first two categories of this classification. Table 1.3 
shows clearly that the majority has an absolute advantage in possessing quality cropland. 
Despite holding more annual cropland than the majority, the ethnic minority holds the 
amount of quality land that is only equal to 13 percent of the majority. All ethnic minority 
groups, accounting for 74 percent of the total population in the extremely difficult 
communes, possess only 24 percent of quality annual cropland. As Chapter 3 of this study 
will analyze, crops income is the most single important income source for households in 
the extremely difficult communes. The fact that the majority posses the most of fertile 
cropland in this area might translate to the income gap between the majority group and the 
ethnic minority (see Chapter 4 for more details).  
Table 1.3 Landholdings in the extremely difficult communes (m2) 
   Annual cropland Perennial land Forestry 
land 
  
Total Good land Total Good land 
Average 1412.7 193.1 370.6 11.8 1461.1 
Ethnic groups 
Majority 1353.2 462.9 502.9 14.8 603.6 
Ethnic minority 1441.7 61.4 306.0 10.4 1879.7 
  
Tay 853.8 34.5 288.8 0.0 3016.5 
  
Thai 1479.0 32.8 202.3 0.0 2064.7 
  
Muong 970.3 121.7 604.8 40.6 1631.4 
  
Nung 1076.7 36.2 497.3 76.6 2506.9 
  
Mong 2206.3 13.0 100.2 0.0 1166.6 
  
Dao 1648.8 137.1 415.5 26.5 4804.5 
  
Others in Northern Uplands 2676.2 0.0 130.6 0.0 3876.1 
  
Bana 2257.4 52.3 143.8 0.0 199.4 
  
H're 1596.7 100.1 1150.5 0.0 996.6 
  
Co Tu 1517.0 0.0 58.8 0.0 552.8 
  
Others in Central Highlands 1514.3 17.4 632.2 2.2 36.4 
  
Khmer 1103.1 146.3 154.0 2.4 0.0 
  
Others 1490.8 0.1 161.6 0.0 279.8 
Regions 
  
Red River Delta 463.8 158.7 57.6 5.9 97.2 
  
North East 1134.0 57.9 338.6 14.1 2771.8 
  
North West 2113.0 29.1 144.7 2.6 1559.2 
  
North Central Coast 769.2 41.4 124.1 1.3 2514.1 
  
South Central Coast 1275.0 60.9 428.3 0.0 478.7 
  
Central Highlands 1476.8 9.5 2131.9 0.1 60.7 
  
South East 1597.1 39.8 1044.2 104.9 0.1 
  
Mekong River Delta 1717.9 761.4 38.2 1.0 13.1 
Gender of household heads 
  
Male 1490.7 216.7 384.2 13.7 1547.4 
  
Female 936.6 49.2 287.3 0.1 934.5 
Daily language 
  
No or little Viet 1582.4 58.2 239.5 11.4 1879.6 
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Both Viet and ethnic 1264.6 80.7 474.4 8.0 2010.1 
  
No or little ethnic 1277.7 407.0 490.9 14.0 721.9 
Poor vs. non-poor 
  
Poor 1016.3 31.2 253.1 7.1 1518.5 
  
Non-poor 1708.0 313.7 458.1 15.3 1418.3 
Source: authors’ calculation from the BLS 
Interestingly, cropland holding of the female-headed households are considerably lower 
than that of the male-headed counterparts. While the average female-headed household had 
an area of nearly 937 m2, the corresponding figure of the male-headed household is 1490 
m2. This represents a considerable disadvantage of the female-headed household, which 
could translate to the difference in the poverty rate between these two groups. It is not 
surprised to find that the non-poor are substantially better endowed that the poor, both in 
the average total cropland and quality cropland. 
As the extremely difficult communes are located in the remote (and often mountainous 
areas), one could expect that forestry is an important source of income-generating 
activities. Possessing forestry land is one of few aspects that the ethnic minority are at the 
advantage compared to the majority. On average, the ethnic minority holds three times 
higher than the majority in terms of forestry land. This advantage is especially pronounced 
for the ethnic minority groups in the Northern Uplands and North Central Coast. This 
advantage is also highlighted in Pham et al. (2010) using the data from the V(H)LSS 
reported that ethnic minorities possess more land than the majority and that endowment 
advantage tend to increase over time. At the start of the land reform in 1993, an average 
ethnic minority-headed household possessed 63 percent more land (all types) compared to 
that of the majority headed household. After fourteen years, this advantage rose up to 154 
percent. Considering different types of land, this advantage of the ethnic minorities is also 
observed. This advantage is most pronounced for forestry landholding. On average, ethnic 
minority-headed households possess ten times larger forestry land area than majority-
headed households. However, whether this advantage could translate into better income-
generating opportunities is a concern. As Chapter 3 of this study will show, forestry is a 
modest (and ignorable for some ethnic groups) source of income for the households 
residing in the extremely difficult communes.  
In addition to landholding as arguably the most important physical assets, Table 1.4 
information on the possession of valuable durable assets, including motorbike, TV, radio, 
telephone, refrigerator and electric cooker, held by the households in the extremely 
difficult communes. Possession of these assets are substantially different between the Kinh 
–Hoa group and the ethnic minority. For instance, 54 percent of the majority had a 
motorbike while only 40 percent of ethnic minorities had that vehicle. There is no doubt 
that valuable assets holdings in the extremely difficult communes are lower the rural 
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average level. It is however noted that possession gaps of key asset holdings between the 
extremely difficult communes and the rural areas of Vietnam are significantly high. Our 
estimations using the  VHLSS 2006 reveal that, nearly 53 percent of the rural population 
possessed a motorbike; 81 percent having a TV; 23 percent having a telephone (fixed-line 
phone or mobile), and 53 percent owned an electric cooker. The corresponding numbers in 
the extremely difficult communes, as reported in Table 1.4, are 45, 58, 19, and 27 percent, 
respectively. 
Table 1.4 Holdings of valuable assets (%) 
  
Motor-
bike 
TV Radio Tele-
phone 
Refri-
gerator 
Electric 
cooker 
Average 44.9 58.0 5.9 18.6 5.5 27.1 
Ethnic groups 
  
Majority 54.3 78.5 4.6 38.4 10.6 52.0 
Ethnic minority 40.3 48.0 6.5 9.0 2.9 15.0 
    
Tay 52.5 67.1 3.4 15.1 7.3 18.2 
    
Thai 43.9 49.3 5.1 5.0 1.3 10.7 
    
Muong 45.2 68.5 4.0 11.4 6.1 22.8 
    
Nung 48.1 55.5 6.4 12.8 6.5 16.2 
    
Mong 22.6 15.7 10.0 1.7 0.0 2.3 
    
Dao 45.6 46.9 8.7 5.9 1.6 4.5 
    
Others in Northern Uplands 33.8 35.8 13.0 2.6 0.0 3.3 
    
Bana 56.6 46.1 2.2 0.2 0.0 8.0 
    
H're 36.6 42.7 3.4 2.2 2.2 7.4 
    
Co Tu 13.6 36.3 6.8 2.2 0.0 1.0 
    
Others in Central Highlands 29.2 50.8 7.7 2.9 0.4 12.6 
    
Khmer 36.6 44.0 8.8 21.5 2.7 39.2 
    
Others 39.5 47.1 2.2 4.8 1.8 12.6 
Regions 
  
Red River Delta 53.9 90.9 2.0 26.8 5.2 54.1 
  
North East 44.3 55.1 5.2 12.0 5.6 15.1 
  
North West 49.1 47.1 10.0 8.6 3.6 11.9 
  
North Central Coast 37.6 55.8 2.0 13.3 5.4 27.1 
  
South Central Coast 39.6 49.7 2.4 14.8 5.1 22.0 
  
Central Highlands 63.4 67.3 8.0 25.0 7.7 37.6 
  
South East 70.8 77.2 5.6 29.9 12.1 55.2 
  
Mekong River Delta 33.7 62.3 6.6 34.8 4.3 44.9 
Gender of household heads 
  
Male 46.6 58.2 6.1 17.7 5.1 25.9 
  
Female 34.5 56.7 4.5 24.1 8.0 34.7 
Daily language 
  
No or little Viet 35.2 40.8 7.7 6.2 1.3 12.8 
  
Both Viet and ethnic 49.8 63.0 4.5 13.9 5.2 18.5 
  
No or little ethnic 59.2 68.4 2.2 18.9 10.1 23.6 
Poor vs. non-poor 
  
Poor 28.9 42.5 5.7 4.8 1.5 10.5 
  
Non-poor 56.8 69.6 6.1 29.0 8.4 39.5 
Source: authors’ calculation from the BLS  
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The living standards of the rural areas in general and the extremely difficult communes in 
particular are also reflected in housing conditions. The BLS allows us to classify houses 
into three types: permanent house, semi-permanent house, and temporary house. Reflecting 
the poor condition in this area,  most of households sheltered in either semi-permanent or 
temporary houses. Only 7.4 percent of the households had permanent houses. Moreover, 
39 percent of the households residing in the extremely difficult communes happened to 
have temporary houses. Nevertheless, the housing conditions of the majority group are still 
slightly better than these of the ethnic minority. Since the questions on housing conditions 
between the baseline survey and the VHLSSs are exactly identical, we are able to make 
comparisons using the two sources of data. Housing conditions in the whole rural areas of 
Vietnam are far better than those in the extremely difficult communes. For instance, in 
2006, only 19 percent of the rural population lived in a temporary house, as compared to 
39 percent in the extremely difficult communes as appeared in the BLS in 2007. The 
proportion of rural population living in a permanent house (or a villa) is two times higher 
than in the poorest area (i.e. 17 percent vs. seven percent).  
Accessibility to public goods and services also reflects the living standard. The majority 
have very good assess ability to clean water and national power grid. As shown in Table 
1.5, the incidence of having access to these services is very high amongst the majority, 
particularly, 87 percent of the majority had access to clean water for cooking, and 91 
percent had access to the national power grid. In contrast, the incidence of access to these 
key services by the ethnic minority is considerably lower. With the exception of access to 
national electric grid, the access rates of the ethnic minority to clean water, sanitary toilet 
facilities are at least two times less than these of the majority. Particularly, the access rate 
of some individual groups to clean water, electricity, and sanitary toilets are very low, 
especially for the H’mong, Dao, Co Tu, and other ethnic groups in the Central Highlands. 
When using the data on the sub-sample of the P135-II communes, we found that 53 percent 
of the P135-II households had clean drinking water.13 Given the current situation of using 
drinking water, there is a big challenge of achieving the target of 80 percent households 
having clean drinking water by the end of the Programme in 2010. Access to sanitary 
toilets is worryingly low in the extremely difficult communes.14 It is reported that only 
eight percent of the households residing in this area had access to sanitary toilets. Most of 
the population thus relied on ‘other types’ of toilets. The BLS does not provide information 
                                                 
13
 We adopted the commonly used definition of clean water applied in a number of poverty reports by WB 
and VASS. Accordingly, ‘clean water’ is here defined based on the internationally commonly-used definition 
of clean water. Accordingly, clean water includes the following sources: (1) private tap water inside the 
house, (2) private tap water outside the house, (3) public tab water, (4) water pumped from deep drill wells, 
(4) water from hand-dug and reinforced wells, (5) rain water, (6) bought water (in tank, bottle,…), (7) small 
water tank, and (8) water tank. 
14
 As commonly used in the previous studies, flush toilet, suilabh, and double vault compost latrine are 
considered hygienic types of toilets. 
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on these ‘other’ types. But it is most likely that ‘others’ in this context referred to simple 
and hence unhygienic types of toilets. Although the information on toilets used by 
households does not capture all aspects of hygienic living conditions of the households, it 
could be taken to suggest poor hygienic conditions in the extremely difficult communes.  
Table 1.5 Access to clean water, national power grid and sanitary toilet (%) 
  
% using clean 
water for 
cooking 
% using 
clean water 
for living 
% having 
access to 
national power 
grid 
% using a 
sanitary 
toilet 
Average 53.6 50.9 73.6 8.2 
Ethnic groups 
  
Majority 86.9 85.1 91.1 16.6 
  
Other ethnicities 37.4 34.2 65.1 4.1 
    
Tay 37.7 34.2 81.7 3.6 
    
Thai 27.8 23.6 59.9 1.5 
    
Muong 48.3 48.2 90.6 4.6 
    
Nung 28.0 25.5 73.8 3.3 
    
Mong 21.2 18.4 36.5 0.8 
    
Dao 10.4 10.4 36.3 3.2 
    
Others in Northern Uplands 20.9 17.2 26.9 1.1 
    
Bana 32.9 38.9 97.9 0.0 
    
H're 48.1 48.1 67.3 1.8 
    
Co Tu 0.5 0.0 66.3 0.0 
    
Others in Central Highlands 19.4 19.8 75.4 1.3 
    
Khmer 94.9 84.8 75.6 16.2 
    
Others 28.8 26.2 82.1 1.3 
Regions 
  
Red River Delta 97.1 97.1 100.0 1.6 
  
North East 37.7 35.2 68.3 3.9 
  
North West 25.5 22.6 54.3 4.0 
  
North Central Coast 44.0 42.5 81.6 2.8 
  
South Central Coast 49.6 48.0 75.3 8.2 
  
Central Highlands 48.0 49.1 85.2 7.2 
  
South East 81.3 81.3 87.0 17.6 
  
Mekong River Delta 95.9 89.9 82.2 19.7 
Gender of household heads 
  
Male 51.2 48.3 72.0 7.2 
  
Female 68.1 67.2 83.7 14.5 
Daily language         
  
No or little Viet 33.7 29.5 59.0 3.3 
  
Both Viet and ethnic 37.6 37.1 76.6 5.1 
  
No or little ethnic 64.6 63.4 84.3 7.7 
Poor vs. non-poor 
  
Poor 41.5 39.3 63.1 3.4 
  
Non-poor 62.6 59.6 81.5 11.8 
Source: authors’ calculation from the BLS  
In addition to quantitative indicators, poverty measurement should also make use of other 
qualitative information to best capture the multifaceted nature of poverty. The BLS 
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provides data on self-assessment of the lack of essential commodities for living including 
food, clean water, medicines, energy, and cash to pay for children’s tuition fee. These are 
reported in Table 1.6 to reflect how the household residing in the poorest commune assess 
their shortage of key goods. On average, 45 percent of the households revealed that they 
did not have enough food, 44 percent lacked of clean water, 44 percent lacked of 
medicines for health care, and 32 percent said that they did not have enough cash to pay for 
education of their children. More importantly, these shortage rates are considerably higher 
for the ethnic minority compared to those of the majority. The incidence of households not 
having enough food is particular high in the Central Highlands. Our observations at various 
location suggest that hunger is most severe before the cultivation time, when households 
have eaten up foods harvested from the previous crops and need money to purchase seeds, 
fertilizer for the coming reason.  
Table 1.6 Self-assessment about shortages of crucial goods (%) 
    In shortage of 
  
Food Clean water Medicines Tuition fees of 
children 
Average 44.8 43.7 43.9 31.8 
Ethnic groups 
  
Majority 32.5 24.4 29.6 25.9 
  
Ethnic minority 50.8 53.2 50.9 34.7 
    
Tay 36.2 34.6 38.7 41.8 
    
Thai 57.0 79.5 74.6 54.3 
    
Muong 55.6 35.2 54.6 44.8 
    
Nung 48.0 53.8 36.9 32.0 
    
Mong 51.2 66.8 43.3 17.4 
    
Dao 42.5 62.3 54.1 24.7 
    
Others in Northern Uplands 63.1 81.5 73.2 44.9 
    
Bana 70.9 37.3 25.0 8.1 
    
H're 64.5 44.8 97.6 34.6 
    
Co Tu 63.5 54.6 65.5 66.6 
    
Others in Central Highlands 72.8 62.2 51.8 38.3 
    
Khmer 37.8 29.5 28.7 17.7 
    
Others 75.3 48.5 55.2 21.9 
Regions 
  
Red River Delta 64.6 11.5 63.9 50.6 
  
North East 44.0 44.7 41.8 31.9 
  
North West 49.1 68.0 65.8 39.6 
  
North Central Coast 53.4 59.7 67.6 47.6 
  
South Central Coast 48.1 35.8 59.3 37.2 
  
Central Highlands 60.1 46.1 39.0 17.2 
  
South East 60.7 36.6 17.0 25.2 
  
Mekong River Delta 25.2 21.1 19.3 19.1 
Gender of household heads 
  
Male 44.7 45.1 44.6 32.6 
  
Female 45.6 35.2 39.3 26.9 
Daily language 
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No or little Viet 53.5 57.7 51.3 32.3 
  
Both Viet and ethnic 47.5 46.0 54.1 38.9 
  
No or little ethnic 41.2 39.6 39.2 39.8 
Self-declared poverty status 
  
Poor 62.3 52.3 52.7 39.5 
  
Non-poor 31.7 37.4 37.3 26.1 
Source: authors’ calculation from the BLS  
Figures on the shortage of cash to pay for children’s tuition fees are noteworthy. It should 
noted that these extremely difficult communes are the target of several policies and 
programmes to support poverty reduction. One key areas of support is to provide access to 
education services. Different sources of assistance have thus been spent for getting poor 
children to schools. However, the incidence of lacking cash to pay for children’ tuition fees 
are very high for some ethnic groups. For instance, 67 percent of the Bana revealed that 
they were short of cash to sending their children to schools. The Thai, Tay, Muong, the 
other ethnic groups in the Northern Uplands and Central Highlands also revealed a very 
high shortage of cash for tuition fee contribution. Surprisingly, the H’mong are amongst 
the poorest but exhibit a low shortage of cash for paying tuition fees. As suggested by the 
high leakage rate of poverty reduction programmes in the first section of this chapter, This 
raises a concern on the efficacy of the current support to provide access to education 
services. 
Table 1.7 Self-assessment about the current living standard (%) 
  
Very 
happy 
Happy Moderate Unhappy Very 
unhappy 
Average 0.7 13.9 32.7 48.0 4.7 
Ethnic groups 
  
Majority 0.7 19.2 34.7 42.5 2.8 
  
Ethnic minority 0.6 11.3 31.7 50.7 5.7 
    
Tay 0.7 12.7 32.3 50.7 3.7 
    
Thai 0.1 6.3 29.1 57.5 7.0 
    
Muong 0.0 6.3 36.8 48.1 8.8 
    
Nung 1.7 9.7 41.3 46.4 1.1 
    
Mong 0.5 17.0 29.9 49.7 3.0 
    
Dao 0.1 14.3 37.1 46.0 2.5 
    
Others in Northern Uplands 0.0 7.5 29.9 58.7 3.9 
    
Bana 0.0 5.6 21.7 65.2 7.6 
    
H're 0.6 1.7 41.1 55.8 0.8 
    
Co Tu 2.2 9.9 40.4 47.5 0.0 
    
Others in Central Highlands 0.2 5.6 25.4 66.9 1.9 
    
Khmer 2.3 19.5 27.1 38.7 12.4 
    
Others 0.0 6.2 32.2 51.6 10.0 
Geographical regions 
  
Red River Delta 0.0 5.0 29.3 49.0 16.7 
  
North East 0.4 13.8 33.0 49.1 3.8 
  
North West 0.3 10.5 37.7 47.2 4.3 
  
North Central Coast 0.0 5.6 30.8 56.6 7.0 
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South Central Coast 0.6 7.1 50.0 41.8 0.5 
  
Central Highlands 1.8 9.0 24.4 59.7 5.2 
  
South East 0.8 9.8 39.0 49.5 0.9 
  
Mekong River Delta 1.4 26.9 25.9 40.0 5.9 
Gender of head 
  
Male 0.5 13.8 33.1 48.4 4.2 
  
Female 1.7 14.2 30.2 45.9 8.1 
Daily language           
  
No or little Viet 0.2 11.7 31.4 51.1 5.6 
  
Both Viet and ethnic 1.9 9.9 33.0 48.5 6.7 
  
No or little ethnic 0.5 12.7 31.1 51.9 3.8 
Poor vs. non-poor 
  
Poor 0.1 6.6 25.5 60.5 7.2 
  
Non-poor 1.1 19.3 38.1 38.7 2.9 
Source: authors’ calculation from the BLS  
To conclude this important chapter of the current study, we explored the data on self-
assessments of the household residing in the extremely difficult communes on their 
satisfaction with the current living standards. Not surprisingly, more than a half of them 
were unhappy with their welfare status. The most powerful figure in Table 1.7 is that 
almost no households were ‘very happy’ with their living conditions. These simple figures 
convey very important message: through the Government and donors have brought into the 
extremely difficult communes several policies and programmes for poverty reduction, 
there is a long way ahead. More importantly, as poverty in this difficult area is stubbornly 
high, future efforts for poverty reduction in the extremely difficult communes will become 
more expensive compared to poverty reduction in the rural areas or to what these were in 
the past two decades. Certainly, it warrants that continuing the support for poverty 
reduction for the ethnic minority is no doubt and urgently needed. 
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Chapter 2. Access to Public Services of the Poor Ethnic 
Minorities 
 
Access to public services and basic infrastructures are considered to be a necessary 
condition for escaping poverty in the developing world and Vietnam is not an exception. 
Guiding by that consensus, a plethora of policies and programmes have invested in the 
remote areas of the country, aiming to provide and/or improve access to public services 
and infrastructures. This is closely reflected in the P135 (through different stages), more 
recently the Programme 30A on the poorest districts, as well as a number of other policies 
and programmes to support the poor ethnic minorities (see chapter 5). This chapter, 
answering the second research question, will examine the access to education, healthcare 
services, and basic infrastructure facilities in the extremely difficult communes surveyed in 
the BLS.  
2.1 Access to education  
Education is widely found in the literature on Vietnam as a crucial factor determining 
household welfare, labour market participation and earnings (see Glewwe et al. 2004). 
Access to education services is thus crucial for poverty reduction. Together with socio-
economic development, education of people has been improved. In addition, Viet Nam has 
made commitment to achieve the Millennium Development Goal in Universal Primary 
Education. According to the VHLSSs, the percentage of people above 22 years old having 
upper secondary school degree increased from 18 percent in 2002 to 26 percent in 2006. 
The ethnic minorities have also achieved significant improvement in education over time 
(World Bank, 2007).   
In the context of the extremely difficult communes covered in the BLS, all communes have 
the program of illiteracy eradication. However, there are still a large gap in education 
achievements between the ethnic minorities and the majority group. Table 2.1 presents the 
percentage of people with different educational degrees in the extremely difficult 
communes. In this poorest region, only seven percent of people aged above 22 completed 
upper secondary school. Less than one percent of people have post secondary school. More 
than 50 percent of people do not have any educational degree. Within the extremely 
difficult communes, there is also inequality in education between ethnic minorities. The 
majority, Tay, and Muong groups have much better education than other ethnic minorities. 
On the contrary, ethnic minority groups such as the Mong, Bana, H’re have lowest 
education degrees.  
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Education degree also varies across regions. Table 3.1 shows that people in the Red River 
Delta have higher education degrees than other region. The percentage of adult people 
without education degree is around 12 percent in the Red River Delta, while this 
percentage for other regions is higher than 40 percentage. The North West and South 
Central Coast are regions which have lowest education levels in the countries. There is also 
a difference in education between poor and non-poor in the extremely difficult communes. 
The proportion of adult poor and non-poor without education degree is around 58 percent 
and 40 percent, respectively.  
Table 2.1 Educational degrees by ethnic groups (%) 
  
No degree Primary Lower 
secondary 
Upper 
secondary 
Post 
secondary 
Average 52.0 25.6 15.4 6.5 0.6 
Ethnic groups 
Majority 33.0 33.3 22.3 10.4 1.0 
Ethnic minority 61.3 21.9 11.9 4.5 0.4 
Tay 34.9 33.1 22.0 9.8 0.2 
Thai 58.9 25.3 11.1 4.3 0.5 
Muong 28.9 30.5 29.9 10.3 0.4 
Nung 52.5 26.5 14.6 6.2 0.2 
Mong 91.5 5.8 2.3 0.5 0.0 
Dao 79.0 12.5 6.3 2.0 0.1 
Others in Northern Uplands 76.8 14.6 6.5 1.8 0.3 
Bana 83.1 11.9 2.6 2.4 0.0 
H're 81.3 15.2 3.0 0.6 0.0 
Co Tu 70.3 19.8 5.1 4.8 0.0 
Others in Central Highlands 78.5 14.0 6.3 1.2 0.0 
Khmer 64.8 26.3 5.3 2.1 1.7 
Others 77.2 14.7 6.6 1.3 0.2 
By regions 
Red River Delta 12.5 21.8 54.6 11.1 0.0 
North East 52.5 23.5 17.2 6.7 0.1 
North West 62.1 18.5 12.7 6.2 0.6 
North Central Coast 41.4 29.6 18.9 9.5 0.8 
South Central Coast 64.0 20.7 9.1 4.3 2.0 
Central Highlands 55.1 22.5 16.7 5.1 0.6 
South East 52.1 30.9 12.9 3.4 0.8 
Mekong River Delta 49.7 33.7 10.0 5.9 0.8 
Source: authors’ calculations from the BLS 
Low education means poor human resource and low labour productivities. To increase 
education, the Government has committed to universal primary school. According the 
2006 VHLSS, the school enrolment rate for children age between six and 11 year old is 97 
percent. This rate is very high compared with other low-income and middle-income 
countries. Yet, the success in education is less clear for ethnic minorities in the extremely 
difficult communes. Table 2.2 estimates the enrolment rate for primary and secondary 
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schools. Nearly 80 percent of children attend school in 2007 in this area. The schooling 
rate for lower-secondary and upper-secondary is much lower than the school rate for 
primary school, estimated at 60 percent and 38 percent, respectively. The schooling rate is 
different for different ethnic minorities, especially at the high educational level. The 
majority, Tay, Muong, Nung, and Co Tu have substantially higher rates of upper secondary 
enrolment than other minority group. The Bana, H’mong, H’re and Khmer are groups 
which have very low education enrolment rate. The education enrolment differs for various 
regions. The Red River Delta and Central Coast have higher schooling rates than other 
regions. The ethnic minorities in the North West and Mekong River Delta have the lowest 
schooling rate at the secondary level. Poor children are more likely to have higher drop-out 
than non-poor children. 
Table 2.2 School enrolment rate by ethnic minorities (%) 
 
Primary Lower 
secondary 
Upper 
secondary 
Average 79.4 59.8 38.0 
Ethnic groups 
Majority 83.1 64.1 52.0 
Ethnic minorities 78.3 58.6 32.3 
Tay 79.2 73.6 57.8 
Thai 76.6 71.8 35.0 
Muong 79.8 73.3 47.7 
Nung 87.8 76.4 50.8 
Mong 74.3 42.7 9.7 
Dao 82.1 53.2 19.8 
Others in Northern Uplands 79.4 53.9 16.7 
Bana 87.4 48.1 6.6 
H're 81.6 55.7 15.8 
Co Tu 81.2 81.3 68.3 
Others in Central Highlands 77.6 57.7 29.5 
Khmer 78.3 38.0 13.0 
Others 78.7 38.3 22.0 
Regions 
Red River Delta 78.5 73.7 67.9 
North East 77.9 62.0 41.6 
North West 78.0 60.4 29.3 
North Central Coast 77.7 71.3 47.8 
South Central Coast 81.8 62.3 45.1 
Central Highlands 84.2 55.8 35.6 
South East 70.5 60.5 31.7 
Mekong River Delta 83.9 44.3 29.5 
Daily language 
No or little Viet 78.6 55.4 25.6 
Both Viet and ethnic 77.0 67.5 43.8 
No or little ethnic 82.2 65.8 52.5 
Poor vs non-poor 
Poor 77.5 55.9 30.3 
Non-Poor 81.6 63.9 44.4 
Source: authors’ calculations from the BLS 
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It should be noted that 67 percent of the extremely difficult communes appeared in the 
BLS are actually covered by the P135-II. Calculating the enrolment rate for these 
communes, we observe a big gap between the current rate of 77 percent and the target rate 
of 95 percent. It suggests that substantial investment from the P135-II will be needed to 
ensure the target of by 2010. There would be a two-year period from the time of 
conducting the BLS and the end of 2010 for the Programme to close the gap. This clearly 
represents a challenge for the P135-II in the remaining time. This is particularly worrying 
given the drop-out rate are quite high in the extremely difficult communes. Pham et al. 
(2010) suggest that most school drop-outs occur during the transitions from primary to 
lower secondary school and from lower to upper secondary school.  In mountainous areas, 
this corresponds to the age at which children usually need to move from village classrooms 
to the main primary school (usually located in the commune centre).  In the Northern 
Uplands, studying in the main primary school often involves a walk of an hour or more to 
the commune centre, which obviously acts as a disincentive for children from outlying 
village attending primary school.  Furthermore, as the other northern minorities are more 
likely to live in outlying villages than the Tay-Thai-Muong-Nung, children from the other 
northern minorities are disproportionately affected. 
The BLS provides information on main reasons for not attending school at the individual 
level. Table 2.3 reports the distribution of children by reasons for not attending schools. 
The main reason for not attending schools is over school age. The second biggest problem 
for child school is that children have to work. It is obvious that parents play the main role 
in their children’s education. Since adult ethnic minorities tend to have low education 
degrees, they can pay less attention to their children’s education.  
Table 2.3 Reasons for school drop by ethnic minorities (%) 
  
Over 
aged 
Long 
distance to 
school 
Do not 
have 
money 
Do not 
want to 
learn 
Have to 
work 
Other 
reasons 
Average 59.4 0.6 3.4 5.2 27.3 4.2 
Majority 57.3 0.8 3.5 6.1 27.8 4.6 
Ethnic minorities 64.0 0.1 3.2 3.2 26.4 3.2 
Tay 58.5 1.2 6.3 9.3 18.2 6.5 
Thai 57.5 0.6 5.2 5.2 29.7 1.8 
Muong 39.0 0.2 2.2 2.4 53.5 2.7 
Nung 67.0 1.3 3.2 7.7 16.7 4.1 
Mong 49.1 0.9 1.1 7.8 35.4 5.7 
Dao 54.9 3.4 2.8 6.5 25.7 6.8 
Others in Northern Uplands 55.7 0.5 4.8 10.1 22.3 6.6 
Bana 51.6 0.0 0.0 2.7 40.8 4.9 
H're 68.9 0.0 2.1 1.3 25.7 2.1 
Co Tu 94.0 0.0 0.9 3.1 0.4 1.7 
Others in Central Highlands 61.6 0.0 0.7 7.0 24.7 6.0 
Khmer 71.3 0.0 4.1 3.4 17.1 4.2 
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Others 69.0 0.2 1.5 5.4 19.7 4.3 
Source: authors’ calculations from the BLS 
Table from 2.4 examines the difficulties in education for pupils in primary and secondary 
schools. For small children at the primary school, language is the main difficulty for their 
study. Pham et al. (2009) reported that more pupils drop out during the primary level in 
remote areas compared to the rural areas in general. This suggests the necessity of having 
language classes for ethnic minority children at the primary schools as highlighted in 
World Bank (2009). For the pupils those passed the primary education level to higher 
levels, their Vietnamese language ability was enhanced during the primary education and 
thus language does not represent a main challenge for their study. For these grades, lack of 
educational materials such books and notes become more pronounced as a reason of not 
attending schools. Therefore, supporting language ability at the primary schools should be 
considered as a priority for further investment in education in the extremely difficult 
communes. 
Table 2.4 Difficulties in attending schools (%) 
  
No 
difficulty 
Lack of 
educational 
materials 
Difficulty 
in Kinh 
language 
Lack of 
educational 
facilities in 
school 
Other 
difficulties 
Primary eduction 
Average 64.2 9.9 17.5 4.9 3.6 
Majority 74.3 11.4 0.0 4.5 8.0 
Ethnic minorities 61.1 9.4 22.3 5.0 2.2 
Lower Secondary Education 
Average 74.3 10.6 5.5 7.3 2.4 
Majority 79.0 11.0 0.0 6.1 3.2 
Ethnic minorities 72.8 10.4 7.0 7.6 2.1 
Upper Secondary Education 
Average 79.0 10.2 0.6 6.8 3.4 
Majority 80.5 11.5 0.0 6.7 1.4 
Ethnic minorities 78.1 9.2 1.0 6.9 4.7 
Source: authors’ calculations from the BLS 
Given these difficulties in attending schools, promoting educational enrolment in the 
extremely difficult communes was one the target of the Programme 135-II as well as many 
other policies and programmes to support improvement of living standards for the ethnic 
minorities. Using the data on the sub-sample of the P135-II in the BLS, we found 91 
percent of primary school pupils were exempted from paying fees and contribution 
compared to the average of 75 percent calculated from the VHLSS 2006. For higher levels, 
the proportions of pupils that were exempted from lower and upper secondary schools 
were 81 and 69 percent, respectively, while the corresponding figures calculated from the 
VHLSS 2006 for these levels were 21 and 18 percent (see Pham et al. 2010 for more 
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details). These differences suggest the importance of the Programme 135-II and other 
support initiative to promote educational attainment in the extremely difficult communes. 
This also implies that continuing this support will be essential to achieve the target of 
promoting schooling in the extremely difficult communes of the country. 
2.2 Access to healthcare services 
Although Vietnam has achieved great success in poverty, poverty rate remains very high 
for ethnic minorities. One of important reasons for poverty is health shocks. In all the 
recent PPA studies, illness is always described by the poor as one of the main reasons for 
their severe difficulties (World Bank, 2004). Households affected by health shocks suffer 
from burden of medical expenses. According to the VHLSS 2006, around 10 percent of 
households spend more than 16 percent of their consumption in healthcare services. High 
out-of-pocket payments on health care are also found in several studies such as World 
Bank (2001), Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2003).  
To improve medical care and to protect people from the catastrophic health spending, the 
government of Vietnam aim to achieve full coverage of health insurance by 2015. During 
the past decade, Vietnam has been very successful in increasing the coverage of health 
insurance, especially for ethnic minorities. According to World Bank (2007), the coverage 
of free health insurance for ethnic minorities increased from 8 percent in 1998 to 78 
percent in 2006. There are around 84 percent of people having health insurance in the 
extremely difficult communes (Table 2.5), while this ratio is around 54 percent for the 
whole population.15 It is interesting that in these extremely difficult communes, ethnic 
minorities are more likely to have health insurance or free health certificate than majority. 
The proportion of people without any health insurance and certificate is 32 percent and 10 
percent for the majority and the ethnic minority, respectively. The coverage rate of health 
insurance is higher for the poor than for the non-poor. This reflects the support of the 
Government and donors in providing access to health insurance.  
Table 2.5 Coverage of health insurance (%) 
 
With health 
insurance 
With fee health 
certificate 
No health 
insurance 
Average 66.1 17.9 16.1 
By ethnic groups 
Majority 54.0 14.1 32.0 
Ethnic minorities 71.0 19.5 9.6 
Tay 83.7 9.4 6.9 
Thai 85.7 8.3 6.0 
Muong 63.5 14.3 22.1 
Nung 76.9 15.5 7.6 
                                                 
15
 The figure for the whole country is estimated from the 2006 VHLSS.  
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Mong 67.2 28.7 4.1 
Dao 71.1 20.6 8.4 
Others in Northern Uplands 90.2 3.0 6.8 
Bana 98.9 0.0 1.1 
H're 96.3 2.3 1.3 
Co Tu 5.4 89.6 5.0 
Others in Central Highlands 73.6 24.2 2.1 
Khmer 31.0 39.2 29.8 
Others 57.9 39.7 2.4 
Regions 
Red River Delta 53.0 0.8 46.1 
North East 72.2 18.6 9.2 
North West 87.4 6.9 5.7 
North Central Coast 66.8 21.8 11.4 
South Central Coast 69.0 28.4 2.5 
Central Highlands 87.1 3.0 9.9 
South East 79.6 7.9 12.5 
Mekong River Delta 23.0 32.3 44.8 
Daily language 
No or little Viet 67.9 23.5 8.6 
Both Viet and ethnic 78.2 11.2 10.5 
No or little ethnic 57.2 12.6 30.2 
Poor vs. non-poor 
Poor 69.2 20.5 10.4 
Non-Poor 63.4 15.6 21.1 
Source: authors’ calculations from the BLS 
Having health insurance however does not necessarily mean better access to health care 
services. The health care clinics in the poor areas are often poorly equipped. it is 
unfortunate that no questions on the conditions of healthcare facilities were asked but it is 
likely that hamlet-level or communal health centres are generally poorly equipped. These 
centres are therefore best used for normal diseases or for emergency treatment before 
transferring to hospitals at higher levels. In fact, the average distance to hospitals was 
found to be 39 kilometres, which would take at least three hours by public transport (where 
passenger transport services were available) or about one hour if motorbikes were used 
given the transportation conditions in these communes. Figure 2.1 shows that the 
percentage of people using outpatient health care service is lower for the ethnic minorities 
than for the majority. The average annual health care contact is also much lower for the 
ethnic minorities. However, the use of health care service tends to increase over time. The 
majority and ethnic minorities have very similar use of inpatient health care treatment 
(Figure 2.1).  The percentage of people using inpatient health care is very stable during the 
period 2004-2006.  
Compared to the rural areas, the proportion of people using healthcare service is rather 
high in the extremely difficult communes. Figure 2.2 shows that the percentage of people 
using health care ranges from 25 percent to 56 percent for different ethnic groups. The 
 majority are still people having the highest rate of using health care service, while 
Mong in the North West and 
using rate. It is notable that 53% of t
centres of hamlets or communes they were living in. The average distance from the 
households to the health centres of 3.8
the hamlet-level or communal
healthcare facilities was common for the households
Indeed, 28 percent of the ill or injured individuals were found to have medical treatment by 
other types of healthcare services. The BLS did not specify further questions on what could 
be the other types but some alternatives available in these 
include self-treatment at home, having treatment by private medical practi
using worship. It is unfortunate that we do not have further information to investigate how 
widely worship is used for medical treatment in the 
 
Figure 2.1: Healthcare utilization: outpatient vs
(a) Outpatient treatment
Source: drawn from the data calculated from the VHLSS 2004, 2006
 
Figure 2.2 The use of health care service in the 
Source: drawn from the data calculated from the 
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2.3 Access to basic infrastructures 
The extremely difficult communes covered in the BLS are mainly located in mountainous 
and remote areas. Although there has been improvement in infrastructure in these 
communes, the current infrastructure remain less developed in these areas. Table 2.6 
examines the access to car road in the extremely difficult communes. More than 90 percent 
of communes have road to their centres. The road coverage in these communes was as high 
as the level observed using the VHLSS 2006. However, the road coverage diminishes 
considerably when moving down to the village level as only 68 percent villages 
interviewed had car road passing by. For communes where the main people group is the 
Mong, more than a half of the total villages do not have car roads. Where road to the 
villages were not available, it took the P135-II households an average of 7.8 km to the 
nearest road. In addition, where roads were available, they were usable during an average 
of 9.9 months. Using the data on types of road according to materials used, it is found that 
a half of all road in the extremely difficult communes are dust roads. This could be taken to 
suggest relatively low quality of roads to villages of the extremely difficult communes. 
This could be translated into difficulties in access to education, healthcare, and, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, major obstacle for market linkages.  
Table 2.6 Access to roads leading to communes and villages (%, km, and number) 
 % 
commune 
having road 
% village 
having 
road 
Distance from 
village to nearest 
road (km) 
Number of months 
that village road 
can be used 
Average 94.1 68.0 7.8 9.9 
Ethnic groups 
Majority 90.3 76.4 3.6 11.1 
Ethnic minorities 94.9 66.2 8.4 9.7 
Tay 94.4 68.9 7.0 10.1 
Thai 91.0 62.7 10.2 8.5 
Muong 98.7 93.0 9.4 10.5 
Nung 100.0 61.8 4.4 9.3 
Mong 99.4 46.2 9.3 10.1 
Dao 97.0 61.4 7.0 8.9 
Others  90.8 73.3 9.0 9.8 
Regions 
Red River Delta & Southeast 100.0 86.6 1.5 12.0 
North East 96.5 61.4 7.0 10.2 
North West 97.3 68.6 10.4 8.2 
North Central Coast 87.0 79.4 9.8 9.5 
South Central Coast 80.0 68.0 12.1 10.6 
Central Highlands 100.0 89.3 6.3 9.5 
Mekong River Delta 88.1 44.5 3.2 12.0 
Geography  
Delta, costal 88.1 44.5 3.2 12.0 
Low mountain 98.0 87.7 2.6 10.7 
High mountain 93.8 65.4 8.7 9.6 
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Source: authors’ calculations from the BLS 
Notes: these figures are obtained at the commune level; the classification of these communes by 
ethnicity is based on which ethnic minority groups are dominant in the population of these 
communes. 
Table 2.7 presents the access to schools by ethnicity and regions. Around 79 percent and 
68 percent of the extremely difficult communes have primary schools and lower secondary 
schools, respectively. However, the percentage of communes having upper secondary 
school is very low, only at around three percent.  As these are the extremely difficult 
communes of the country, these figures are lower than the national average level reported 
on the basis of the VHLSS 2006. For instant, more than 95 percent of rural communes 
having primary schools, while less than 80 percent of the extremely difficult communes 
having this school facility. Using the data on the sub-sample of the Programme 135-II 
communes, we found that only 78 percent of the P135-II communes had primary schools. 
This represent a big gap between the current rate of 78 percent and the target rate of 100 
percent. It suggests that substantial investment from the P135-II will be needed to ensure 
the target of all communes having schools/classes by 2010. This clearly represents a 
challenge for the P135-II. 
Table 2.7 Access to schools  (%) 
 % commune 
having primary 
school 
% commune having 
lower secondary 
school 
% commune 
having upper 
secondary school 
Average 79.0 68.1 3.0 
Ethnic groups   
Majority 91.6 81.9 5.9 
Ethnic minorities 76.2 65.0 2.3 
Tay 85.5 73.5 3.2 
Thai 89.6 89.6 9.3 
Muong 89.7 85.2 7.2 
Nung 74.2 40.5 0.0 
Mong 64.5 60.0 0.7 
Dao 67.4 58.4 0.0 
Others  72.9 54.2 0.0 
Regions 
Red River Delta & South East 100.0 86.6 13.7 
North East 74.1 63.9 2.7 
North West 81.5 78.0 4.4 
North Central Coast 83.2 72.9 2.7 
South Central Coast 74.9 52.6 0.0 
Central Highlands 69.2 47.3 0.0 
Mekong River Delta 100.0 92.3 0.0 
Geography 
Delta, costal 100.0 92.3 7.7 
Low mountain 93.4 79.2 0.6 
High mountain 74.3 63.9 1.9 
Source: authors’ calculations from the BLS 
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Notes: these figures are obtained at the commune level; the classification of these 
communes by ethnicity is based on which ethnic minority groups are dominant in the 
population of these communes. 
Access healthcare service is widely considered as equally important as access to education. 
Table 2.8 assesses the availability of healthcare centres in the extremely difficult 
communes. Almost all the communes have commune health care centres. Where 
healthcare services were not available at the communes, the households in these communes 
needed to travel an average of 20 kilometres to the nearest health centres. However, there 
are only a few communes having district hospitals. There is a long distance from commune 
to the nearest district hospital. The average distance from communes to the nearest district 
hospitals is 17 km for the majority and 28 km for the ethnic minority. People who live in 
delta areas have much shorter distance to hospitals than people in mountainous areas. The 
BLS does not provide information on the conditions of the healthcare stations found in the 
extremely difficult communes. But it is commonly understood that these stations are only 
equipped with the most essential facilities and basic medicines for popular and simple 
diseases. Hospitals at the district level or provincial level are expected to provide more 
complicated medical treatment. 
Table 2.8 Access to health care centres and hospitals (%, km, and minute) 
 % commune 
having 
health care 
centre 
% commune 
having 
district 
hospital 
Distance from 
commune to 
district hospital 
(km) 
Travelling time 
from commune to 
district hospital 
(minute) 
Average 96.9 1.1 25.8 93.0 
Ethnic groups 
        
Majority 97.6 0.0 17.2 41.2 
Ethnic minorities 96.7 1.3 27.7 104.2 
Tay 100.0 0.0 21.8 71.9 
Thai 99.0 0.0 36.0 120.9 
Muong 98.7 1.3 26.3 70.3 
Nung 100.0 7.9 19.3 124.0 
Mong 91.0 0.0 30.2 137.0 
Dao 100.0 0.0 33.5 139.4 
Others  94.7 2.9 25.1 85.4 
Regions 
        
Red River Delta & South East 93.3 2.0 22.1 48.0 
North East 97.7 0.8 23.5 100.6 
North West 97.8 0.0 39.9 127.2 
North Central Coast 98.5 0.0 23.8 75.1 
South Central Coast 90.9 4.0 20.0 97.7 
Central Highlands 100.0 4.1 26.8 68.2 
Mekong River Delta 92.3 0.0 9.8 24.7 
Geography          
Delta, costal 92.3 0.0 9.8 24.7 
Low mountain 95.4 0.6 18.4 47.8 
High mountain 97.5 1.3 28.5 107.5 
Source: authors’ calculations from the BLS 
 Notes: these figures are obtained at the commune level; the classification by ethnicity is based on 
which ethnic minority groups are dominant in the population of these communes.
In addition to access to education and healthcare facilities, other b
also important for improving living standards. Figure 2.3 provides a general picture by 
comparing the access to other infrastructures between the 
minority using data from the VHLSSs. It seems that ther
access to tap water, market, and electricity across these two ethnic groups, while the access 
to post office and culture houses is essentially the same between the two. Access to tap 
water and market is much better higher 
majority group also have higher percentage of households using electricity than ethnic 
minorities.  
 
Figure 2.3
Source: drawn from the data calculated from 
 
Given this general picture, Table 2. 9 below provides further insights on the access to some 
basic infrastructure facilities in the 
that the access to electricity in these 
calculated from the VHLSS 2006. On average, 
access to national electricity grid.
welfare in previous studies on Vietnam (se
it is important to inform that 86 percent of the 
offices. This coverage rate is considerably higher than the national average level obtained 
from the VHLSS 2006 (whic
on access to irrigation system, which is important for agricultural production. On average, 
62 percent of the extremely difficult communes
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asic infrastructures are 
majority group and the ethnic 
e are considerable differences in 
for the majority than for ethnic minorities. The 
 Other infrastructures by ethnicity in 2006 (%)
the VHLSS 2006
extremely difficult communes of the country
communes was as high as the national average level 
nearly 95 percent of these
 Having post office was found important for household 
e Baulch et al. 2008 for instance). In this regard, 
extremely difficult communes
h was about 40 percent). The BLS also provides information 
 reported having irrigation systems. 
ccess to irrigation facilities. Using the data on the 
-II, it should be stressed that the coverage of 61 percent
Market Electricity Post-office Culture house
Majority Ethnic minority
 
 
 
 
. It is noted 
 communes had 
 had post 
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was observed for the Programme’s targeted communes. This represents a big gap between 
the current rate of having irrigation systems and the target of 80 percent of the communes 
having small irrigation systems by 2010.  
Table 2.9 Access to basic infrastructure facilities (%) 
    
% having 
electricity 
grid 
% having 
post 
office 
% having 
cultural 
house 
% having 
radio 
station 
% having 
irrigation 
% 
having 
market 
Average 96.6 86.4 22.2 39.4 61.8 30.6 
Regions 
  
Red River Delta and Southeast 100.0 79.8 37.5 77.9 49.0 22.1 
  
North East 97.3 87.4 17.4 32.5 66.9 38.4 
  
North West 94.3 89.8 33.2 22.0 47.2 20.0 
  
North Central Coast 93.3 79.0 25.6 37.8 64.1 29.8 
  
South Central Coast 95.2 80.0 24.0 51.4 78.9 17.1 
  
Central Highlands 98.8 90.5 14.8 49.7 58.5 9.5 
  
Mekong River Delta 100.0 94.0 7.7 88.1 59.0 66.7 
Main ethnic groups 
  
Majority 100.0 86.9 25.5 62.7 63.0 45.7 
  
Tày 97.5 95.1 20.5 31.8 64.3 31.5 
  
Thái 93.6 84.1 48.8 21.4 72.6 21.9 
  
Mường 94.0 85.4 19.8 50.9 48.4 51.0 
  
Nùng 100.0 84.3 0.0 14.7 48.4 15.7 
  
H'Mông 96.0 79.7 8.7 16.8 51.6 34.8 
  
Dao 96.7 91.0 25.8 30.5 67.4 29.6 
  
Còn lại 94.5 84.9 21.2 52.5 65.8 15.4 
Geography 
  Delta, costal 100.0 94.0 7.7 88.1 59.0 66.7 
  Low mountain 100.0 92.9 27.7 53.1 66.9 50.0 
  High mountain 95.4 84.6 22.0 33.0 61.0 23.9 
Source: authors’ calculations from the BLS 
Notes: these figures are obtained at the commune level; the classification by ethnicity is based on 
which ethnic minority groups are dominant in the population of these communes. 
In effect, although Vietnam have provided significant support programs for ethnic minority 
development, the access to public services of ethnic minorities remains limited. Education 
degree among adults as well as school enrolment among children are lower for ethnic 
minorities compared to the rural average levels. There is also a large difference in 
education degree among ethnic minority groups. The Mong, Bana and H’re are ethnic 
minority groups who have the lowest education as well as the lowest enrolment rates.  
The use of health care service is also lower for ethnic minorities than for the majority. 
However, the use of health care services for ethnic minorities tends to increase overtime. 
Perhaps, the most successful in health care policy for ethnic minorities is the increase in 
the health insurance provided for ethnic minorities. The percentage of the insured people 
among ethnic minorities increases significantly and is even higher than the percentage of 
the insured  among the majority group. The extremely difficult communes are featured by 
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poor infrastructure conditions. Both the majority and the ethnic minority residing in these 
areas. Yet, the majority group tends to live in communes which have better infrastructures 
such as road, schools, healthcare centres than ethnic minorities. 
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Chapter 3. Livelihoods of the Poor Ethnic Minorities 
 
How household diversify their resources for alternative livelihood activities is the key 
determinant of their well-being. In attempts to answer the research question three, This 
chapter analyzes the livelihood of the ethnic minorities in the extremely difficult 
communes of the country. We first provide a narrative of labour market participation by 
the poor ethnic minorities. Given the data availability to this study, the chapter then 
focuses on income sources generated from different livelihood activities pursued by the 
poor ethnic minorities before some stylized facts on each of the major activities are 
highlighted.  
3.1 Labour market participation and labour allocation 
The labour market functioning and labour market participation are key issues for the 
poverty reduction policies. At the micro level, the poor derive the main part of their 
income from work. At the macro level, labour markets are the major channel through 
which growth and global macroeconomic conditions affect households’ living conditions 
and poverty. The BLS is not designed mainly to capture expenditure and income, and the 
labour market indicators are limited in scope. As a result, it is not possible to measure 
unemployment or underemployment accurately neither to distinguish between formal 
sector employment and informal sector employment. Other key information on 
employment such as social security or information on those working in household 
businesses is also unavailable. In spite of these shortcomings, we have explored the 
information available to report some core standard labour market indicators  as in Table 
3.1 and some stylized facts characterizing labour force participation of the ethnic 
minorities in the extremely difficult communes of the country. 
It is not surprising that employment rate in the poorest commune was as high as the 
common standards in rural Vietnam. Nearly 90 percent of people aged from 16 to the 
retirement age having jobs. This might reflect the fact that people at the working age have 
to work as their income levels are so low to afford being out of the labour force. The fact 
that employment rates in the poorest regions such as North East, North West, Central 
Highlands are higher than in the other two deltas lend a support to that notion. In addition, 
for some ethnic groups such as Mong, Dao, Bana, H’re, the employment rates are higher 
than 95 percent. As shown in Chapter 1, these are also the poorest ethnic groups in the 
country. As a consequence, the employment rate for the groups who speak the Kinh 
language or little ethnic languages is lower than the other groups who speak both the Kinh 
and ethnic language or only ethnic languages by an order of twelve percentage points. 
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Table 3.1 Participation in the labour market in the extremely difficult communes (%) 
  
Working 
in the past 
12 months 
Wage 
employed 
Farming 
activities  
Off-farm 
activities 
Under-
employed 
(less 30h/ 
week) 
Having 
one job 
Having 
two 
jobs 
Average 89.6 28.2 77.7 11.7 52.1 62.6 26.0 
Ethnicity 
  
Majority 81.4 33.7 59.5 15.5 60.1 54.7 26.1 
  
Ethnic minority 93.5 25.6 86.2 9.9 48.3 66.3 26.0 
  
Tay 91.9 23.7 88.9 13.2 44.4 60.3 29.4 
  
Thai 93.6 17.5 91.3 8.2 60.7 71.1 21.5 
  
Muong 91.1 33.3 85.9 8.6 41.6 55.5 34.5 
  
Nung 93.5 22.4 92.3 12.2 37.6 62.5 28.4 
  
Mong 96.8 10.2 96.5 11.3 32.1 76.4 19.7 
  
Dao 95.4 15.0 94.0 15.9 37.2 67.7 26.1 
  
Others in NU 93.6 12.8 92.1 7.9 47.3 75.0 17.9 
  
Bana 97.2 30.7 97.2 1.9 45.2 65.5 30.6 
  
H're 98.4 34.3 97.5 1.8 90.8 63.3 35.1 
  
Co Tu 86.9 14.6 85.8 2.2 66.3 71.9 14.3 
  
Others in CH 91.4 27.2 89.8 2.5 55.4 63.8 27.2 
  
Khmer 91.0 66.9 41.7 11.7 56.9 62.5 27.7 
  
Others 97.0 28.6 95.5 1.3 61.1 68.5 28.4 
Regions 
  
Red River Delta 83.0 29.0 72.8 8.1 45.9 56.6 25.9 
  
North East 93.2 21.0 90.5 14.9 36.8 61.7 29.7 
  
North West 93.8 15.4 90.6 8.6 50.9 74.0 19.1 
  
North Central Coast 89.7 27.1 84.2 7.6 62.5 61.3 27.5 
  
South Central Coast 93.0 26.5 89.3 6.9 78.6 63.7 29.1 
  
Central Highlands 91.9 35.3 88.3 6.6 47.1 54.2 37.1 
  
Southeast 86.5 55.1 49.7 10.8 63.1 57.4 28.9 
  
Mekong River Delta 80.2 42.9 44.5 14.8 63.9 58.7 21.1 
Gender of household head 
  
Male 90.0 27.0 79.8 11.6 51.8 62.7 26.2 
  
Female 86.2 38.9 58.8 12.8 54.6 62.1 24.0 
Daily language 
  
No or little Viet 94.2 24.3 85.7 9.1 45.7 70.0 23.3 
  
Both Viet and ethnic 92.4 28.8 88.0 10.2 57.0 59.7 30.8 
  
No or little ethnic 82.6 32.7 63.0 15.7 57.8 54.7 27.2 
Poor vs. non-poor 
  
Poor 91.6 22.8 85.8 6.3 52.2 68.8 22.4 
  
Non-poor 88.1 32.2 71.7 15.6 52.0 58.1 28.7 
Source: authors’ calculations from the BLS 
Though the employment rates are high across all the dimensions of the analysis, the most 
of working people are however self-employed in agriculture (i.e. 78 percent). It is not 
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surprised that the majority is less dependent on agriculture (less than 60% working in the 
sector). Wage employment, which are taken place mainly in terms of working for the 
authorities, is rather limited at around 28 percent. The incidence of wage employment in 
the extremely difficult communes are thus considerably lower than the rural average level 
of 39% (using the VHLSS 2006). The Bana, H’re, Muong are as active as the majority but 
none is however comparable to the Khmer group. With 66 percent of working people are 
wage-employed, the Khmers are found active in the paid jobs. This might reflect the fact 
that they were hired by other households to work on their farms on daily or weekly basis. 
On average, the incidence of wage employment is also higher in the South and in the 
North. This is in comport with the previous studies on the labour market of Vietnam (see 
Pham and Reilly, 2009 for instance). 
It is noted that nonfarm diversification is modest in the extremely difficult communes. Less 
than 12 percent of working people participated in off-farm activities. Using the data from 
VHLSS 2006, the incidence of nonfarm diversification in 2006 was nearly 58 percent. 
Participation into nonfarm activities is almost ignorable for the ethnic minorities residing 
in the Central Highlands. The ethnic minority groups those are most assimilated to the 
Kinh such as Tay, Thai, Muong, Nung are as diversified as the average of the ethnic 
minority. Surprisingly, the H’mong people, who are mainly reside in high mountains are 
diversified into the nonfarm sector as much as the average level. In fact, nonfarm 
diversification could taken place for ‘good’ or ‘bad’ reasons. While the latter refers to the 
pressure on the poor to diversify as a coping strategy, the former implies the attraction of 
the RNFS to the better-off. In this regard, the welfare effect of nonfarm diversification 
depends on whether rural households are in a ‘pull’ or ‘push’ scenario – using Hart’s 
(1994) terminology. Some rural households may be ‘pushed’ into nonfarm activities in 
their struggle to survive, while others may be ‘pulled’ into them by their desire to 
accumulate. As the ‘pushed’ scenario is usually referred to poor households and the 
‘pulled’ is more likely associated with the non-poor, the welfare effect of nonfarm 
diversification on rural poverty in general is not unequivocal. In the context of the 
extremely difficult communes in Vietnam, it is likely that nonfarm income-generating 
opportunities available for the ethnic minorities represent the ‘push’ scenario, and thus 
contribution of nonfarm activities to the living standards might be minimum. The final row 
of Table 3.1 show identical level of nonfarm diversification between the poor and the non-
poor in the extremely difficult communes of the country. This also reflects the finding 
reported by Pham et al. (2008) who found that nonfarm diversification is generally a way 
out of poverty for rural households but the poor are less able to benefit from nonfarm 
opportunities.  
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We define underemployment by the common threshold of working less than 30 hours per 
week. Using that definition, it was found that more than a half of the working people in the 
extremely difficult communes were under-employed. Underemployment is particularly 
worrying in the (North and South) Central Coast, Mekong River Delta, and Southeast. For 
instance, nearly 80 percent of households in the South Central Coast revealed that they 
were underemployed. This incidence of underemployment is far higher than the average 
level in the rural areas. According to MOLISA, the underemployment rate of the rural 
labour force was about 29 percent in 2006 (GSO, 2008). This might be taken to suggest an 
important aspect of employment in the extremely difficult communes, where almost 
everyone in the working age work (either for themselves on their farms or for the other) 
but their employment activities are not sufficient and they are thus seriously under-
employed.  
To some extent, the analysis from Table 3.1 suggests a vicious cycle in the extremely 
difficult communes: most of people have to take some work activities but as these are not 
sufficient to generate income, leaving them in poor conditions but having little time to 
invest in human capita and better income diversification opportunities. The subsection 
below provides insights on different sources of household income. 
3.2 Income sources of the poor ethnic minorities 
Overall picture of income-generating activities and their contribution to total household 
income is given in Table 3.2. In absolute terms, the average household member in the 
poorest commune earned 4.6 million VND/per year in 2007.16 But the average per capita 
income varies greatly amongst different ethnic groups. The majority earned the highest of 
7.4 million VND/per head/per year. This income level is at least two times higher than 
those earned by other ethnic groups (with the exception of the Khmer’s). Particularly, the 
majority earned on average 3.6 times higher than the H’mong, around three times higher 
than the Bana, H’re, and other ethnic groups in the Central Highlands. The Khmer, Muong, 
Tay, Nung, Thai respectively ranked after the majority in their average earning per head. 
This suggests a strong correlation, through not causal, between assimilation to the Kinh 
majority and average income level. Figure 3.1 provides a better illustration for the income 
gap between the majority group and the ethnic minority. The vertical line represents the 
average income level in the extremely difficult communes. Most of ethnic minority 
households are located on the right of the vertical line, representing lower income levels; 
while the majority are located primarily on the opposite of the vertical line. Interestingly, it 
shows that at any income levels on the right of the vertical line, the majority earn 
                                                 
16
 As noted in the Introduction, all income indicators in this study is given in the real terms of September 
2009, when the BLS was started the data collection process. To facilitate the comparison of the analysis 
across sections and chapters, unless explained otherwise, per capita income is used. 
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considerably higher than the ethnic minority. This kernel distribution of per capita income 
looks essentially the same as the kernel density of per capita expenditure between the two 
ethnic groups as reported in World Bank (2009). 
 
Table 3.2 Real Per Capita Income by Sources (%) 
  
Structure of household income (per head) 
Total 
  
crops Live
stock Aqua Forestry Wage 
Off-
farm transfer Other 
Average 33.7 7.4 2.6 4.4 22.8 18.4 8.4 2.4 4,636 
By regions   
  
Red River Delta 18.0 15.1 1.4 1.8 30.0 8.1 23.9 1.8 4,233 
  
North East 38.7 14.6 1.0 8.7 18.6 7.8 9.1 1.5 3,242 
  
North West 50.5 9.6 1.4 6.9 18.3 6.2 5.4 1.9 3,550 
  
North Central Coast 20.4 12.6 1.5 8.7 26.0 10.4 15.3 5.1 3,727 
  
South Central Coast 27.9 9.3 0.8 6.4 27.4 8.8 17.6 1.8 3,380 
  
Central Highlands 53.7 3.4 0.4 1.6 26.6 7.5 4.8 2.0 4,702 
  
Southeast 24.5 1.8 0.1 3.2 46.6 9.7 12.4 1.6 5,329 
  
Mekong River Delta 28.1 2.0 5.4 0.5 19.9 36.1 5.3 2.7 8,357 
By ethnic groups   
  
Majority 27.5 5.0 4.1 1.8 22.3 28.3 9.3 1.8 7,404 
  
Ethnic minority 40.5 10.0 1.0 7.2 23.3 7.4 7.5 3.0 3,285 
  
Tay 34.8 13.3 1.2 8.9 19.1 9.7 11.6 1.5 3,698 
  
Thai 45.5 11.4 2.7 7.8 17.9 3.9 6.0 4.8 3,188 
  
Muong 34.2 12.4 0.7 5.3 27.7 9.1 8.5 2.0 3,904 
  
Nung 44.8 14.6 0.8 8.6 19.6 5.0 6.0 0.6 3,294 
  
Mong 57.8 13.9 0.3 12.2 6.6 3.4 4.0 1.7 2,034 
  
Dao 52.1 14.2 0.8 12.3 10.8 3.3 4.6 1.8 2,890 
  
Others in NU 58.7 8.1 1.0 9.9 13.1 1.7 3.7 3.7 2,873 
  
Bana 73.7 3.2 0.1 3.3 14.2 1.0 3.9 0.7 2,345 
  
H're 35.8 11.7 0.4 5.4 24.2 1.9 19.9 0.7 2,547 
  
Co Tu 26.6 4.7 1.3 15.3 23.5 0.6 21.1 6.9 2,969 
  
Others in CH 44.9 2.1 0.6 10.6 20.5 1.2 16.1 4.0 2,671 
  
Khmer 27.4 2.8 0.3 0.3 45.4 15.5 3.3 4.9 4,832 
  
Others 38.8 5.6 1.1 8.9 25.0 1.1 13.6 5.8 2,568 
Gender of household heads   
  
Male 36.0 7.6 3.1 4.7 20.9 18.6 6.8 2.3 4,544 
  
Female 21.1 6.6 0.1 2.9 32.6 17.0 16.8 3.0 5,198 
Daily language                   
  
No or little Viet 43.9 9.3 0.9 7.6 22.9 5.9 6.6 3.0 3,001 
  
Both Viet and ethnic 36.7 10.5 1.2 7.5 21.6 10.0 8.8 3.6 3,731 
  
No or little ethnic 31.3 13.9 0.9 4.7 29.1 10.2 7.9 2.0 4,284 
Poverty status 
  
  
Poor 49.6 12.5 -6.2 13.1 21.3 -0.5 7.4 2.8 1,300 
  
Non-poor 31.5 6.7 3.8 3.2 23.0 20.9 8.5 2.3 7,121 
Source: authors’ calculations from the BLS 
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Figure 3.1 Income of the Kinh and the Ethnic Minority 
 
Source: drawn from the income data calculated from the BLS 
 
There is also a spatial pattern in income distribution. Households in the poor communes of 
the Mekong River Delta earned highest compared with those residing in the other reasons. 
Compared to the other regions in the Northern part and the Central Highlands, the average 
income level in the Mekong River Delta is higher by between two to 2.6 times. This might 
reflect the concentration of rice production in this delta. As suggested by Benjamin and 
Brandt (2004), removing barriers to trade and production in agriculture directly benefited 
the majority of Vietnam’s population whose livelihoods were closely dependent on small-
scale subsistence agriculture. In addition, the average income level also varies by the 
language ability. As expected, the households those speak the Viet language and little or no 
ethnic languages earned higher than those in the other two language groups. The most 
striking income gap is found between the poor and the non-poor. Figures in the last row of 
Table 3.2 reveal that the non-poor earned on average 5.5 times higher than the poor. It 
should be noted that this gap is found between the poor and the non-poor living in the 
poorest areas of the country, where one could expect a low level of income inequality. 
We now turn the attention to the eight major income sources, including those from crops, 
livestock, aquaculture, forestry, wage, off-farm activities, transfer, and other sources. The 
structure of income reported in Table 3.2 mirrors the structure of income-generating 
activities covered earlier in this subsection. On average, crop income, accounting for one 
third of the total income, is the most important income source for households in the 
extremely difficult communes of the country. Wage and off-farm income ranked second 
and third with the corresponding shares of 23 and 18 percent, respectively. These three 
sources contribute up to two third of the total income per head. The remaining is attributed 
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 to livestock, forestry, aquaculture, transfer, and other income sources. It is important to 
emphasize that while the land endowment in the 
forest land but forestry represents a modest, and almost ignorable source of income. On 
average, forestry accounts for less than five percent of the total income. There mig
two reasons underlying this modest contribution of forestry income source. At many 
locations, forest are classified as protected forest, making it illegal for households to 
exploit forestry resources. In addition, where forests were almost cut down c
(former) forestry land is used for some low yielding staple crops and thus is not attributed 
to forestry income source. Being the 
households in the areas received considerable transfers from sever
programmes. These transfers contribute to the average income per head as much as 
livestock, and nearly equal to income from forestry, aquaculture, and other sources 
together. 
 
Figure 3.2 Income Structure of the 
(a) 
Figure 3.2 above is drawn from the income structure of the two groups with panel (a) for 
the majority, panel (b) for ethnic minority. The pattern of income diversification of the 
ethnic minority is different from that of the 
minority relies heavily on crops as their major source of income (i.e. 40 percent), while the 
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the BLS, the nonfarm sector contributed up to 28 percent of the average per capita income 
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 income from nonfarm participation is equal to that of forestry in the average income of the 
ethnic minority. For the majority
accounted for less than two percent of the real per capita income.
There is also a considerable difference amongst the ethnic groups in their income 
portfolios. With the exception of the Khmer, who earned more than a half of their income 
from wage employment, crop income remains the most important income source for all 
other ethnic groups. Figur
income per capita according to ethnicity. The bar highlighted in brown represents the crop 
income share of the ethnic minority as a whole (which is equal to around 40 percent). All 
that ethnic groups that are located on the left of this bar are more dependent on crop 
income. They consist of the Bana, 
Central Highlands and in the Northern Uplands of the country. Of these groups, the Bana 
in the Central Highlands exhibits heaviest dependence on crop income source (i.e. nearly 
74 percent). The ethnic groups that are located on the right of the highlighted bar earned 
less than the average of the ethnic minority from crop activities. These groups are t
and Co Tu in the Central Highlands, Muong, Tay, and the other groups. It is noted that the 
Khmer and Co Tu are dependent on crop income as much as the 
Khmer, this might be linked to their concentration to the Mekong River D
rice bowl of Vietnam. 
 
Figure 3.3 Crops as the Most Important Income Source
Source: drawn from the income data calculated from the BLS
Female-headed households account for 11 percent of the total BLS sample. The gender 
dimension is also reflected in the structure of household income. 
households possess less annual crop land than male
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agriculture equal to 46 percent that of male headed households. Table 3.2 suggests that 
female-headed households in the extremely difficult communes are less dependent on crop 
income than the male-headed counterpart by an order of 15 percentage points. To 
compensate for that, female-headed households are more reliant on wage employment 
activities. Given the data available to this study, it is difficult to provide a satisfactory 
reason for this difference as detailed information on these wage employment activities are 
not available or not reliable given the small number of observation. However, one could 
postulate that as female-headed households are poorly endowed in landholding (see 
Chapter 1), they are more likely to seek for work in terms of working for other households.  
Finally, the difference in income-generating patterns of the poor and the non-poor is 
noteworthy. The final rows of Table 3.2 report negative numbers at the cells of aquaculture 
and nonfarm activities of the poor. This is because the poor households spent on these 
activities more than what they earned from these. More importantly, while the non-poor 
earned nearly one fifth of their average income from the nonfarm sector, the poor 
compensated their nonfarm participation by other income sources as they lost from such 
activities. Given that, the poor in the extremely difficult communes have little choice but 
rely on agriculture as their main income source. For these households, crop income 
contribute a half of the total income per head, while the non-poor earned less than one third 
of their income from crop cultivation. Observed from the above, the non-poor is endowed 
two times larger than the poor in annual crop lands, but their income from that endowment 
is higher than that of the poor by more than three times. This suggests that the non-poor 
used their crop lands more effectively compared to the poor. 
3.3 Main livelihoods of the poor ethnic minorities 
This last section of the chapter focuses on the main livelihoods of the households in the 
extremely difficult communes of Vietnam. Using the data available from the BLS, we will 
examine some stylized facts on each of these main livelihood activities. 
Livelihoods in agriculture 
Table 3.3 gives an overall picture of land allocation amongst different crops, which 
reported above as the most important source of household income in the extremely difficult 
communes. On average, households in this areas allocate 54 percent of annual crop land 
for rice, 29 percent for other staples, the remaining is for other crops. There is however a 
great variety in annual crop land use pattern between the ethnic groups and regions. The 
majority, Khmer, and H’re spare most of their annual croplands for rice. Especially, the 
Khmer exhibits a heavy concentration on rice with nearly 99 percent cropland used for 
rice. The Khmer households possess substantially more rice land compared to the majority 
and any other ethnic groups. In absolute terms, the Khmers are endowed 2.7 times more 
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than the average of the extremely difficult communes, and 1.8 times higher than the 
majority. This lends an explanation for the share of 99 percent of land in the Mekong River 
Delta used for paddy rice cultivation. 
While households in the poor MRD are most well endowed with paddy rice land; those in 
Northern Uplands and Central Highlands are better endowed in staple crop land. 
Consequently, the ethnic groups in these regions are more dependent on staples crops. 
Particularly, the H’mong, Dao, Thai, Muong, others in the North West, the Bana, and 
others in the Central Highlands allocated more than a half of their total cropland 
endowment for staples, which are mainly maize, cassava. Interestingly, we found a 
considerable difference in cropland use pattern between the poor and the non-poor. While 
the non-poor allocated 70 percent of their cropland for rice, the poor spared a half of their 
cropland for other staples. This reflects the high concentration on rice of the majority, who 
are less likely to be poor than the ethnic minority. It is also in comport with the figures 
calculated by the language dimension, which show that the households those speak the 
Viet language and little or no ethnic languages allocated nearly 82 percent of their annual 
cropland for rice production. 
Given the dominance of rice production in the cropland use pattern, it is expected that rice 
income is an important source of household income. Indeed, Table 3.3 shows that rice 
contributed up to 52 percent of crop income (which is equal to nearly 16 percent of total 
income per head) in the extremely difficult communes. Other staples accounted for less 
than one third, the remaining is shared by annual perennial crops, fruits, and other related 
products. The structure of crop income mirrors the pattern of cropland by the different 
ethnic groups. As the Khmer mainly focus on rice production, this livelihood represents 87 
percent of their crop income. The ethnic groups in the Northern Uplands and Central 
Highlands (with the exception of the H’re) are more dependent on staple crops as their 
major or the second most important source of crop income. Annual perennial crops do not 
represents an important source of crop income in general but turn out to be a major income 
source for the H’re and other ethnic groups in the Central Highlands. This reflects the land 
endowment in this area, which is particularly favorable for production of annual perennial 
crops. 
However, the differences across the poor and non-poor and gender of household heads 
noted above do not translate into differences in the structure of crop income. While the 
non-poor are more concentrated on rice production than the poor, the shares of rice income 
in the total crop income almost identical between the two groups. This is attributed to the 
fact that the non-poor, as highlighted earlier, are more diversified than the poor, especially 
in wage employment and other off-farm income-generating activities (see Table 3.1). 
Though the share of rice production in the total crop income of the non-poor is not 
considerably different from the poor, it should be noted that in absolute terms, rice per 
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capita income of the non-poor is 3.4 times higher than that of the poor households in the 
extremely difficult communes of the country. 
Table 3.3 Cropland Allocation and Structure of Crop Income (%) 
    Land allocation (%) Contribution to crop income (%) 
  
Rice  Staples Peren-
nial 
crops 
Fruits Rice  Staples Peren-
nial 
crops 
Fruits Other 
by-
produc  
Average 64.5 33.2 1.5 0.8 51.8 29.1 11.3 5.0 3.0 
Regions 
  
Red River Delta 66.0 31.7 1.7 0.6 47.6 16.8 13.1 11.6 11.0 
  
North East 46.8 49.0 3.3 0.9 48.7 33.4 8.9 5.8 3.4 
  
North West 40.7 58.3 0.9 0.1 45.6 47.1 2.5 2.9 1.9 
  
North Central Coast 71.9 25.3 1.5 1.3 55.0 23.7 10.7 6.2 4.4 
  
South Central Coast 82.0 16.9 1.1 0.0 50.3 11.1 23.0 9.1 6.5 
  
Central Highlands 34.0 58.5 0.8 6.8 28.7 40.5 28.9 2.3 0.3 
  
Southeast 83.1 14.3 2.3 0.3 38.8 13.3 46.4 0.6 1.0 
  
Mekong River Delta 99.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 82.2 6.5 6.3 3.8 1.2 
Ethnic groups 
  
Majority 84.6 13.5 1.0 0.9 49.3 18.2 20.6 8.4 3.7 
  
Ethnic minority 55.3 42.2 1.7 0.7 52.7 33.4 7.6 3.6 2.7 
  
Tay 67.7 28.9 2.3 1.1 62.8 22.5 7.8 5.1 1.9 
  
Thai 54.3 44.4 1.0 0.3 57.8 34.2 2.3 3.0 2.8 
  
Muong 41.3  56.8 1.1 0.7 52.4 30.9 7.6 5.5 3.6 
  
Nung 60.2 37.3 2.1 0.4 44.1 30.0 18.3 3.9 4.0 
  
Mong 40.4 55.5 3.2 0.8 38.5 52.4 4.3 1.8 3.2 
  
Dao 46.0 51.6 1.7 0.6 50.6 35.5 9.3 2.7 2.0 
  
Others in NU 33.0 63.8 0.9 2.3 34.8 53.9 4.0 4.4 3.2 
  
Bana 50.5 49.5 0.0 0.0 38.7 45.1 9.3 3.0 3.9 
  
H're 93.0 6.9 0.1 0.0 49.0 6.1 32.5 2.9 9.5 
  
Co Tu 59.7 38.0 2.3 0.0 57.1 32.9 1.7 8.1 0.2 
  
Others in CH 53.5 43.3 1.2 2.0 43.4 34.0 18.8 1.8 2.0 
  
Khmer 98.7 0.2 1.1 0.0 87.0 7.2 1.1 4.1 0.6 
  
Other ethnic 
groups 44.9 54.1 0.9 0.0 40.8 42.7 11.3 4.1 1.2 
Gender of household head 
  
Male 64.2 33.5 1.4 0.8 52.4 29.2 10.9 4.7 2.9 
  
Female 68.2 29.4 2.0 0.4 46.4 28.4 13.9 7.3 4.0 
Daily language                     
  
No or little Viet 53.0 44.4 1.8 0.8 52.7 36.6 5.7 2.7 2.3 
  
Both Viet and ethnic 63.3 34.9 1.3 0.5 53.2 27.3 11.3 5.0 3.3 
  
No or little ethnic 81.8 16.3 1.0 0.9 49.7 18.9 19.4 8.3 3.8 
Poor vs non-poor 
  
Poor 54.4 42.5 2.1 1.0 53.9 32.4 8.0 2.7 3.2 
  
Non-poor 69.2 28.9 1.2 0.7 50.0 26.5 13.9 6.8 2.8 
Source: authors’ calculations from the BLS 
51 
 
Livelihood  from livestock, forestry and aquaculture 
This sub-section attempts to analyze some aspects of the livelihoods in livestock, forestry, 
and aquaculture, which contribute on average 15 percent of the total income of the 
households in the extremely difficult communes. Table 3.4 reports income generated from 
these activities with a focus on the structure of livestock income.17 It seems that poultry is 
the main livestock raised in this area. On average, poultry accounted for a half of livestock 
income. Given the dependence on poultry and the reported incidence of poultry diseases 
(especially influenza A virus), livestock income is likely to be unstable over time, though 
time dimension is not captured by the BLS. Raising pork ranked after poultry as second 
most important livestock. The ethnic groups in the Northern Uplands tend to earn more 
from livestock than those in the other regions of the country. While the Tay, Thai, Muong, 
Nung, Dao earned higher than the average level, earnings from livestock in the Central 
Highlands are generally lower. In particular, the Bana, Co Tu earned only one fifth 
compared to the average livestock income (per head) of the extremely difficult communes. 
As shown in Chapter 1, and confirmed elsewhere (see, for instance, Pham et al. 2009 using 
the VHLSSs), forestry account for the majority of land endowment of the ethnic minority 
in the extremely difficult communes. Forestry income is however modest. On average, 
forestry income is around income from poultry, cows, and buffalos together. The ethnic 
groups in the Northern Uplands and North Central Coast earned considerably more than 
those in the rest of the country in forestry activities due to land endowment in these 
regions. Consequently, the Tay, Thai, Nung, H’mong, Dao, and other groups in the North 
West earned from forestry activities more than other ethnic groups. 
Seafood export growth has been an important source of economic growth in parts of the 
countries over the past decade. Aquaculture could be segmented into two broadly defined 
sub-sectors, including commercial aquaculture for export, and small-scale aquaculture for 
home consumption and/or supplying the domestic market. There are unfortunately 
statistics on participants in aquaculture are limited and it is thus not possible to provide a 
breakdown on the composition of these numbers according to export and small-scale 
aquaculture producing for the domestic market. Nevertheless, it is widely considered that 
most small-scale aquaculture is undertaken by poor farmers and fishermen. This point 
reflects the situation found in the extremely difficult communes. It is evident in Table 3.2 
that aquaculture is a marginal livelihood amongst the extremely difficult communes. 
Aquaculture is mainly focused in the Mekong River Delta, while diversification into this 
activity by ethnic groups in other regions is extremely limited. It is observed that the 
majority participate most actively and hence earn most from aquaculture compared to any 
                                                 
17
 It is desirable that the details on the other activities should also be covered in the study. However, data 
availability is a constraint for further disaggregate analysis of the forestry and aquaculture activities 
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other ethnic groups. This might relates to the requirement of knowledge and investment in 
aquaculture. 
Table 3.4 Livelihoods from Livestock, Forestry, and Aquaculture (% and 1000 VND) 
 
Structure of livestock income Total 
live- 
stock 
Forestry Aqua-culture 
  
Pork 
Cow, 
buff-
alo 
Castle Pou-ltry Others Trees 
Ser-
vices 
Rai-
sing 
Cap-
ture 
Average 32.2 6.2 3.0 50.1 9.5 348 178 23 101 16 
By regions 
  Red River Delta 35.4 6.2 3.7 46.0 13.8 660 44 30 -36 1 
  North East 32.2 4.5 3.7 46.5 13.8 480 255 28 22 9 
  North West 34.3 5.7 3.1 49.8 7.2 341 211 32 38 10 
  North Central Coast 31.9 10.6 3.8 47.1 7.9 478 285 35 13 35 
  South Central Coast 21.2 5.3 1.6 66.2 5.8 315 169 18 19 6 
  Central Highlands 17.3 16.0 3.2 58.2 10.6 168 60 16 14 5 
  Southeast 13.1 32.5 0.3 54.7 0.0 97 145 27 5 3 
  Mekong River Delta 40.9 2.5 0.0 57.1 0.2 171 33 0 416 31 
Ethnic groups 
  Majority 32.6 6.0 2.4 53.8 7.5 379 121 10 275 16 
  Ethnic minority 32.0 6.3 3.2 48.8 10.2 332 205 29 16 16 
  Tay 32.6 4.4 2.6 46.1 14.6 498 309 19 22 20 
  Thai 34.8 7.9 2.2 46.9 8.6 363 208 41 51 32 
  Muong 40.5 6.2 4.9 47.2 2.9 490 187 21 22 5 
  Nung 28.0 -1.5 3.2 50.4 20.3 483 274 9 20 7 
  Mong 30.4 7.6 4.8 43.3 14.6 285 222 26 2 3 
  Tay 30.4 9.1 3.0 43.7 13.9 413 295 60 16 5 
  Others in NU 25.1 3.6 4.4 61.0 6.2 234 234 50 17 9 
  Bana 6.0 37.0 0.0 49.6 7.5 75 72 3 1 2 
  H're 16.5 3.1 0.5 73.4 6.6 298 136 1 10 0 
  Co Tu 8.4 9.7 0.1 80.2 1.6 139 285 58 24 16 
  Others in CH 15.4 14.2 10.1 58.3 4.4 58 166 91 6 10 
  Khmer 46.4 7.2 0.0 46.2 0.2 136 14 0 -22 28 
  Other ethnic group 24.1 -4.2 0.7 77.5 1.9 143 201 24 2 23 
Gender of household heads 
  Male 32.7 6.5 3.2 48.9 9.7 347 185 23 118 17 
  Female 27.8 3.7 1.9 59.9 7.9 348 132 18 -3 6 
Daily language 
  No or little Viet 29.4 7.6 3.5 49.1 10.9 279 192 31 8 16 
  Both Viet and ethnic 39.3 4.1 2.3 47.3 7.4 399 250 27 33 11 
  No or little ethnic 32.1 5.5 2.7 53.3 8.5 411 130 11 243 15 
Poor vs non-poor 
  Poor 29.3 3.9 2.7 52.6 12.4 166 146 22 -97 15 
  Non-poor 34.4 8.1 3.3 48.1 7.2 483 201 23 248 16 
Source: authors’ calculations from the BLS 
53 
 
Livelihoods and market linkages 
Market linkages are crucial for the growth of cash crops, and thus income of the 
households in the remote locations. This notion provides a strong background for 
infrastructure development support in Vietnam and elsewhere in the developing world. Our 
calculation revealed  rice production was however found being mainly used for home 
consumption.18 On average, only 15 percent of the total rice output was sold by the 
households in the area. The level of rice commercialization of the majority-headed 
households was considerably higher than that of ethnic minorities. While 31 percent of rice 
produced by the majority-headed households was sold, only eight percent of the rice output 
harvested by the ethnic minority-headed households was sold to the market. Industrial 
perennial crops were most market-oriented as nearly a half of these crops were traded. 
These proportions remain relatively stable when comparing across ethnic groups, language 
ability, and gender of household heads. The highest level of commercialization was found 
for the industrial and perennial crops. On average, nearly a half of industrial crop outputs 
were marketed. It is also noted that communes in the Southern part of the country were 
generally more market integrated than those in the Centre or in the North. This could be 
linked to the fact that this is the major bowl for rice export and rice production in the South 
was more market-oriented than in the other two regions. 
In addition, the BLS reveals a monopoly of private traders in providing market linkages 
between the extremely difficult communes and centres of districts and provinces under 
consideration. In the case of rice, nearly 85 percent of rice commodity was actually sold to 
private traders. For other staple crops, 76 percent of commodities were bought by private 
traders. Unfortunately the BLS does not provide further information on these private 
traders and price margins. Pham and Konishi (2009) interviewed poor households in Son 
La and Dien Bien to indicate that the price margins taken by private dealers are anywhere 
between 20 to 50 percent. This high margin is partly due to (i) road conditions making 
access to remote villages prohibitive at times; and (ii) private dealers tend to dominate the 
transport of crops to the market and are able to charge above normal transport rates.  
Through there has been great improvements access to physical infrastructures in recent 
years, quality of access remains a concern (see Chapter 2). Our observations in poor 
communes, for instance in the North West, suggest that there are inter-village road system 
to connect villages and villages to the commune. But all of these road are small dust road, 
making it difficult for travelling during the rainy seasons. At times, some 
communes/villages can be completely disconnected from the rest of the country during 
heavy rain. As a result, access to market by poor households in remote communities could 
                                                 
18
 We report the most important figures rather than provide full tables here to conserve the space. But 
detailed indicators for commercialization of different crops are available from the authors upon request. 
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be extremely limited. Most households have no choices but to rely on private dealers for 
inputs such as seeds, livestock feed, fertilizers, and for selling their output.   Though this is 
not necessarily applicable to other provinces or regions, this does suggest that market 
linkages are likely to be an obstacle for escaping poverty of the poor in the difficult areas. 
More importantly, it is noted that limited market linkages does coincide with continuous 
improvements in access to market facilities. Using data from the V(H)LSS, Pham et al 
(2009) reported a marked increase in the incidence of communes having access to new 
markets. This suggests that providing physical markets is important to promote commodity 
production in the poor communes. But this is certainly not sufficient. Promoting market 
linkages to generate income opportunities for the poor requires attention to both physical 
and institutional changes. Improving transportation and markets are as necessary as 
introducing innovative mechanisms to ensure that farmers in the difficult area could 
receive competitive prices for their output. 
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Chapter 4. Re-Examining the Ethnic Income Gaps  
 
The gap in living standards amongst ethnic groups in Vietnam has been an area of 
intensive research. Most of the existing studies has investigated the gap in living standards 
between the majority and the 53 remaining minority groups using the data available from 
the series of VLSSs and VHLSSs. While highlighting the gap in living standards, as 
measured by per capita household expenditure, these studies have decomposed this 
majority-minority gap into differences in endowment (i.e., characteristics) and treatment 
(i.e., returns to characteristics) effects between the majority and the other ethnic minority 
groups. The differences in both components are found to favour the majority (see Pham et 
al. 2008 for a review). 
However, the existing literature suffers from three major limitations. Firstly, when 
examining welfare of ethnic minorities, most of the previous studies acknowledged an 
important role of ‘unobserved’ factors, which are partly attributed to heterogeneity in 
locations. However, we are currently pretty in the darkness as we do not know how this 
heterogeneity affects the results. But the effect of this factor could be large when 
comparing a Kinh-headed household living in Hanoi and a H’re-headed household, for 
instance, living in the Central Highlands. Secondly, previous studies have investigated the 
gap in living standards between majority and broadly defined minority groups at specific 
points in time using mean regression analysis. Although the aggregation of distinct groups 
is necessary and inevitable in such an exercise, the simple majority-minority dichotomy 
used in these studies is prone to distort important differences that may exist between 
individual ethnic groups.19 Finally, as mentioned earlier, empirical evidence on welfare of 
ethnic minorities has been based using the VHLSSs and VLSSs, which were not designed 
to be representative for ethnic minorities. This warrants cautions in interpreting this 
evidence, especially in formulating policy suggestions based on that evidence. 
In this context, the current study is developed to fill in the above gaps in the existing 
literature on ethnic minorities in Vietnam. This introduces the following novelty. First, the 
BLS interviewed different ethnic groups living in the extremely difficult communes of the 
countries that are of relatively similar socio-economic characteristics. As a result, the 
impact of location heterogeneity is minimized by the BLS itself. Thus, the welfare gaps 
between them (if any) could be better indicators to evaluate whether there are ‘differences 
in returns’ (or discrimination, if labour economics jargon is used). Secondly, in addition to 
                                                 
19
 This is largely due to data constraint. With exception of the VHLSS 2002, the other VHLSSs and VLSSs 
provides relatively small samples of ethnic minorities. This renders it difficult to investigate the welfare gaps 
among a finer disaggregation of different ethnic groups as the estimation results could be sensitive and 
unreliable due to small sample sizes. 
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re-examining the ‘conventional’ majority-minority welfare gap, the BLS provides a unique 
opportunity to investigate the welfare positions of around thirteen ethnic groups to the 
majority group as the base. This would produce, for the first time, insights on the welfare 
gaps among ethnic groups with a finer and at a more disaggregate classification of ethnic 
minorities.  
This chapter adopts the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition approach to examine the income 
gap across the ethnic groups. As a starting point, this approach will be applied to examine 
the income gap between the majority and the ethnic minority. Pursuing this approach in the 
current study involves two stages. First, the function of household income will be 
regressed on a number of explanatory variables at the household level, including 
demography, education, landholding, access to basic infrastructures, access to policies and 
other support. Table A4 of the appendix reports the mean regression estimates for the 
different ethnic groups using the above framework.  These estimates are not the subject of 
discussion here to conserve space.  However, the estimates are generally signed in 
accordance with priors and have plausible magnitudes.  The ‘goodness-of-fit’ measures are 
satisfactory by cross-sectional standards, which is an important requirement given the 
decomposition analysis undertaken in this study.20 
In the second stage, the estimates obtained from the first stage are then used to decompose 
the total income gap into the ‘differences in characteristics’ and the ‘differences in returns 
to characteristics”. For simplicity, these two component should be understood in the 
following way. Suppose that one majority-headed household A has one hectares of terrace 
land suitable for maize; another ethnic minority-headed household B has two hectares of 
terrace land of the same quality. Then the ‘differences in characteristics’ between 
household A and B is one hectare. Assuming that maize cultivation on these land is the 
only economic activity that the two household pursue; the total income of household A and 
B (from maize cultivation) is VND 2,000,000; then the productivity of household A is two 
millions/hectare, while that of household B is one million/hectare. In this case, this 
productivity could be considered as ‘return’ to maize terrace land; and the ‘differences in 
returns to characteristics’ between household A and B is one million VND. In this context, 
the former refers to how the majority and the ethnic minorities differ in terms of 
demography, physical assets, education, access to infrastructures etc. while the latter refers 
to differences in how the majority and the ethnic minorities benefit from their 
characteristics.  
                                                 
20
 To avoid unnecessary difficulty for the reader with non-econometric background, this report will not 
describe the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition approach adopted to investigate empirically the income gap 
across the ethnic groups. Instead, the technical details are given in Annex 3 of the Appendix for further 
references. 
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After performing these two stages, we will be able to know the relative importance of the 
‘differences in characteristics’ component (also called the ‘endowment effect’) and the 
‘differences in returns to characteristics’ component (also called the ‘treatment effect’) in 
the total income differential between the majority and the ethnic minority. The Blinder-
Oaxaca approach will then be pursued between the majority and each ethnic minority 
group that is identified in this study. The next section will focus on the results obtained 
from applying this approach using the BLS data. 
4.1 Income gap across ethnic groups: Empirical results 
The differences in household per capita income between the Kinh majority vis-à-vis the 
ethnic groups are decomposed into the differences in characteristics and the differences in 
returns to characteristics as in Table 4.1. The first two rows represent the decomposition of 
the income gap between the Kinh majority and the ethnic minority as a whole. This 
reaffirms the previous studies and notes a considerable income gap of 70 percent (i.e. 0.53 
log point) between the two groups. The result reveals that around one third of the total 
difference is attributed to differences in the average characteristics of the Kinh and the 
ethnic minority. These are differences in landholding, educational attainment, household 
demographic features, access to infrastructures, and access to programmes and support. 
Importantly, the remaining of two third is attributed to differences in returns to the above 
characteristics. It should be noted that these differences are statistically significant at the 
conventional level. This finding reported bigger scale of the differences in refurn 
component comapred to that found in Pham et al. (2008b). This that study, the data from 
the V(H)LSSs in the period 1992-2004 was employed and reported that the differences in 
returns to characteristics contribute for at least a half of the gap in household per capita 
expenditure across the majority and ethnic minority groups.  
Table 4.1 Decomposition of the Income Gap 
Total differences 
Differences in 
endowment 
Differences in 
treatment 
Kinh vs EMs 0.5311*** 0.1796*** 0.3515*** 
(0.047) (0.065) (0.053) 
Kinh vs Tay 0.427*** 0.0364* 0.3906*** 
(0.049) (0.02) (0.056) 
Kinh vs Thai 0.5302*** 0.0656* 0.4646*** 
(0.057) (0.039) (0.062) 
Kinh vs Muong 0.3696*** -0.0031 0.3726*** 
(0.067) (0.021) (0.066) 
Kinh vs Nung 0.4618*** 0.0351 0.4268*** 
(0.067) (0.03) (0.065) 
Kinh vs H'mong 0.8745*** 0.2022*** 0.6723*** 
(0.04) (0.074) (0.087) 
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Kinh vs Dao 0.5605*** 0.0757** 0.4847*** 
(0.051) (0.041) (0.068) 
Kinh vs Other in NM 0.6195*** 0.1983*** 0.4211*** 
(0.091) (0.054) (0.102) 
Kinh vs Bana 0.7306*** 0.1616** 0.569*** 
(0.089) (0.079) (0.098) 
Kinh vs H're 0.6722*** -0.0421 0.7142*** 
(0.078) (0.041) (0.087) 
Kinh vs Co Tu 0.5346*** 0.1957*** 0.3389*** 
(0.09) (0.057) (0.08) 
Kinh vs Other in CH 0.7421*** 0.1844*** 0.5577*** 
(0.067) (0.065) (0.075) 
Kinh vs. Khmer 0.196** 0.0511 0.1449*** 
(0.08) (0.039) (0.086) 
Kinh vs Others 0.7437*** 0.2026*** 0.5411*** 
(0.079) (0.062) (0.086) 
Notes:  
(a) The decomposition in this table uses the set of majority coefficients as the reference group 
for unequal treatment; see expression [3] in the text.  
(b) ***, **, and * denotes statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively; 
(c)  Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are based on bootstrapping with 200 
replications. 
 
This chapter offers further insights on the gap in living standard between the Kinh majority 
and a number of individual ethnic groups. Table 4.1 reports the decomposition results for 
the differences in per capita income between the majority group and the other thirteen 
ethnic groups. Figure 4.1 represents the raw differences in per capita income between the 
Kinh majority and other groups given in the first column of Table 4.1. The income gap of 
70 percent between the majority and the ethnic minority is highlighted in red colour. The 
Khmer group has the smallest income gap with the majority compared to that of the other 
ethnic minority groups. Muong, Tay, Nung, Thai are the four ethnic groups that are 
arguably most assimilated to the Kinh majority. These groups are also better off compared 
to the average of the ethnic minority. The other ethnic groups are however lagged behind. 
Of the individual ethnic groups that could be statistically identified in this chapter, the 
H’mong experienced the largest income gap with the majority. Our estimates show that the 
income gap between the H’mong and the majority is nearly 140 percent. With the 
exception of the H’mong, the ethnic groups in the Central Highlands are found to be most 
disadvantaged to the majority. The Bana, H’re, other ethnic groups in the Central 
Highlands, suffered from an income gap of more than 110 percent with the majority.  The 
‘others’ group refers to small individual ethnic minority groups residing in the other 
regions rather than the Northern Uplands and Central Highlands and could not be separated 
as a single group in this study. Not surprisingly, this group experienced an income gap of 
110 percent compared to the majority group. 
 To ease the interpretation of the decomposition results, Figure 4.2 represents the 
endowment and treatment effects given in the last two columns of Table 4.1. The darker 
portions of the bar charts are the diff
the differences in returns to characteristics. For the H’re and Muong, the differences in 
characteristics compared to the 
all the remaining ethnic groups, it seems apparent that differences in the observed 
characteristics contribute less than one third of the total income differences. At least two 
third of the income gap is attributed to differences in returns to those characteristics.
Figure 4.1 Income Gap Amongst the Ethnic Groups
Figure 4.2 Differences in Endowment vs. Differences in Returns
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The analysis above suggest that the endowment effect found in the extremely difficult 
communes under this study is relatively smaller than those found in the previous studies 
using the V(H)LSSs (Van de Walle and Gunewardena, 2001; Baulch et al. 2004, Hoang et 
al. 2007, Pham et al. 2008). This difference is plausible as the differences in household and 
community characteristics between the ethnic groups residing in the extremely difficult 
communes in this study should be less pronounced than the nation-wide average. This is 
largely linked to the plethora of policies and programmes to support poverty reduction, 
access to public services, and key infrastructure facility. However, the dominance of the 
treatment effect in the income gap amongst ethnic groups calls for an explanation.  
4.2 Income gap across ethnic groups: Search for an explanation 
One obvious issue is related to the empirical methodology used in this chapter. It should be 
noted that the differences in returns includes not only the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables themselves but also the intercepts, which capture unobserved factors. Candidates 
for these unobservable factors are very broad, ranging from the quality of endowments 
such as land, education and infrastructure to more subtle factors such as language, customs 
and practices, and even governance. Ideally, it would be best to carry out quantitative and 
qualitative analysis simultaneously. But this is too hard and costly to do so in a large scale 
for any surveys including this BLS as well as other V(H)LSSs. In attempt to shed lights on 
the drivers of this treatment effect, we based on the results from a host of PPA and 
anthropological researches on ethnic issues in Vietnam, summarized in the World Bank 
(2009) and VASS (2009), and our analysis using the BLS and V(H)LSSs.21 
Language and Cultural Issues 
When seeking for an explanation on what drives the above ‘differences in returns’, one 
obvious possibility is the ability of ethnic minorities to speak the Vietnamese language. 
Inability to speak Vietnamese language and some traditional cultural practices are 
emphasized as obstacles that prevent ethnic minorities from being better integrated into the 
economy and taking advantage of the new opportunities provided by the Doi moi in 
numerous qualitative studies. For example, VASS (2009) found that language constraints 
under-lied difficulties of ethnic people in accessing services and information. According to 
World Bank (2009), ethnic women were often reported as being reluctant to use free 
services due to language and cultural barriers. 
Language, however, is not the only barrier to prevent the ethnic minorities from benefiting 
the mainstream economic development but also other socio-cultural factors. As discussed 
in World Bank (2009), these may include factors such as “community levelling 
                                                 
21
 This analysis is drawn from the author’s contribution to Pham et al. (2009). 
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mechanisms that create social pressure against excess economic accumulation and cultural 
perceptions of social obligations and “shared poverty”; religious obligations that require 
economic expenditures; gender expectation grounded in different cultural models; and 
community ownership of land and assets”. Minorities are also reported as not being able to 
do many economic transactions as the Kinh such as charging interest on loans and selling 
things to neighbours and kin. These are regarded as against the minorities’ social norms.  
In attempt to capture partially the impact of ability to speak Vietnamese and some cultural 
factors on welfare status of ethnic minorities, Pham et al. (2008) and Baulch et al. (2009) 
estimated a simple regression in which the per capita expenditures of ethnic minority-
headed households were regressed on the set of the explanatory variables that is essentially 
the same as the one used in this study, augmented by matrilineal practice, religion, 
Vietnamese language ability. The results show that ability to speak Vietnamese is an 
important determinant of welfare for ethnic minority households. For instance in 1998, 
coming from an ethnic minority-headed household whose head was unable to speak 
Vietnamese language decreases real per capita expenditures by nearly 10 percent. The 
association of Vietnamese language ability and expenditures is similar in 2004 and 2006.  
Ceteris paribus, a head’s inability to speak Vietnamese is associated with a 10 to 12 
percentage point reduction in the level of per capita expenditure for ethnic minority-headed 
households.22 This finding is consistent with empirical results in the literature. For 
instance, Grafton et al. (2007) shows linguistic barriers to communications reduce 
productivity and capital accumulation.  
Returns to land and land quality 
As highlighted in Chapter 1 and 3, ethnic minorities possess more land than the majority 
and their land holdings have tended to increase over time. However, the ethnic groups’ 
land bundle consists mostly of forest land and low quality, non-irrigated annual crop land 
while the majority have much more water surface land and their crop land is usually 
irrigated and of higher quality. Baulch et al. (2009) show that more than 80 percent of the 
annual cropland of the majority was irrigated, while only 44 percent of ethnic minority 
land was irrigated in 2006.  
In addition, there are many factors that place ethnic minorities at disadvantage in making 
use of their land endowments. First, the ethnic minorities live in places where the farm 
productivity and efficiency is generally lower. At the same time, the agricultural extension 
services provided to the ethnic minorities are often not appropriate as they are based on 
wet rice cultivation techniques suitable for the lowlands (Jamieson et al., 1998, World 
                                                 
22
 Note that these regression results did not find any evidence that matrilineal practices or religion are 
statistically significant determinants of the per capita expenditures of the ethnic minorities. 
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Bank, 2009, ADB, 2002). Rice varieties which are more appropriate to the soil conditions 
in the mountains are often too expensive (VASS, 2009). 
Second, their knowledge about their rights over land is less than the majority. Historically, 
the ethnic minorities used to live in land tenure systems in which community-managed 
land was not commoditized (Vuong, 2001). The land reforms in Vietnam, which aims at 
allocating land to households, have proved to be a big success for Vietnam’s development 
and poverty reduction (Ravallion and van de Walle, 2008). Yet, to many ethnic people, 
understanding and practicing their land rights is still a challenge (VASS, 2009). Not being 
able to communicate well in Vietnamese is a further barrier to some ethnic people’s access 
to land laws and procedures.  
Third, ethnic customs and conventions restrain some ethnic people from exercising their 
rights over land. According to Vuong (2001, p.275), “communal land ownership bears the 
most characteristic of community-wide participation in land administration of ethnic 
minorities in the highlands, where land was a common possession; community members 
had the right to use but not to sell it; land administration was bound with religious beliefs 
and closely linked with territorial sovereignty and autonomous village governance 
structures”. So, in the transition to a more market-based land tenure system, many ethnic 
households were unwilling to practice their private land use rights. Indeed, ethnic 
households with abundant land have been found to lend it to those with less land for 
cultivation without any charge (VASS, 2009).  
Thus given better land quality, the majority have generally been more successful in 
translating their land assets into higher returns under Vietnam’s new market economy. As 
shown in Chapter 3 of this study, the majority  have diversified more within the 
agricultural sector, relying more on industrial and perennial crops and less on low-value 
staple crops, and have often supplement their farm income with trading or services. The 
ethnic minorities, on the other hand, tend to be locked in staple and traditional agriculture 
(World Bank, 2009). While food crop were the most important source of agricultural 
income for the ethnic minorities after rice, the majority households relied on industrial 
crops to supplement their incomes from rice production. 
Education Quality and the Returns to Education 
Quality of education could be an important unobserved factor underlying the aggregate 
component of ‘differences in returns’ reported above. However, data on education quality 
is however rarely available.  Furthermore, when assessing the returns to education it is past 
rather than current educational quality that is important. Our estimates on the determinants 
of per capita income shows that, after controlling for other household and community 
characteristics, the returns to education of both the majority and minority groups are 
positive. Furthermore, they generally favour the Kinh/Hoa group at all schooling levels 
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with the exception of primary (see Table A2 in the appendix). These results are similar to 
those of Baulch et al. (2009), who show that returns to education are higher for the 
majority households than the ethnic minority-headed households in cases in the period 
1993-2004.  The same results are also observed in Walle and Gunewardena (2001) for 
1993 and Nguyen et al. (2009) for 2002, 2004 and 2006.  This suggests that a generalized 
policy of education expansion will not be enough to close the ethnic education gap.  
Regarding wage returns to education, the previous literature notes that education is an 
important factor of the wage determination process in Vietnam (Pham and Reilly, 2009). It 
is likely that education is more important to wage and salary employees in rural areas than 
those who are self employed (either in agriculture or in the rural nonfarm sector). 
However, as highlighted in Chapter 3, the ethnic minorities are much less likely to be 
employed as wage workers and are generally less mobile than the majority. Furthermore, 
not only is access to wage income is limited for ethnic minorities, but the few ethnic 
minority workers who are wage employee are subject to lower returns than the majority 
counterparts with the same characteristics. Pham and Reilly (2009) examined the ethnic 
way gap using the data from the VHLSS 2002. After controlling for education, experience 
and other relevant characteristics, they report that majority workers earn nearly 11 percent 
more on average than their minority counterparts. Around two-thirds of this earnings 
differential is attributed to ‘differences in returns’. So the returns to educations are lower 
for ethnic minority than majority wage workers. 
Misconceptions and stereotyping of ethnic minorities 
An important source of the ‘differences in returns’ is very difficult to quantitatively 
measure and is a sensitive issue in policy debates in Vietnam. It is quite common for some 
Kinh people to have ‘negative stereotypes’ of the minorities, and these stereotypes might 
serve to dis-empower or deprive the minorities of their economic and other rights. Our own 
observations (based on considerable experience working in the areas of ethnic minority 
development) suggests that ethnic minorities are frequently considered as less developed, 
and at times less “civilized” or more ‘backward’, than the Kinh.  For several reasons, 
ethnic minorities have long been considered as different from Kinh and the attention paid 
to poverty reduction in upland areas by the Government and international donors has 
served to reinforce the longstanding perception that minorities are economically backward 
and should be assisted to “catch up” to the Kinh (World Bank, 2009). Given these negative 
stereotypes, there has been a general tendency to assume that ethnic minority development 
should involve interventions to eliminate ‘backwardness’ and/or promote assimilation with 
the Kinh majority.  Some ethnic minority development programs and policies in Vietnam 
have included campaigns that try to change the “cultures” of minority areas, including 
eradicating religion, primitive beliefs, superstitions taboos and wasteful social ceremonies. 
Such interventions are intended to move the ethnic minorities up the ‘civilization ladder’ 
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and to facilitate their ‘catching-up’ to the Kinh majority or even promote ‘Kinh-isation’. 
This reflects the widespread notion in many Southeast Asian countries that their majority 
populations should be considered as superior to ethnic minorities (Duncan, 2004). 
It is not clear, however, how such misconceptions and negative stereotyping have actually 
prevented ethnic minorities from taking advantages of opportunities brought by the Doi 
moi in the same way as the majority majority. Vietnam has laws which prevent 
discrimination, while Article 5 of the Constitution states that all people regardless of their 
ethnic origins are considered equal under laws. In addition, there are no cultural codes 
deeply embedded in society regarding peoples’ “status” and “place,” as might be the case 
in societies in which castle is an issue (such as India). These are among most important 
background for those who believe that discrimination does not exist. However, we argue 
that the existence of the above stereotyping and misconceptions does represent in one way 
or the other some harmful impacts on (or even implicit discrimination against) ethnic 
minorities. For instance, as the ‘backwardness’ of ethnic minorities are widely recognized, 
it could effectively decrease participation of ethnic minorities in society. More seriously, it 
may also cause inclination of authorities to listen and thus respond to ethnic minorities as 
they are considered as less ‘civilized’ or having ‘inferior intellectual capacity’.  
A recent survey by the Institute of Ethnic Minority Affairs, described by the Country 
Social Assessment (CSA) of the World Bank (2009) provides evidence of a number of 
instances of negative stereotyping of the ethnic minorities. For instance, belief that the 
minorities have less intellectual capacity can result in investment in Kinh development to 
“show minorities how to develop”, as was the case with migration programs in Quang Tri, 
rather than directly investing in minority communities themselves. Another example from 
the CSA where stereotyping occurred was found in the credit system in Dak Lak. There, 
the Ede reported that the staff of large commercial banks would state (either explicitly or 
implicitly) that minorities did not have sufficient credit worthiness to obtain large loans, 
and would therefore direct Ede to the Social Policy Bank. The belief of bankers that 
minorities couldn’t handle larger loans, or the belief among Ede that they would not 
receive such loans even if they asked, accounts for the fact that many Ede have never taken 
a large loan out, while many more Kinh have. Through it is not possible to generalize these 
observations to confirm that there is discrimination against ethnic minorities, the existence 
of such misconceptions and negative stereotyping does represent a source of disadvantages 
for ethnic minorities. These could be considered as another factor that contributes to the 
‘differences in returns’ component of the ethnic expenditure gap reported in this paper. 
In summary, using the finding from this chapter, several implications could be drawn. 
There is a considerable gap in living standard between the majority and the ethnic 
minority. This gap is attributed mainly to differences in returns to characteristics of the two 
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groups. And remoteness is not the only source of the gap in living standard amongst ethnic 
groups. In the extremely difficult communes, the gap in per capita income between the 
majority and the ethnic minority is considerably high. The income gap between the ethnic 
minority groups and the majority in the extremely difficult communes varies greatly from 
20 to 140 percent. This suggests that poverty reduction efforts should not be implemented 
without a throughout consideration of the welfare status of individual ethnic groups. 
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Chapter 5. Recommendations for Future Policies and 
Programmes 
 
This final chapter of the report will firstly review the current policies and programmes to 
support poverty reduction for the poor ethnic minorities. Instead of providing a 
comprehensive review of policies and programmes, this chapter will focus on the 
‘mismatch’ between the current policies and programmes and the characteristics of the 
poor ethnic minorities (as analyzed in the previous chapters). More importantly, this 
chapter will produce a set of suggestions for future policies and programmes for the poor 
ethnic minorities. These recommendations are based on the understanding of the poor 
ethnic minorities as captured in the earlier chapters and the ‘mismatch’ highlighted in the 
first section of this chapter. 
5.1 Review of the current policies and programmes for the poor 
ethnic minorities 
 
Vietnam has had a plethora of policies and programmes aiming at poverty reduction but 
effective coordination among stakeholders is ‘missing’ 
Vietnam has had a plethora of policies and programmes aiming at poverty reduction, 
improvement of people's living standards, including those for the poor in general and some 
specifically for the poor ethnic minorities. These policies and programmes could be 
classified according to their scopes and approaches of interventions as follows (see the box 
next page): 
Comprehensive poverty reduction programs and projects are programs with the general 
approach, aiming at improving all aspects of life of poor households from access to 
services (education, healthcare), infrastructure, production support (seeds, fertilizers, 
trainings and capacity building, agriculture extension), promoting commodity production 
and market links, vocational training, participation in the labor market. Most significantly, 
there’re Programme 135-II; National Target Program on Poverty Reduction, 2006-2010; 
Program for Fast and Sustainable Poverty Reduction in 62 poorest districts (Programme 
30A). 
Programs that have direct or indirect impacts on people's living standards improvement 
with national approach are National Target Programs (NTP) and other national programs 
target, focusing on some specific aspects of living standards. Notable examples include the 
NTP on Rural Clean Water Supply and Sanitation; NTP on Education and Training; NTP 
on Job Creation till 2010; NTP for Population and Family Planning, NTP on New Rural 
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Development, NTP on Culture... Most of the NTPs have been implemented the second 
phase in the period of 2006-2010 after completing the first phases in the period 2000-2005. 
Poverty reduction policies and programs with regional approaches are programs with 
emphasis on support some certain geographical areas, which may or may not relate to 
poverty reduction efforts for ethnic minorities. The most notable are the Socio-economic 
Development Programme of Communes along Vietnam-Laos-Cambodia border (Decision 
No.160/2007/QD-TTg); Job Creation Programme for  Ethnic Minorities in the South West, 
2008-2010 (Decision No.74/2008/QD-TTg); Forest Allocation and Protection for Ethnic 
Minorities in the Central Highlands (Decision No.304 /2005/QD-TTg); Socio-economic 
Development Programme (SEDPr) in the Central Highlands (Resolution No.10/NQ-TW); 
SEDPr in Northern Mountainous Areas (Resolution No.37/NQ-TW); SEDPr in the Central 
Coast (Resolution No. 39/NQ-TW); SEDPr in the South West (Resolution No.21/NQ-
TW). 
Poverty reduction policies and programs with sectoral approach support specific aspects 
such as education, healthcare, housing, access to land, clean water, afforestration. Example 
of this type includes, for instance, the Programme 134 providing access to land, housing 
and clean water; the Programme 167 providing support for poor households; the 5-million 
hectare afforestration Programme; the Programme on Healthcare for the poor (Decision 
No.139/2002/QD-TTg). 
Some poverty reduction programmes and policies for the poor ethnic minorities. 
Comprehensive Support 
• The Socio-economic Development Programme for the extremely difficult communes in the 
ethnic minority and mountainous areas (Decision No.07/2006/QD-TTg) 
• The Programme for Fast and Sustainable Poverty Reduction in 62 poor districts (Resolution 
30A/2008/NQ-CP) 
• Policy to support the ethnic minorities and policy beneficiary household, near poor and poor 
households and fishermen (Decision No.965/2008/QD-TTg) 
• Support for basic needs of ethnic minorities in disadvantaged areas (Decree 
No.20/1998/ND-CP; and Decree No.02/2002/ND-CP) 
Sectoral Support  
• Support ethnic minority students in boarding high schools (Circular No.109/2009/TTLT-
BTC-BGDDT) 
• Scholarships and social welfares for ethnic minority students (Circular No.43/2007/TTLT-
BTC-BGDDT) 
• Support teachers in extremely difficult areas (Circular No. 06/2007/TTLT-BGDDT-BNV-
BTC) 
• Preferential loans for the ethnic minorities facing severe difficulties (Decision 
No.32/2007/QD-TTg) 
• Support the ethnic minorities, near poor and poor households, and social policy beneficiary 
households in areas without national grid (Decision No.289/2008/QD-TTg) 
Ethnic group support  
• Development of Si La ethnic minority in Lai Chau Province (Decision No.236/QD-UBDT) 
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• Development of Si La ethnic minority in Dien Bien Province (Decision No. 237/QD-UBDT) 
• Development of Pu Péo ethnic minority in Ha Giang Province (Decision No. 238/QD-
UBDT) 
• Development of Rơ Măm ethnic minority in Kon Tum Province (Decision No. 292/QD-
UBDT) 
• Development of Ơ Đu ethnic minority in Nghe A Province (Decision No.304/QD-UBDT) 
• Development Brau ethnic minority in Kon Tum Province (Decision No.255/QD-UBDT) 
Regional Support 
• Social-economic development support in the areas along Vietnam - Laos - Cambodia border 
(Decision No.160/2007/QD-TTg) 
• Production land, housing land and job creation support for poor ethnic minorities in Mekong 
River Delta, 2008-2010 (Decision No.74/2008/QD-TTg) 
• Forest allocation and protection for ethnic minorities in the Central Highlands (Decision 
No.304/2005/QD-TTg) 
• Social-Economic Development Support for the Central Highlands (Resolution No.10/NQ-
TW and Decision 25/2008/QD-TTg) 
• Social-Economic Development Support for Northern Mountainous Areas (Resolution 
No.37/NQ-TW and Decision 27/2008/QD-TTg) 
• Social-Economic Development Support for Central Coastal areas (Resolution No.39/NQ-
TW and Decision 24/2008/QD-TTg) 
• Social-Economic Development Support for Mekong River Delta (Resolution No.21/NQ-TW 
and Decision 25/2008/QD-TTg) 
• Support ethnic minorities for resettlement (Decision No.33/2007/QD-TTg on 05/03/2007) 
• Support for resettlement in the communes along the border with China (Decision 
No.60/2005/QD-TTg on 03/24/2005) 
Source: compiled with modification from Jones et al (2010) 
Having several policies and programmes to support the poor in general and the poor ethnic 
minorities that jointly contribute to poverty reduction is a distinctive feature of Vietnam 
under the Doi moi. However, this also represents a problem. Jones et al. (2010) in a UNDP 
summary report on these policies and programmes concluded that the 'overlapping' in 
programme design is very high. In terms of scope and beneficiaries, there are two major 
overlaps. The first is the 'overlapping' among poverty reduction programmes and policies 
in general. The second is the 'overlapping' among poverty reduction programs and projects 
for ethnic minority groups. In terms of organization and management, there is considerable 
'overlapping' between implementing and/or ‘owning’ agencies (most significantly among 
CEMA, MOLISA, and other line ministries) in implementing poverty reduction programs 
and policies for ethnic minorities. 
In principles, the 'overlapping' in poverty reduction programs for ethnic minorities is not 
necessarily a limitation if programmes and policies are implemented in a way to ensure 
that there are no overlaps in beneficiaries or the design of the new programmes is made. 
And thus, as suggested by Jones et al. (2010), this overlapping in design should not be 
necessarily a big problem. In fact, the localities often try to ensure that the 'overlapping' in 
the design will not lead to the 'overlapping' in beneficiaries. In addition, they usually 
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integrate (at various level) resources and plans of poverty reduction programs and projects 
into Social Economic Development Plans (SEDP) and annual plans. On that basis, the 
'overlapping' in implementation may be mitigated. 
However, it is not easy to ensure that the 'overlapping' in design does not become the 
'overlapping' in beneficiaries. Even the locality can guarantee that the resources of all 
programs and projects are integrated in their annual socio-economic development plan, it 
remains a big challenge for full implementation of activities in accordance with the 
provisions of each programme or project. Jones et al. (2010) estimated that many localities 
must comply with 100 regulations and guidelines used for the existing programs and 
projects. It is obviously very difficult to fully implement a series of the provisions, 
especially in the condition of limited human resources in the local level. 
Until now, not many studies about the consequences of 'overlapping' in management and 
implementation of poverty reduction programmes and policies. In fact, there are many 
agencies and organizations relating to the management and implementation of poverty 
reduction intervention. CEMA as 'the standing committee' of the P135 is arguably the most 
important agencies of poverty reduction programmes for ethnic minorities. MOLISA (with 
the National Target Programme (NTP) on Poverty Reduction, job creation programmes...), 
MOET (with NTP on Education and Training; education support policies), Ministry of 
Health (MOH) (with NTP on Population and Family Planning; Healthcare support 
programs), Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE), and Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD)... are implementing and/or ‘owning’ 
agencies of important poverty reduction programs and projects. In addition, Ministry of 
Planning and Investment (MPI), Ministry of Finance (MoF) also play a role of state 
management in poverty reduction projects supported by international donors. International 
organizations, governmental organization, and NGOs who have supported various 
programs and policies are also key players in implementation of poverty reduction 
programmes... In this given context, it is very difficult to ensure an effective coordination 
mechanism among the relevant agencies. It is likely that this lack of effective coordination 
mechanisms hamper the effectiveness of poverty reduction interventions for ethnic 
minorities. 
Current approach to poverty reduction has not fully addressed all facets of poverty amongst 
ethnic minorities 
Have the plethora of programmes and polices tackled all facets of poverty? 
There is no doubt that the above interventions have brought in significant contribution to 
poverty reduction for the poor ethnic minorities, through slower than average (see chapter 
1). However, it can be seen that with the above intervention priorities, poverty reduction 
programs for ethnic minorities mainly emphasize on address disadvantages of ethnic 
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minorities in terms of endowment (i.e. the differences in characteristics). As shown in 
Chapter 4, these differences contributed as much as one third of the total difference in gap 
in income per capita between the majority and different ethnic minority groups. Therefore, 
one of important reasons for economic ‘backwardness’ of ethnic minorities, which is the 
differences in returns to characteristics has not been paid due attention when determining 
intervention priorities to reduce poverty. In other words, the current plethora of poverty 
reduction policies and programmes have mainly aimed at ensuring that ethnic minorities 
are provided with production land, housing, access to public services, essential 
infrastructure. Very little efforts are made to ensure that ethnic minorities really use and 
know how to take advantage of this access to improve their living conditions, and escape 
from poverty. There is also little attention and intervention to ensure equal (market) returns 
to endowment across the minority and majority groups. 
Given the relative importance of the differences in returns, the lack of awareness and 
interventions to tackle these differences represents a considerable shortcoming of the 
existing policies and programmes for poverty reduction. There has not been a single study 
that investigates the impact of this leakage. However, this raises a number of important 
questions, such as whether this leakage is one (of several) reason(s) leading to the 
widening gap in living standards across the majority and minority groups?; whether this 
constitute to the lower poverty reduction for ethnic minorities compared to that of the 
majority? The answers to these important questions have not been provided by the current 
literature. Nevertheless, it could be taken to suggest that provision of access to public 
services, basic infrastructure facilities, and essential physical assets (housing, landholding) 
solely is clearly not sufficient to tackle multi facet poverty of the ethnic minorities. 
Therefore, attempts to narrow the differences in returns to characteristics between the 
majority and minority groups should be considered as priority for future poverty reduction 
programmes. 
Do poverty reduction approaches for ethnic minorities have adequate 'sensitivity' with the 
differences among the ethnic minority groups? 
Except for some small-scale support programs for the very small ethnic minority groups 
such as Si La in Lai Chau and Dien Bien, Pu Péo in Ha Giang, Rơ Măm, Brâu in Kon 
Tum; Ơ Đu in Nghe An, most of poverty reduction programs for ethnic minorities 
generally target to ‘ethnic minority’ as a single group. In other words, major poverty 
reduction programs and policies have aimed at reducing poverty for ethnic minorities 
without distinguishing individual ethnic minority groups. Therefore, poverty reduction for 
the ethnically diversified 53 minority groups are carried out using a ‘one-size-fit-all’ 
approach without adequate attention of differences in history, culture, practices, and other 
anthropological characteristics of each group. The question is whether such approach is 
appropriate? 
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There is no doubt that the 53 ethnic minority groups in Vietnam have very different 
characteristics. They distribute in different geographical areas and topology, and thus are 
endowed differently in terms of factor of productions (mainly in agriculture). As far as 
language concerned, the 53 ethnic minority groups in Vietnam can be classified into seven 
different linguistic families, which lead to distinctive features of languages, culture, 
practices and habits. If considering anthropological factor, the 53 ethnic minority groups 
have very different origins, some of them originally from Central Asia (the Tibetan-–
Burma linguistics family), some from Southeast Asia, Pacific regions migrating into the 
peninsula and then further into the highlands (Austro Island linguistics family), some 
migrating from South China, South Asia... After many ups and downs of history, despite of 
their unity in the resistance war for national independence and construction process, ethnic 
minority groups still preserve their own distinctive characteristics of languages, cultural 
practices and norms... Studies have proved that these characteristics have important effects 
on household welfare. In such conditions, having a program or policy with a ‘one-size-fit-
all” approach for all ethnic minority groups is not sufficient to effectively address poverty 
amongst ethnic minorities. 
It is worrying that the ‘one-size-fit-all’ approach is widespread in the programmes and 
policies to support poverty reduction for the ethnic minorities (except for some small 
support programs for ethnic minority groups with very few people, as mentioned above). 
Consequently, poverty reduction intervention have not been responsive to characteristics of 
each ethnic group. This approach has certain advantages and ensure uniformity in the 
implementation process and appropriate for ‘mixed’ distribution of ethnic minority groups 
in many locations. This certainly prevents having interventions that are responsive and 
sensitive to the characteristics and needs of individual ethnic groups. 
Ensuring the availability of ‘access’ is not sufficient; ensuring ‘ better access’ is equally 
important 
There are two important issues that arguably determine the benefit of the ethnic minorities 
from public services and basic infrastructure, including (i) to ensure that the ethnic 
minorities are able to access those services and facilities; and (ii) to ensure that the ethnic 
minorities have access to services and facilities that are as good as the average level. While 
the former has been the focus of the existing policies and programmes, the concentrated 
and resolved, the latter has not been paid due attention.  
The analysis using data from the BLS as well as other data sources does not provide 
sufficient assessments on differences in the quality of access to public services and 
infrastructure across the majority and minority groups. However, there is a widely 
recognized fact that the quality of public services and infrastructure in the areas with 
concentration of the ethnic minorities are lower than the average nationwide or that of the 
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rural areas. For instance, schools in poor communes of the P135-II are less well equipped 
as those usually observed in the rural areas. According data from the Ministry of Education 
and Training, around 11 percent of schools are temporary in 2009 and most of them are in 
the extremely difficult communes. Though most of all the extremely difficult communes 
under the P135-II have road to commune centers, these roads are of lower quality than the 
average level in the rural communes and could be difficult to access under heavy rain. 
Quality of drinking water is also lower than average in the rural areas.  
To promote improvements in quality of infrastructures and basic services in the areas with 
concentration of the ethnic minorities is a big challenge, which might even more difficult 
than ensuring the availability of access. It requires substantial efforts and various 
investment resources. If Vietnam has succeeded for nearly 20 years in ensuring that ethnic 
minorities can have more access to public services, and essential infrastructure, the 
challenge for Vietnam in the next decade will be to ensure that they can have better access 
to public services, and infrastructure quality on par with the national average.  
5.2 Suggestions for future policies and programmes for the 
poor ethnic minorities 
 
One central message of this study is while the living standard of the ethnic minorities have 
clearly improved over the last decade, it is also clear that the minorities have benefited less 
from the Vietnam’s dramatic economic growth than the majority. Our analysis suggests 
that for narrowing the gap between the majority and the ethnic minority, ensuring the 
future economic growth more inclusive for the ethnic minority is essential. Given the 
evolution of the majority-minority gap over the past two decades, unless bold and radical 
steps taken, poverty will soon be a phenomenon of the ethnic minority. This section 
provides a number of suggestions for future policies and programmes to support 
improvements of living standards for the poor ethnic minorities. These suggestions are 
structured into four groups; including the proposed suggestions/changes in the approach, 
focus, tools, and ‘other’ (e.g. suggestions that cannot be structured in one of the above).  
Change in the approach 
One comprehensive framework to support the poverty reduction for the ethnic minorities is 
a necessity, through some compromises will be needed 
As highlighted in section 5.1, Vietnam has a large number of policies and programs 
specifically designed to assist ethnic minority development. The existing policies and 
programmes however exhibit substantial overlaps in design and implementation, leading to 
the involvement of many stakeholders. In principle, these overlaps might not necessarily 
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lead to problems under an effective coordination among the key players (i.e. CEMA, line 
ministries, and donors). Unfortunately, such coordination never exist in the current context 
of Vietnam. Therefore, the current plethora of policies and programmes to support the poor 
ethnic minorities could be considered as a ‘spaghetti bowl’. One obvious resultant outcome 
is the ‘defragmentation’ of resources stretched over a number of overlapped 
programmes/policies. This could translate into complexity of implications, which will need 
further consideration for meaningful inferences. At this stage, it is plausible to argue that 
this ‘spaghetti bowl’ have probably negative impacts on the effectiveness of these policies 
and programmes for the poor ethnic minorities. This calls for a comprehensive framework 
to support the poor ethnic minorities in the coming years. This framework will be 
necessary to provide a ‘sound board’ for all future poverty reduction interventions for the 
ethnic minorities and ensure more effective coordination among ‘key players’, including 
CEMA, MOLISA, some other line ministries, and main donors.  
However, given the current defragmentation of policies and programmes managed and 
implemented by a variety of key players, having all coordinated in a concerted effort is 
near impossible given the ‘political economy’ of ‘owning’ the programmes and policies. 
Therefore, such framework and its associated coordination mechanism should be aimed for 
the period 2015-2020. From now until 2015, CEMA should play a central role in building 
up such framework. Advocating a comprehensive and uniform framework for ethnic 
minority development might lead to create or re-enforce a separate ‘lane’ for the ethnic 
minority. This treatment is certainly provide privileges for the poor ethnic minority and 
having such privileges might be discriminatory in nature. However, given the large and 
widening gap in living standards between the majority and the ethnic minorities, this 
approach, albeit discriminatory in nature, is appropriate.  
Impacts of ‘average equality’ on poverty reduction is diminishing and more radical 
approach might be relevant 
Reviewing the ‘mainstream’ policies and programmes (as above) suggest an the popularity 
of an ‘average equality’ approach. This approach implies that all the beneficiaries under a 
given policy or programme are expected to receive the equal amount of support (i.e. the 
‘average equality’). If resources are sufficient to ensure that this average equality would 
result in adequate resources allocated for each beneficiary, there should be no problem in 
executing this approach. In fact, this is however not the case. Resources to support the poor 
ethnic minorities, through growing and significant, are under the large investment 
requirement of supporting the socio-economic development of the areas with ethnic 
minority concentration and the mountainous areas. The ‘production support’ component 
under the P135-II is a good example. Under this component, each P135-II commune is 
allocated an amount of approximately VND 300 million per year for all activities that are 
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eligible for production support (as regulated in the Circular 12/2009/TT-BNN). 
Considering the wide scope of the P135-II, this amount is significant in total. But that 
amount is clearly not sufficient to, for instance, support a medium-sized commodity 
production project. Similar observations could be found under other components of the 
P135-II and/or in most of the main policies and programmes to support the poor ethnic 
minorities. 
Keep this ‘average equality’ approach is important in the future to ensure that all the poor 
ethnic minorities and communes will receive a reasonable support. In addition to this 
average support, providing extra resources and incentives for the well-performed and/or 
well-endowed beneficiaries will probably be desirable for at least two reasons. First, extra 
resources will be needed to boost cash crop production or other productive activities in 
those communes that are well endowed with potentials for these activities. Providing 
resources according to ‘average equality’ does not take into account the great heterogeneity 
among communes in their potential, while it became widely accepted that there are areas 
that are extremely difficult for any sustainable poverty reduction interventions.  
In addition, incentives for better-performed will be needed to provide a ‘push’ for the 
beneficiaries of the future policies and programmes to compete for more resources, while 
an average level of support is still secured. In fact, these incentives are almost absent in 
most of the ‘mainstream’ policies and programmes, while variety of incentives are actually 
in places under (mainly) small or medium-scaled projects supported by donors and NGOs. 
In the absence of incentives to reward good performers, there has been recently a concern 
that some beneficiaries tend to ‘passively’ over-rely on the support without adequate 
efforts. Having these incentives available for the beneficiaries in the future policies and 
programmes should be considered in order to both (i) encourage efforts of the poor 
households and communes; (ii) make extra resources available for the well-performed 
beneficiaries. 
It is important to note that the move toward incentives and extra resources will not 
necessarily result in problems as the ‘average equality’ approach is still in the place to 
ensure that all beneficiaries will have access to a significant level of support. Having extra 
resources and incentives is a way to facilitate more efficient use of scare resources for the 
poor ethnic minorities. In this regard, the resultant improvements are likely to be pro-poor 
in the sense that all beneficiaries will be better-off, while the most capable and innovative 
ones will have more tools to pursue sustainable improvements in their living standards. 
This (quite) radical change in approach does not necessarily require a significant 
restructuring of the current (or future) policies and programmes. Instead, these policies and 
programmes should be implemented as usual. In addition to this ‘business as usual’ part, 
there should an additional (or reserved) fund to be allocated for ‘innovative cases’ within 
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the same set of activities. There are a number of activities that could be classified as 
‘innovative cases’, including, for instance, commodity production project, non-farm 
business proposals, cultural reservation and promotion with linkages to tourism. In order to 
govern this additional part, transparency and simplicity in the allocation of extra resources 
are crucially important. 
One-size-fit-all approach revealed its limitations, suggesting the role for a more ethnically 
responsive approach to poverty reduction for the poor ethnic minorities 
As highlighted earlier in this chapter, with exception of some support policies for ethnic 
minority groups with very small population, ‘one-size-fit-all’ approach is observed in the 
system of poverty reduction programmes and policies. Very few interventions have been 
carried out with explicit awareness of differences amongst ethnic minority groups (except 
some interventions on training, public capacity building and communications which are 
delivered in different ethnic languages). This approach might be appropriate over the past 
two decades given the priority is to reduce poverty as fast as possible. However, after 20 
years of implementing many poverty reduction programmes, this approach has reached its 
limitations and exposed to certain shortcommings. This is likely to be the time to switch to 
a new approach which can ensure the “sensitivity”  of interventions to own characteristics 
of individual ethnic minority groups. 
Languages, practices and habits, spiritual and religous values and belief have certainly 
impacts on awareness and behaviors of individuals as well as community. Given cultural 
differences across different ethnic minority groups, it can be foreseen that with same 
intervention, there’s difference in participation and beneficiaries between ethnic minority 
gruops. One poverty reduction intervention that is considered to be ‘good’ for the Mông 
might not be necessary suitable for Dao or Pà Thẻn (even these groups are classified in the 
same Mông-Dao language), and might even not suitable for Cơ Tư, Hre, and Bana in the 
Central Highlands. Do cultural differences lead to differences amongst ethnic minorities in 
benefiting from poverty reduction interventions? The knowledge of how culture impacts 
on household life, is very limited. Researches on ethology is largely focused on cultural, 
anthopological of ethnical aspects without adequate attention on their impacts on economic 
factors such as income, employment, or other activities to benefit from economic growth. 
While several researches on poverty reduction in Vietnam do not shed light on cultural 
aspects. In this context, there is apparently a need for further inter-discipline researches on 
relationship between cultural features of ethnic minority groups and their economic life. 
Given this, the future policies and programmes for the poor ethnic minorities should be 
designed in order to ensure that its approach is more ethnically sensitive. The fact that 
different ethnic minorities often reside in the same locations could be an obstable for this 
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approach,but this does not necessarily mean that the ‘one-size-fit-all’ approach should be 
used. At the central level, it is very difficult to ensure the sensitivity beacuse it will make 
the designing of future policies become more complicated. However, this sensitivity could 
be realized if there is an explicit and well-enforced principle in planing and implementing 
activities. 
In addition, this ‘ethnic responsiveness’ component will be secured by promoting further 
the participatory approach and stronger decentralization in the implementation of future 
policies and programmes. The participatory approach is stressed and implemented under 
the P135-II as a key principle in planning and implementing the activities of the P135-II. 
The implementation of the participatory approach has ensured that people can have their 
voices considered in selecting investment priorities, and participate in implementing and 
monitoring investment decisions. This participatory approach needs to be further enhanced 
in the future policies and programmes for the poor ethnic minorities. In addition, it needs 
to be expanded and/or improved in order to ensure that investment priority decisions are 
made basing on the essential needs of ethnic minorities.  
Decentralizing to communes in implementation of programme interventions is another 
approach for the P135-II, which should be retained and strengthened in the future policies 
and programmes. Especially, then one-size-fit-all approach is no longer suitable, 
decentralization to communes is a necessity to ensure that interventions can be carried out 
in accordance with specific conditions and characteristics of ethnic minority group in the 
locality. If provinces or districts are allowed to use the resources available from future 
policies and programmes in accordance with their own experiences and arrangements, their 
specific interventions are more likely to be ethnically sensitive. Therefore, it is important 
that ‘ethnic sensitivity approach’ should be considered as a fundamental principle in 
designing the future policies and programmes for the poor ethnic minorities. 
Change in the focus  
Tackling the ‘differences in returns’ 
One central part of our analysis suggests two major sources of poverty among ethnic 
minorities. One concerns differences in ‘characteristics’ or ‘endowment’ of ethnic 
minorities; the other relates to differences in ‘returns’ to these characteristics. This result is 
also reported by the previous studies using the data available from the V(H)LSSs in 
attempts to explain the widening gap between the majority and the ethnic minority. In 
these studies, “differences in characteristics” (including demographic characteristics, 
education, landholding, household level access to infrastructures and public services) 
account for less than a half of the total gap, the remaining is attributed to “differences in 
returns to these characteristics”. These econometric evidence is consistent and robust 
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across different studies. In our study, as we have examined the income gap between the 
groups of ethnic groups residing in the extremely difficult communes, the significance of 
differences in characteristics are thus partially mitigated. As a result, these differences 
accounted for less than one third of the total income gap between the majority and the 
ethnic minority as a broad group or the disaggregate ethnic groups. 
Given these sources of the widening gap in living standards between the majority and the 
ethnic minority, the current focus of policies and programmes to support economic 
development of the ethnic minority is placed on narrowing the differences in 
characteristics, especially in providing access to public services, basic infrastructure 
facilities, key household assets (e.g. housing, land), and in some cases essential goods (e.g. 
foods, fuel). The results in this paper suggest that the geographically targeted interventions 
combined with the programmes to improve ethnic minority endowments that have been 
implemented to date have not able to counteract the rising differentials in treatment 
experienced by the ethnic minorities. More importantly, we postulate that these differences 
in returns might exacerbate over time as markets tend to value human capital and other 
(household or community assets) more appropriately.23 The time may therefore be apposite 
for the Government, donors and NGOs to re-appraise the policies and programmes they 
have designed to assist the ethnic minorities and, in particular, to recognize that 
interventions designed to reduce poverty and inequality also need to tackle the unequal 
treatment received by the ethnic minorities. 
Tackling differences in returns is however a complicated task. In most developing and 
industrialised countries, ethnic minority and indigenous groups are poorer than the 
majority population across several dimensions.  According to IDS-CAF-DfID (2009), there 
are two broad sets of policies have been used to narrow the differences in returns that are 
experienced by these ethnic minority or indigenous groups in other countries. 
First, Equal Opportunity Legislation, which aims to prevent people with equivalent 
qualifications and experience from receiving lower wages, less access to jobs or 
government services on grounds of their ethnicity or gender, religion or sexual orientation.  
Following the 1959 revolution in Cuba, for example, equal opportunity legislation was 
enacted alongside broader economic and social policies, which had virtually eliminated the 
black-white gap in living standards by the 1980s. More recently, Ecuador’s 1998 
constitution has guaranteed indigenous people communal land rights, the right to education 
in indigenous languages, and to participate in natural resource use decisions.   Despite the 
prevalence of equal opportunity legislation in these and other developing and industrialised 
                                                 
23
 For instance, Pham and Reilly (2008) found negative or low returns to education in the market of wage 
employment at the early of the 1990s. But human capital was found better valued as Vietnam transformed 
toward a market-oriented economy. They argued this is because the market valued human capital more 
correctly. This was also observed in other former socialist countries during the transition. 
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countries, numerous studies show that gaps in wages and living standards are still 
prevalent.  
Second, Affirmative Action programs, which give preferential treatment to members of 
disadvantaged groups.   For example in India, since 1950 a percentage of higher education 
places, government jobs and some parliamentary seats are reserved for members of the 
scheduled castes and tribes. Similarly, Malaysia’s New Economic Policy of 1971 set 
targets for native Malay or bumiputera ownership of companies and their employment in 
different sectors. Affirmative action programs, which have also been used in South Africa 
and the United States, are controversial and can be criticised for helping already relatively 
better-off members of ethnic groups, generating resentment among other groups, and 
undermining advancement based purely on merit. 
International experience also suggests that pursing coordinated and integrated actions 
across a number of sectors is necessary to reverse ethnic minority disadvantage.  Advocacy 
organisations, forums and NGOs run for and by indigenous minority groups have been 
important in enforcing legislation and breaking down cultural and attitudinal barriers 
among majority groups. For example, in Bangladesh, Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Thailand, indigenous organisations have given their minorities groups with greater voice 
and provided a way to counter the ‘negative stereotyping’ of such groups.  Indigenous 
organisations can  enhance both the endowments and the returns which minority groups 
receive. 
Continuing support for improving ‘quality’ of “characteristics”.  
The above do not necessarily imply less support needed to improve “characteristics”. The 
analysis in this study suggests that there are considerable gaps between access to public 
services and infrastructures of the households residing in the extremely difficult communes 
and the rest of rural Vietnam. Therefore, continuing support to ensure better access for the 
households, especially ethnic minority-headed households is still necessary. In this regards, 
the Government and donors have achieved important improvements. 
However, our experiences in the areas of ethnic minority development suggests that in 
addition to ‘providing access’, the focus of future programs should be placed to improve 
‘quality’ of these access. As noted in Chapter 4 of the current study, the differences in 
quality, which are unobserved and thus cannot be controlled for in our analysis, could be 
an important part of the unequal treatment component of the total income gap across 
different ethnic groups. Therefore, improving the ‘quality’ of access to education, 
healthcare, production support services, and the quality of infrastructure facilities should 
also be a priority. For instance, quality of schools and teaching in minority communities 
need to be upgraded rather than new built and similarly to healthcare services. In some 
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areas, new inter-village or inter-commune car road to villages need to be built, but it is 
probably not as important as upgrading the current road system to improve accessibility, 
especially under heavy rain.  
In this regard, it is important to note that access to infrastructures and public services have 
been significantly improved by numerous programs but repair and maintenance of these 
facilities are in very poor conditions, at least in most of the P135-II communes (Pham et al. 
2009) or in the communes under the Northern Mountain Poverty Reduction Project (World 
Bank, 2007). This poor repair and maintenance has been discussed at times but we 
experienced little improvements to date. Future policy intervention should take this into 
account when prioritizing investment. As emphasized earlier, this could be very expensive 
given the ethnic minorities remain overwhelmingly upland residents.  
Changes in the tools 
Conditional cash transfer should be a piloted before popularizing to the future policies and 
programmes for the poor ethnic minorities 
Following the success of conditional cash transfer projects (CCTs) like PROGRESA24, 
which delivered transfers to poor families in rural Mexico conditional upon schooling or 
regular healthcare visits, many developing countries have implemented similar programs in 
the hopes of increasing family income and stimulating demand for social services. In most 
of the cases, it has been seen that the CCTs worked effectively in ensuring the responsible 
usages of support for accessing to public services in particular and poverty reduction 
support in general. Countries have been adopting or considering adoption of CCT 
programs at a prodigious rate. Virtually every country in Latin America has such a 
program. Elsewhere, there are large-scale programs in Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Turkey, 
and pilot programs in Cambodia, Malawi, Morocco, Pakistan, and South Africa, among 
others. Interest in programs that seek to use cash to incentivize household investments in 
child schooling has spread from developing to developed countries - most recently to 
programs in New York City and Washington, DC. 
Literature on CCT evaluation has noted significant impacts of this mechanisms upon 
schooling, health, infant mortality, child labour, and poverty reduction. Transfers generally 
have been well targeted to poor households, have raised consumption levels, and have 
reduced poverty—by a substantial amount in some countries. In some cases, CCT 
programs often have provided an entry point to reforming badly targeted subsidies and 
                                                 
24
 This is a big programme of Mexico, having an annual budget of US$2.6 billion (equivalent to about 0.5% 
of the country’s GDP). PROGRESA was introduced first under the Rural Program 1997-2000 to cover about 
2.6 million families from 50,000 villages (accounting for nearly 40% of the rural Mexico). Based on the 
success of the PROGRESA, the Urban Expansion 2001-2003 has added about two million families under the 
coverage of the Program. 
80 
 
upgrading the quality of safety nets (see Fiszbein et al. 2010 for a review). There are cases 
of failures observed in the areas where the beneficiaries do not have adequate access to 
public services, making it difficult for them to fulfil the ‘conditions’ applied under such 
CCT schemes. Given the success, albeit at early stages, the CCT mechanism has been wide 
considered as one of the most significant development in social policies in recent years. 
In the context of Vietnam, CCT is a new concept and has not been used within the 
‘mainstream’ poverty reduction policies and programmes. To date, there has had no formal 
explanation why Vietnam has been an ‘outsider’ of the CCT wave in the developing world. 
The starting point of widespread poverty (i.e. more than 58 percent of the population lived 
under the poverty line) in the early 1990s lends a likely explanation. In addition, the focus 
of investment on basic infrastructures and public services might have driven attention away 
from supporting directly to households and/or individuals. While the former is largely 
location-based in nature, the latter is more household-based. Given the predominance of 
location-based support and the high incidence of poverty, there has been little room for 
applying the CCT in most of the past poverty reduction interventions.  
However, after about two decades of poverty reduction, there could now be a room for 
applying CCT schemes. This suggestion is based on a number of reasons. First, significant 
improvements in poverty reduction have been secured, making access to public services 
increasingly available, even in the remote areas. It is therefore feasible now to exercise 
some CCT schemes to stimulate the effective usage of public services and other support. 
Second, applying CCT could provide a ‘push’ for the poor ethnic minorities in using public 
services, evidence noted in chapter 2 show that there are gaps between the majority and the 
ethnic minorities in the level of access to public services in the extremely difficult 
communes – where the availability of these services is the same regardless the ethnic 
groups. This could be taken to suggest that encouraging the poor ethnic minorities to 
utilize the public services and basic infrastructures made available is also an important 
issue. In this regard, applying CCT scheme could be a solution to promote the usage of 
public services and other supports by the ethnic minorities. 
As the CCT mechanism is new to Vietnam, it might be useful to experiment some CCT 
schemes in the first instance in order to raise the awareness and thus acceptance of the 
public (including some key stakeholders) to this concept. One potential area for application 
of the pilot CCT could be in the next stage of the P135 (for the period 2011-2015). As this 
is the experiment to raise awareness on the advantages of this CCT mechanism, a well-
defined planed with structured technical assistance will be most useful. 
Block grants should be also experimented before popularizing to the future policies and 
programmes for the poor ethnic minorities 
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Block grant is a special mechanism applied widely in the developing world for poverty 
reduction intervention. The block grant mechanism is similar to the CCT as described 
above. Perhaps, the most important departure of the block grant from the CCT mechanism 
is the target of these two schemes. While the former is more community based, the latter is 
mainly on the individual or household based. The essential of this block grant mechanism 
is to create an grant that is exclusively for certain community, within the defied lines of 
activities and rules, the community has the autonomy to decide how to spend that grant 
without asking the sponsor(s) for permission. The spirit of having this block grant is to 
facilitate the pro-active usage of the grant by the community. This could serve as a way to 
promote the participation of local authorities, civil society, and inhabitants in planning and 
implementing the activities within the grant available. This is expected to ensure that the 
interventions will reflect the needs of the community without any outside influences. 
Similar to the CCT, the block grant mechanism has recently become popular in the 
developing world but remains a new concept for Vietnam. There are currently some 
experiments by donors-funded projects such as the World Bank Northern Mountain 
Poverty Reduction Project (NMPRP-2), where block grant is introduced to the targeted 
communes in the six poor provinces in the Northern Uplands. The AusAid’s 
Implementation Support Programme (ISP) for the P135-II in Quang Ngai also 
experimented the block grant mechanism under the Commune Development Fund (CDF) 
facility. In both of these two examples, the grant is given for communes under a well-
defined set of expenditure lines and rules. Active participation of the authorities, 
organizations, and people in selecting and managing the implementation of the activities is 
emphasized under both the two schemes. However, as these mechanisms are at the 
beginning stages, it is too early to evaluate how these block grants will exert impacts in the 
targeted areas. 
Under this context, the block grant mechanism should be further experimented before 
popularizing in the future policies and programmes for the poor ethnic minorities. At this 
stage, it is however plausible to postulate that the introduction of this scheme is in line with 
the decentralization approach adopted in the majority of poverty reduction interventions in 
Vietnam. Exercising this mechanism will certainly reinforce a more active role of local 
stakeholders in directing the support to, what they considered, the best for the local context 
and needs. 
Other suggestions 
Better understanding of poverty amongst ethnic minorities.  
The existing database on ethnic minorities is quite patchy. Some datasets, such as 
VHLSSs, allows disaggregation of ethnic minorities into small groups or even individual 
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ethnic groups but observations are not sufficient for each group to infer any reliable 
estimates. In some others, which are the cases of most of other surveys rather than the 
VHLSSs, only some large ethnic groups could be identified. As a consequence, the current 
understanding on ethnic minorities is largely based on a majority-minority dichotomy. This 
dichotomy potentially conceals important differences between individual ethnic groups. 
Poor classification and understanding of ethnic minorities can lead to inaccurate targeting 
of resources, and more accurate local data can help identify the most vulnerable minorities. 
In this regard, making the BLS available to the public could be helpful in having the 
research community involved in producing further research on the poor ethnic minorities. 
In addition, making usage of the recent Population and Housing Census 2009 to depict 
how the ethnic minority groups evolve since the previous Census 1999 will be informative 
in informing any structural changes in demography, allocation, and other important 
characteristics of the ethnic minorities. 
Better understanding of poverty amongst the ethnic minority is apparently needed. As 
mentioned earlier, getting insights on the drivers of the differences in returns to 
characteristics, which explain most of the gap in living condition between different ethnic 
groups is challenging. Given the Vietnamese context, important questions need more 
satisfactory explanation such as are there forms of discrimination against the ethnic 
minority in practices (not by the Constitution, laws, policies, or programmes)? If these 
discriminatory forms exist, how these factors affect living standards of the ethnic minority? 
It is also very important to note that better understanding of cultural differences is needed 
to clear misperception and stereotyping of ethnic minorities. There are significant cultural 
norms in minority communities that often go against trends in the new market oriented 
economy of Vietnam. These cultural norms vary by village and by ethnic groups, making 
one-size-fits all development interventions difficult. Responding to these cultural 
differences is not easy but will be required for more effective policy interventions in the 
future. 
Technical assistance for future policies and programmes for the poor ethnic minorities 
should be more systematic.  
It has been clear that poverty reduction will be more difficult than it was over the past two 
decade for many different reasons. Most significantly, poverty is now focused on ‘pockets’ 
of poverty and become more ‘stubborn’ or ‘resistant’ to poverty reduction interventions. In 
addition, as argued in this report, changes will be desirable in both the approaches, the 
focuses, and the tools of future policies and programmes to tackle poverty. Therefore, there 
is a need for technical assistance associated with the design and implementation of these 
policies/programmes. 
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One priority area for technical assistance is to ensure that implementation provisions (such 
as Manual on Programme guidelines, training documents, etc.) are ready in the early stages 
of the future policies and programmes for the poor ethnic minorities. The case of the P135-
II lends a background for advocating this priority. In fact, there is a significant lead time 
between the start of the P135-II and the issuance of relevant guidelines and manuals. For 
instance, the inter-ministerial Circular No. 1 guiding implementation of P135-II was issued 
in Sept 2008; Bidding Manual in Dec 2008; the Circular No.12 of MARD for the P135-II’s 
Production Support component in Mar 2009. This delay has certainly translated in 
difficulties, especially for the local authorities, to implement the P135-II support 
effectively. 
While arguing for technical assistance, this report also calls for more systematic provision 
of technical support. In fact, technical assistance under the P135-II and other poverty 
reduction programmes have been carried out in unsystematic (or even ad-hoc) manner 
from a variety of consultants, either individual or institutional, when appropriate. This 
allows to take advantage of various knowledge and experience from advisors but reduces 
efficiency of technical assistance because advisors have different levels of knowledge on 
the programme, work quality and different viewpoints. Therefore, more systematic 
provision of technical assistance, probably in a ‘drawn-down’ basis, should be considered 
(especially by the donors) when directing the technical support for the future policies and 
programmes for the poor ethnic minorities. 
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Conclusions 
This report examines the poverty of the ethnic minorities by exploring the baseline survey 
data of the 2nd Stage of the Programme 135 with references to the commonly used 
V(H)LSSs. Taking advantage of having an arguably the most comprehensive dataset on the 
household living standards of the ethnic minorities, this study offers some novel findings to 
our current understanding of the poor ethnic minorities. The key messages of this report 
could be summarized as follows: 
First, through the Government and donors have brought into the extremely difficult 
communes several policies and programmes for poverty reduction, there is a long way 
ahead. Accounting for around 14.5 percent of the population, the ethnic minority now 
constitute more than a half of the poor population in 2008. The share of the poor ethnic 
minorities in the total poor has steadily increased from 18 percent in the early 1990s up to 
56 percent recently. Unless significant improvements in the living standards for the poor 
ethnic minorities are achieved, poverty will be a particularly a phenomenon of ethnic 
minorities in the future. 
Second, there has been significant improvements in the availability of basic infrastructure 
and public services for the ethnic minorities in the extremely difficult communes. 
However, there is a concern on how the ethnic minorities have actually benefited from 
these improvements. The findings suggest that facing the same level of availability of 
infrastructures and public services, the ethnic minorities tend to utilize less than the 
majority from these facilities/services. Having some advantages over the majority in terms 
of landholding (as the most important physical assets of the poor), the ethnic minorities 
have not been able to benefit from this advantage and tend to focus on low productivity 
livelihood activities. 
Third, in attempts to shed lights on the driven forces underlying persistent poverty of the 
ethnic minorities, it was reported that differences in characteristics could explain as much 
as one third of the income gap between the majority and all other ethnic minorities groups. 
Importantly, it implies that poverty of the ethnic minorities cannot be solved simply by 
investment in infrastructures and public services. This suggests an awaking alarm for the 
focus on provision of basic infrastructure and public services emphasized in most of the 
current policies and programmes for ethnic minorities.  
Fourth, the current policies and programmes have not fully addressed the multi facet 
characteristics of poverty among ethnic minorities. The ‘one-size-fit-all’ and ‘average 
equality’ approach, as shown in this report, are not sufficient to achieve the target of 
poverty reduction for the ethnic minorities. It is about the time to call for changes in 
approaches, focuses, and tools of the policies and programmes for the poor ethnic 
minorities. It should be noted that as poverty in this difficult area is stubbornly high, future 
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efforts for poverty reduction for the ethnic minorities will be more expensive compared to 
poverty reduction in the rural areas or to what these were in the past two decades.  
Fifth, among the policy suggestions drawn in this study, we strongly advocated an 
comprehensive framework to support the poor ethnic minorities. In that framework, 
creating incentives to reward the potential and/or well-performed beneficiaries is important 
for allocation of resources within the future policies and programmes for the poor ethnic 
minorities. It is also argued that future interventions need to be more ethnically responsive 
to distinguished characteristics of individual ethnic groups. This could be achieved by 
further decentralization and having this as a central principle of the future policies and 
programmes for the poor ethnic minorities. 
The above messages should be interpreted in the context of this study, which is largely 
based on the baseline survey on the extremely difficult communes covered by the P135. 
Through it could be argued that most of the poor ethnic minorities residing in these 
communes, there could be some ethnic groups or community that are not well captured in 
this context. In addition, as the data was collected about three years ago, there could be 
some additional improvements in living standards of the ethnic minorities in the communes 
under consideration, especially in terms of access to basic infrastructures and public 
services. In addition, it is not possible, due mainly to data availability, within the current 
study to evaluate how the recent economic shocks (e.g. the economic crisis, fluctuations in 
international prices of food and energy). 
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Appendix 
 
Annex 1. The Baseline Study 
As part of the impact evaluation package, the BLS for the P135-II was implemented by the General 
Statistical Office (GSO) in 2007, under the authority of the Committee for Ethnic Minority Affairs 
(CEMA) and with technical assistance from UNDP. This BLS is a first step of the two-stage 
evaluation process of the P135-II. The ultimate objective of this BLS is to establish the initial 
characteristics of communes and households before the onset of the P135-II. It should be noted that 
the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS) 2006 was considered for this objective 
as an alternative to the BLS. However, the content of the VHLSS 2006 does not cover several 
aspects necessary for evaluating the P135-II. In addition, the VHLSS 2006 only provides 
information on the 202 P135-II communes (i.e. equivalent to 12% of the total P135-II coverage) 
(GSO, 2008). In the next stage, the characteristics (concerning the outcome variables) need to be 
compared before and after the Program. This will be the focus of a follow-up survey that is planned 
for 2010. Since changes before or after the program cannot by themselves reveal the potential 
impacts of the Program (as the outcomes observed may be due to other non-program related 
factors), there is a need to select a “control” group. The impact of the program can thus be revealed 
by the “differences in differences” between the “treated” and the “control” group before and after 
the program.  
The treatment group of the BLS consisted of 266 (treated) communes, which were randomly drawn 
from the list of 1,632 targeted communes of the P135-II, which was selected out of 2,359 
communes that have been supported by the P135-I during the period 1998-2005. This selection also 
ensures that the treated communes selected spread over all the provinces that are included in the 
P135-II. This selection is made on the basis of the commune’s characteristics, including poverty 
rate, commune infrastructure situation such as access to road, school, health center, electricity and 
market. In order to construct the control group, it is necessary to find communes which are as 
similar to the P135-II communes as possible. In order to do it, the 2,359 P135-I communes were 
employed. A logistic regression model was adopted to estimate the probability of being selected 
from these 2,359 P135-I communes into the P135-II. The logistic regression equation models the 
probability of being selected to the P135-II on a set of the commune characteristics that capture all 
criteria used by CEMA to select the targeted communes into P135-II such as poverty rates, access 
to road, electricity, school, and health centre (GSO, 2008). A sub-list of the 724 communes that 
‘graduated’ from the P135-I was then obtained with relevant selection probabilities. From this list, 
communes with the selection probabilities higher than the average were identified as potential 
communes for the control group.  Based on these, 134 communes for the control group were 
selected randomly. Given this, the 400 communes surveyed in the BLS could be considered as 
amongst the extremely difficult communes in Vietnam. 
For each commune, one village was randomly selected from the list of all villages. This selection 
method was applied for both control and treatment groups. In each selected village, 15 households 
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were selected for interview. The list of all households in the selected villages, drawn from the 
Agriculture Census 2006, was provided by the GSO. The simple random method was also applied 
to select the household at this stage. Two steps were involved. Firstly, 20 households were 
randomly selected from the list of all households in each selected village and. Secondly, 15 
households out of 20 households were randomly selected from the official list of households for the 
BLS. The remaining five households were used as the reserve for replacement. This process results 
in a sample of 6,000 households for the BLS. As households were randomly from the 400 
communes that were not randomly selected, sampling weights were used to obtained unbiased 
results reported in this study.  
The BLS had a household module and a commune module. The household questionnaire mirrored 
that of the VHLSS 2006 (see Nguyen and Phung, 2007 for the details of the VHLSS) with two 
substantial modifications. First, the (sub)sections on expenditures, assets, savings, housing used in 
the VHLSS were dropped. The content of the remaining sections were simplified to exclude 
questions that were not relevant to the Program. Second, new sections/questions were added on the 
participation of the P135-II households in the projects supported by the Program. Similar to the 
household questionnaire, the commune questionnaire also mirrored that of the VHLSS 2006 with 
certain modifications. The VHLSS's sections on general information, infrastructure conditions, 
access to public services (i.e. schools, healthcare services) were simplified. New sections on the 
projects carried out over the past 12 months at communes, land endowments, nonfarm income-
generating opportunities were added to the commune questionnaire (GSO, 2008). These two 
modules were then used to collect the information from the households in the sample during a 
period going from 4th September to 25th November 2007.  
Pham et al (2009) was the first to explore this dataset in order to inform the baseline performance 
indicators for the P135-II. Their analysis suggests that this BLS is of high quality and could be used 
to provide a snapshot on the multifaceted poverty of the ethnic minorities. Our thorough 
investigation of the dataset shows that this is a dataset of high quality. Particularly, this is probably 
the most comprehensive dataset that focuses on ethnic minorities available up to date.  
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Annex 2. Dimensions of Analysis 
Throughout the report we have analyzed living standards of the households residing in the 
extremely difficult communes from different angles. In addition to average indicators which 
statistically represent the whole population in the areas we also provide analysis according to 
different dimensions identified by ethnic groups, spatial regions, gender of the household head, and 
languages used in the daily life.  
At household level, we divide the households into 14 groups of ethnicity. Our classification is 
based on two criteria: the similarities of different ethnic groups and the number of observations to 
ensure the credibility of statistical inferences. The 14 ethnic groups include the majority (Kinh 
people are the majority living all over the country while Hoa people are minority living mainly in 
Ho Chi Minh City and some provinces in Mekong River Delta), Tày, Thái, Mường, Nùng, Mông, 
Dao and Other minorities in Northern Uplands, Bana, H’re, Cơ Tu, and Other minorities in Central 
Highlands, Khmer and Others. With this classification in the BLS sample, the smallest group 
(Bana) contains 90 observations. Having the Hoa in the majority group could be controversial. 
However, the Hoa (i.e. Chinese) accounted for less than 0.7 percent of the total sample (i.e. 41 
households), therefore merging the Hoa to the majority group is not a problem to treat the Kinh in 
our analysis. Having the majority together in one group will facilitate comparison with the previous 
studies on poverty in Vietnam. The number of observations allows us to draw statistical inferences 
with high credibility. Table A1 below summarizes the number of observations for each ethnic 
group available in the baseline survey. 
Table A1 Distribution of household observations among 14 ethnic groups 
Ethnic group Observations Percent 
Majority 1,282 21.49 
Tày 753 12.62 
Thái 584 9.79 
Mường 498 8.35 
Nùng 292 4.90 
Mông 808 13.55 
Dao 578 9.69 
Others in Northern Uplands 211 3.54 
Bana 90 1.51 
H're 120 2.01 
Cơ Tu 90 1.51 
Others in Central Highlands 309 5.18 
Khmer 133 2.23 
Others 217 3.64 
Source: authors’ calculation from the BLS 
We also draw statistical inferences for groups of households identified by geographical regions. 
Taking into account the geographical characteristics of regions in Vietnam, it has been a 
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convention to divide the country into the eight spatial regions, including: Red River Delta, North 
East, North West, North Central Coast, South Central Coast, Central Highlands, South East, and 
Mekong River Delta. It is worth noting that, the regions not only differ in geographical aspects but 
they are also associated with locations of residence of ethnicities. For instance, Tày people mostly 
concentrate in Lang Son, Cao Bang, Tuyen Quang, Ha Giang, Bac Kan, and Thai Nguyen 
provinces of North East region; Khơ me people, however, live mostly in Soc Trang, Tra Vinh, Bac 
Lieu, Ca Mau and Kien Giang provinces of Mekong River Delta region. Using the eight regions in 
our analysis has one pitfall as the Red River Delta has only 75 observations (i.e. 1.3 percent of the 
total sample). However, merging this region into any other regions is not plausible due to its own 
geographical characteristics. Therefore, we adopted the classification of these eight regions but will 
not focus on the indicators calculated for the Red River Delta in our analysis. 
As the main objective of this study is to provide insights on living standards of the ethnic minority 
at the most disaggregate ethnicity classification, we have tried to identify main ethnic minority 
groups in each regions. It is believed that the Tay, Thai, Muong, Nung residing in the Northern 
Uplands could be different from those Tay, Thai, Muong, Nung who migrated to the Central 
Highlands during the 1980s and 1990s. This tabulation using both regional and ethnicity 
dimensions might provide us some further insights on within-group differences. However, such 
classification results in very small sizes for sub-samples of ethnic groups in each regions (with 
exception of the North West and North Central Coast) and thus not employed in this analysis. 
In addition, the baseline survey allows us to categorize households into three groups according to 
the language they use in everyday life. The three groups are: (i) those who speak only their ethnic 
language or mostly ethnic language, (ii) those who speak both (mixed) ethnic language and the 
Kinh language, and (iii) only Kinh language or with little ethnic language. There are also 188 
observations who speak only the Kinh language. But as this group accounted for nearly three 
percent of the total sample, we put this group into the category (iii) as above.  
For the analyses at the commune level, we calculate the averages using the whole commune sample 
and the eight regions. In addition, we create an ‘ethnicity’ indicator at commune level to keep our 
focus on the ethnicity dimension. Using the household-level data, for each commune in the baseline 
survey we identify the ethnicity with the largest population in the community. Then, the communes 
are divide into seven groups of most populated ethnicity, including the majority, Tày, Thái, 
Mường, Nùng, Mông, Dao and Others. Once again, the ethnic classification follows the two criteria 
we discussed above. As we see in Table A2 which shows the number of communes in each ethnic 
group, Nùng group has smallest size with 17 communes. Other groups have sizes big enough for 
reliable statistical inferences.  
Table A2. Distribution of commune observations among seven ethnic groups 
Ethnic group Observations Percent 
Majority 78 19.50 
Tày 54 13.50 
Thái 38 9.50 
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Mường 36 9.00 
Nùng 17 4.25 
H'Mông 55 13.75 
Dao 39 9.75 
Others 83 20.75 
Source: authors’ calculation from the BLS 
Regarding the spatial dimension at the commune-level analysis, we added Red River Delta and 
Southeast together as these two regions accounted for 5 and 12 observations respectively. This 
grouping is to avoid potential errors in statistical inferences due to very small sample sizes. 
However, this does not make practical sense to merge these two regions. Therefore, we merged the 
two regions purely for technical purpose, the commune-level analysis will not be based on the data 
calculated for this group. 
Finally, we analyze the commune-level indicators at the third dimension identified by the 
geographical characteristics of the communes. At this dimension, 400 communes are divided into 3 
groups including: (i) communes in low land areas, (ii) communes in low mountains, and (iii) 
communes in high mountain areas. In our sample, there is one costal commune and two midland 
communes and these are merged into the first group of communes in the low land areas. 
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Annex 3. The Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition Methodology 
This study adopts the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition approach to investigate empirically the 
income gap across different ethnic groups. In the first instance, the essence of this approach applied 
for decomposing the income gap using the ‘conventional’ majority-minority dichotomous will be 
outlined. Separate equations describing the determination of log per capita household income are 
specified for the majority (majority) and minority groups as follows: 
mmmm ' uβxy +=                                                       [1] 
eeee ' uβxy +=                                                          [2]  
where yj denotes the per capita household income expressed in natural logarithms for the jth ethnic 
group (where j = m or e denoting the majority and minority groups respectively),  xj is a (k × n) 
matrix of household characteristics (e.g., household structure, education of members, household 
landholding) and community characteristics (e.g., infrastructure conditions); β is a (k × 1) vector of 
unknown parameters capturing the effect of the relevant covariates on log per capita expenditure; uj 
is a (n × 1) vector of random error terms for which the standard assumptions apply for estimation 
by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). 25 
Using the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition approach (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973), the estimated 
mean ethnic difference in log per capita household expenditure can be expressed as:   
)ββ('xβ)'xx(yy emememem ˆˆˆ −+−=−                                     [3] 
where the ‘bar’ denotes mean values and the ‘hat’ denotes OLS coefficient estimates, and the 
subscripts m and e denote the majority and ethnic minority groups. This allows the overall average 
differential in household expenditure between the two ethnic groups to be decomposed into a part 
attributable to differences in characteristics (known as the ‘explained’ or ‘endowment’ component) 
and a part attributable to differences in the estimated returns to characteristics between majority 
and minority households (known as the ‘ ‘treatment’, ‘residual’ or ‘unexplained’ component). The 
final part of expression [3] is sometimes taken to reflect the degree of unequal treatment or 
discrimination against ethnic minorities. This approach assumes that in the absence of unequal 
treatment the majority group’s coefficient structure prevails.26  Given that these components are 
(log) linear in the estimated parameters, their sampling variances can be computed with ease.   
The framework described from [1] to [3] above will then be used to decompose the welfare gap 
between each of the thirteen ethnic groups (see Annex 2 for details) and the majority group. By this 
decomposition, this study will provide insights on the ethnic welfare gap at the most disaggregate 
level possible. Instead of using the subscript e for the whole population of ethnic minorities, each 
                                                 
25
 In the mean regression analysis, the effects of clustering and stratification are taken into account in the 
estimation of the per capita log expenditure equation’s coefficient standard errors through exploiting the 
individual survey’s sample design features.   
26
 The minority coefficient structure could be also assumed to prevail in the absence of unequal treatment.  
This can yield numerically different values for the component parts compared to expression [3] due to a 
conventional index-number problem. 
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of the ten ethnic groups will be in turn investigated in comparison with the majority group using 
the above estimation framework. 
As suggested by the literature, the set of regressors used in the decomposition framework above 
consist of various household and community characteristics. At the household level, demographic 
factors (i.e. household size, proportion of children aged from zero to six years old, proportion of 
children aged from seven to 16, proportion of male adults, proportion of female adults, types of 
households (i.e. nuclear family or different types of extended families)) qualifications of the most 
educated household members, and household landholdings (annual cropland, perennial land, and 
forestry) are specified. At the commune level, access to key infrastructure facilities (road to 
commune, road to village, public transportation, electricity grid, post office, cultural house, 
irrigation scheme, radio station) are included in the set of explanatory factors. In addition, as the 
extremely difficult communes have received several supports from the Government and donors, 
accesses to different programmes and supports, such as job creation, poverty alleviation, 
healthcare, culture and education, economic growth, environmental protection could have impact 
on household income, and thus should be included in the specification. Finally, whether the 
commune is the P135-II commune or not is included in the set of regressors used for our empirical 
analysis. A statistical summary of these variables is given in the Table A3 (see Annex 4). 
  
Annex 3. Other Statistics 
Table A3 Summary Statistics of major variables used in the income regression analysis 
K-H EMs Tay Thai Muong Nung H'Mong Dao Others in NU Bana H're 
Co 
Tu 
Others 
in CH Khmer Others 
Log of per capita income 8.33 7.80 7.91 7.80 7.96 7.87 7.46 7.77 7.71 7.60 7.66 7.80 7.59 8.14 7.59 
Household size 4.15 5.02 4.51 5.33 4.30 4.68 6.04 5.34 5.35 5.55 4.38 5.48 5.55 4.25 5.21 
Proportion of children aged from 6 to 15 0.18 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.18 0.22 0.27 0.26 0.29 0.21 0.19 0.24 0.27 0.21 0.21 
Proportions of male adult aged from 16 0.34 0.30 0.33 0.31 0.33 0.32 0.25 0.30 0.26 0.28 0.32 0.27 0.26 0.31 0.27 
Proportions of female adult aged from 16 0.38 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.37 0.35 0.27 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.37 0.30 0.29 0.36 0.28 
Household type: parents and one child 0.17 0.12 0.13 0.09 0.18 0.15 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.19 0.11 0.08 0.17 0.09 
Household type: parents and two child 0.27 0.23 0.29 0.21 0.28 0.20 0.13 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.14 0.18 0.30 0.19 
Household type: parents and more than 2 child 0.19 0.27 0.20 0.27 0.14 0.21 0.39 0.25 0.46 0.38 0.15 0.48 0.42 0.21 0.36 
Household type: three-generation 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.18 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.20 0.07 0.19 0.26 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.08 
Household type: other types 0.17 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.29 0.23 0.24 0.15 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.22 
Gender of household head 0.80 0.89 0.89 0.95 0.88 0.89 0.95 0.93 0.91 0.88 0.87 0.94 0.84 0.73 0.89 
Most educated: primary 0.48 0.33 0.26 0.38 0.20 0.32 0.29 0.36 0.44 0.41 0.31 0.27 0.44 0.38 0.33 
Most educated: lower secondary 0.24 0.27 0.37 0.28 0.43 0.33 0.18 0.26 0.18 0.11 0.27 0.44 0.20 0.16 0.19 
Most educated: upper secondary 0.27 0.09 0.17 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.04 
Most educated: vocational training 0.30 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.11 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.06 
Annual cropland (1000m2) 0.11 7.29 3.79 7.85 4.73 5.11 12.28 8.77 13.5 11.7 6.9 7.6 7.94 4.36 7.55 
Perennial land (1000m2) 0.14 1.35 1.16 1.07 2.07 2.27 0.66 2.13 0.60 0.81 4.76 0.34 3.42 0.48 0.81 
Forestry land (1000m2) 0.48 9.48 13.18 11.13 7.55 12.18 6.23 25.31 22.7 0.82 5.77 2.59 0.21 0.00 1.35 
Having road to commune 0.09 0.95 0.93 0.89 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.94 1.00 1.00 0.73 0.85 0.98 1.00 
Having road to villages 0.65 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.94 0.72 0.48 0.67 0.68 1.00 0.77 0.66 0.81 0.53 0.93 
Having public transportation 0.45 0.23 0.24 0.27 0.39 0.04 0.03 0.15 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.32 0.42 0.37 
Having national electric grid 0.95 0.85 0.99 0.72 0.93 0.98 0.55 0.88 0.68 1.00 1.00 0.69 0.89 1.00 1.00 
Having post office 0.27 0.90 0.97 0.90 0.89 0.92 0.80 0.94 0.91 1.00 1.00 0.54 0.87 0.97 0.81 
Access to cultural house 0.26 0.21 0.20 0.44 0.25 0.10 0.10 0.19 0.49 0.17 0.04 0.20 0.34 0.02 0.05 
Access to health centres 0.29 0.40 0.34 0.20 0.44 0.17 0.19 0.30 0.49 0.01 0.64 0.36 0.68 0.88 0.63 
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Access to small irrigation 0.08 0.63 0.65 0.64 0.54 0.58 0.48 0.71 0.63 0.51 0.78 0.79 0.57 0.79 0.66 
Access to market 0.18 0.34 0.36 0.23 0.55 0.22 0.37 0.38 0.21 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.59 0.14 
Having job creation project 0.42 0.18 0.27 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.13 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.48 0.33 0.11 0.39 0.18 
Having poverty reduction project 0.14 0.43 0.63 0.33 0.24 0.52 0.53 0.63 0.52 0.51 0.83 0.21 0.38 0.09 0.51 
Having economic development project 0.28 0.18 0.29 0.11 0.32 0.08 0.15 0.16 0.03 0.17 0.28 0.24 0.27 0.08 0.25 
Having cultural and education project 0.38 0.28 0.14 0.28 0.47 0.27 0.33 0.39 0.50 0.57 0.42 0.41 0.35 0.00 0.46 
Having healthcare project 0.25 0.13 0.05 0.19 0.15 0.10 0.23 0.11 0.61 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.01 
Having environmental project 0.21 0.27 0.23 0.11 0.32 0.28 0.23 0.31 0.23 0.72 0.60 0.28 0.22 0.45 0.25 
Source: authors’ calculation from the BLS 
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Table A4 Income regression results for the majority, the Ethnic Minority, Tay, Thai, Muong, H’mong 
majority EMs Tay Thai Muong H'mong 
Household size -0.0196 -0.0774*** -0.1353*** -0.0435* -0.0566 -0.0972*** 
[0.045] [0.012] [0.023] [0.025] [0.04] [0.011] 
Proportion of children aged from 6 to 15 0.3684 0.4034*** 0.3718** 0.0162 0.6814** 0.2374** 
[0.267] [0.116] [0.152] [0.183] [0.266] [0.108] 
Proportions of male adult aged from 16 0.4644** 0.917*** 0.5538*** 0.1226 1.0209*** 0.2581 
[0.232] [0.177] [0.183] [0.484] [0.255] [0.178] 
Proportions of female adult aged from 16 0.4093 0.6935*** 0.37 0.4645 0.2491 0.1885 
[0.288] [0.171] [0.239] [0.374] [0.335] [0.157] 
Household type: parents and one child 0.1249 -0.0107 0.1249 -0.3645* -0.3391 -0.3987*** 
[0.138] [0.111] [0.276] [0.25] [0.262] [0.128] 
Household type: parents and two child -0.1727 -0.0245 -0.1443 -0.4478* -0.513** -0.5043*** 
[0.166] [0.099] [0.233] [0.246] [0.243] [0.137] 
Household type: parents and more than 2 child -0.3628* -0.1106 -0.2538 -0.5302** -0.6275** -0.555*** 
[0.217] [0.11] [0.274] [0.264] [0.273] [0.126] 
Household type: three-generation 0.0834 -0.1548 -0.1737 -0.6506*** -0.6207** -0.5269*** 
[0.24] [0.118] [0.291] [0.243] [0.285] [0.142] 
Household type: other types -0.1111 -0.1207 -0.1259 -0.6898*** -0.4945* -0.4878*** 
[0.156] [0.104] [0.265] [0.238] [0.26] [0.134] 
Gender of household head -0.0357 -0.0807 0.0605 0.1709 -0.0347 0.134* 
[0.133] [0.105] [0.115] [0.142] [0.156] [0.081] 
Most educated: primary -0.1112 0.1438*** 0.2537*** 0.1792* 0.0577 0.1264** 
[0.14] [0.042] [0.072] [0.112] [0.148] [0.049] 
Most educated: lower secondary 0.022 0.2398*** 0.3353*** 0.309*** 0.2393** 0.1765*** 
[0.126] [0.047] [0.083] [0.094] [0.1] [0.063] 
Most educated: upper secondary 0.1932 0.4487*** 0.6437*** 0.5497*** 0.2875*** 0.2999** 
[0.15] [0.073] [0.107] [0.139] [0.103] [0.125] 
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Most educated: vocational training 0.7378*** 0.8295*** 0.9368*** 1.0034*** 0.9681*** 0.553*** 
[0.162] [0.124] [0.129] [0.155] [0.148] [0.122] 
Annual cropland (1000m2) 0.0134*** 0.0168*** 0.0353*** 0.0167*** 0.0121* 0.0213*** 
[0.001] [0.003] [0.013] [0.005] [0.007] [0.002] 
Perennial land (1000m2) 0.0046 0.0037* 0.0017 0.0023 -0.0003 0.0012 
[0.004] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] 
Forestry land (1000m2) 0.0008 0.0001 0.0017*** -0.0001 0.0023*** 0.0036** 
[0.001] [0] [0.001] [0] [0.001] [0.001] 
Having road to commune 0.246* 0.0502 0.1617 0.1005 0.9029** -0.1928 
[0.135] [0.095] [0.137] [0.19] [0.442] [0.298] 
Having road to villages -0.073 -0.0631 0.1052 0.0239 -1.1152*** -0.0557 
[0.12] [0.065] [0.091] [0.11] [0.415] [0.057] 
Having public transportation -0.1282 0.0888* 0.1222 0.353*** 0.2415*** -0.2163*** 
[0.112] [0.053] [0.102] [0.128] [0.08] [0.067] 
Having national electric grid 0.2107 0.0708 0.2486 0.0506 0.0887 0.0586 
[0.285] [0.066] [0.219] [0.089] [0.156] [0.05] 
Having post office -0.094 -0.0686 -0.2297** -0.1904 -0.0878 -0.1681*** 
[0.202] [0.061] [0.105] [0.125] [0.101] [0.055] 
Access to cultural house 0.0561 0.0387 -0.0022 0.2028* 0.2348*** 0.3033*** 
[0.084] [0.061] [0.077] [0.11] [0.087] [0.079] 
Access to health centres 0.0844 0.0253 -0.3234*** -0.0765 -0.1705 0.1437** 
[0.102] [0.056] [0.096] [0.126] [0.125] [0.062] 
Access to small irrigation -0.0138 0.1055** -0.0594 -0.0398 -0.0935 0.1758*** 
[0.106] [0.051] [0.067] [0.098] [0.105] [0.058] 
Access to market -0.0796 -0.0329 0.1596** -0.2243** 0.1191 0.1019* 
[0.118] [0.051] [0.081] [0.116] [0.092] [0.059] 
Having job creation project 0.2635* 0.0049 -0.3577*** -0.1512 -0.7125* 0.0339 
[0.158] [0.074] [0.138] [0.168] [0.428] [0.061] 
Having poverty reduction project -0.2016** -0.1827*** -0.035 -0.098 -0.0126 0.0933 
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[0.102] [0.049] [0.08] [0.083] [0.091] [0.061] 
Having economic development project -0.1825* 0.0043 -0.1724* -0.0124 -0.0498 -0.0249 
[0.105] [0.051] [0.09] [0.159] [0.07] [0.064] 
Having cultural and education project -0.2092* 0.0787* 0.0794 0.3092*** 0.1713* 0.0912** 
[0.125] [0.046] [0.083] [0.114] [0.089] [0.045] 
Having healthcare project 0.3243** -0.0043 -0.0309 0.1926* -0.2136 -0.0521 
[0.142] [0.071] [0.179] [0.116] [0.154] [0.064] 
Having environmental project -0.0526 0.0712 -0.1231* 0.0054 0.23* -0.056 
[0.093] [0.058] [0.074] [0.137] [0.121] [0.061] 
P135 communes -0.1036 -0.1071* -0.1021 0.0257 -0.0788 -0.1404** 
[0.089] [0.061] [0.096] [0.085] [0.072] [0.066] 
Constant 7.846*** 7.4437*** 7.7025*** 7.6327*** 7.8523*** 8.0939*** 
[0.391] [0.215] [0.404] [0.38] [0.47] [0.352] 
R squared 0.307 0.2652 0.2866 0.3273 0.2908 0.3474 
Number of obs. 1264 4591 751 584 443 792 
Notes:  
(a) ***, **, and * denotes statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively; 
(b)  Standard errors are reported in parentheses; 
(c)  Regression results for income analysis of the other ethnic groups are available from authors upon request but not reported here for brevity. 
 
